dience to himself, when he had deliberately trained him up in such a manner as to destroy his moral ability; that it would not be just for a sovereign to torment an innocent creature for his own glory; that God, having given existence to men, without their consent, will deal justly with his creatures. This idea of justice is common to all men however they may differ with regard to the nature of certain particular actions. We have no other notion of justice, nor can we conceive any. The only knowledge we have of it is derived from our own consciousness and experience. And these lead us to conclude, that if there is the attribute of justice in the nature of God, it is a justice which will induce him to be just not only to himself, but also to his creatures. This attribute in God we believe Calvinism does not recognize.

In defence of this position, as unexceptional authority as any to which we can resort, is the Westminster Confession of Faith; a standard of the Presbyterian Church. We admit indeed, that this work applies the term justice, as well as goodness and mercy, to the Supreme Being more than once. Nay, it makes his justice so severe and inexorable, that man could not be forgiven, unless an innocent being, by "the perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself," had "purchased" reconciliation, and "fully discharged the debt" of those who are justified, or, in other words, "made a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice on their behalf"(a)-thus really denying his mercy to exalt his righteousness. We think it will be apparent, however, on a careful inquiry, that it intends, and recognizes no other justice in God but that by which he is bound to respect himself-a sort of justice, which, so far from necessarily implying the idea of rectitude, as we understand rectitude, might, it is obvious, be an attribute of a supreme tyrant.

In this confession, the supreme and ultimate motive to action ascribed to God is his own glory.(b) For it represents him as "working all things, according to the counsel of his own immutable and most righteous will, for his own glory."(c) "By the decree of God," it adds, "for the manifestation of this glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting

(a) Ch. VIII. 5.—XI. 3.

(b) It will be seen that we are not attempting to show that Calvinism makes God unjust, but only that it does not recognize the attribute of justice. "It cannot,” says Edwards. "be any injustice in God to determine [decree] who is certainly to sin, and so certainly to be damned."—"Miscellaneous Observations on the Divine Decrees. Ed. Works, Vol. V. p. 354, which on the assumption that there is no justice in God, properly considered, is very true.

(c) Ch. II. 1.

life, and others foreordained to everlasting death."(a) The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he withholdeth or extendeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain then to dishoro: and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."(b) We presume that no Calvinist will be disposed to deny that the meaning of all this is at least, that God's highest and last motive to action is his own glory. In our view, it means more. It makes glory the sole motive. For to say that all things are done for one and the same end, which is to say that nothing is done for any other end, is to exclude the idea of any other end, and consequently, every motive except the accomplishment of that end. Hence, that God has ever acted on the principles of justice, or that the attribute of justice belongs to his nature, it is impossible to determine. would be impossible to affirm it, even were there events in the divine administration which should approve themselves to our notions of rectitude. For a being whose sole motive is his own glory, may sometimes do acts apparently just, but they can be only accidentally such. They cannot prove that he is a just being; for if actions of an opposite character would more certainly accomplish the end, they would be performed. An act of a tyrant, though just, may be dictated only by his selfishness, nor can it afford the slightest proof that he will ever do another act of the same nature. In the case of a being governed solely by a regard to his own glory; all actions both good and bad, proceed from the same source, and illustrate the same selfish purpose. Thus, to advert to a doctrine professed by some of those who framed the Westminster Confession of Faith; and which led them to speak of "elect infants" in that document (c)-the salvation of the elect, and the damnation of the infant, would equally illustrate the divine glory. We conclude, therefore, that to represent the glory of God as the end of all his actions, is to make it impossible to determine whether the attribute of jus ice belongs to him?

(a) III. 3. (b) III. 7.

(c) "As to those who are condemned to eternal death solely on account of original sin, their condemnation to eternal death is the conseqnence of Adam's transgression alone. But many infants depart from this life in original sin, and consequently are condemned to death solely on account of original sin; therefore, the condemnation of many infants to eternal death is the consequence of Adam's transgression alone."-Twissi, Gul, vindiciae Gratial, Potestatis, ac Providential Dei, etc. Edit. ult. fol. Amst. 1638. Lib. I. Parsprim, sec. 2. p. 43. This horrible doctrine of infant damnation is a genuine shoot from the stock of Calvinism, as the elder Calvinists well knew, and did not flinch from asserting. Nor do we see how any Calvinist "in good consistence with himself" can deny it.

Such an attribute he may possess, as man has dormant faculties; but we cannot know it. We do not know that he has ever acted upon it. To us it is as if it were not.

If it shall still be pretended that the attribute of justice belongs to the divine nature, it must be that sort of justice by which he is bound to respect himself, and no other—a justice which gives us no assurance except that he will exert his power to effect his own purposes-and which may belong to any despot. That this in the only sense in which the Confession of Faith ascribes the attributes of justice to God, we shall now proceed to show on unquestionable authority. For this purpose we need only make a few references to Dr. Twiss, the prolocutor or speaker of the assembly of divines by whom it was framed, and who has recently been extolled by a high authority in the Presbyterian church as its "living expositor." "If we can refer to him, it is as if we could call Washington, or Jefferson; or Hamilton, or Adams, and question them concerning the meaning of a passage in the Declaration of Independence."(a)

In the work to which we have referred in the last paragraph but one, this thorough and unflinching advocate of Calvinism, maintains that God is not bound to manifest his justice at all. "For," speaking of predestination and reprobation, he says, "these acts do not proceed from mercy and justice as their immediate source, but from an unlimited liberty of action. Nor is he [God] bound at all to manifest either his mercy or his justice. In accordance with this, he has a digression in which he attempts to prove, that God may torment an innocent creature at pleasure (probatur posse Deum creaturam immerentem affligere, seu pro libito cruciare.) In this digression he proceeds to prove-I, that God may torment an innocent creature at pleasure; 2, that he may torment him forever without violating his justice; 3, that he may inflict on him the pains of hell (pœnam infernalem)—nay, that he may torment him to an infinite degree-(in infinitum.)(c) Again, in language

(a) Dr. Beecher. See report of his "Trial and acquittal before the Presbytery of Cincinnati, on charges preferred by Joshua L. Wilson, D. D. Cincinnati, 1835,” pp. 44 and 99.

(b) Lib. I. Parsprim. Sec. 2, P. 43.

(c) Lib. I. Parsprim. Degr. I. pp. 326-7-We translate "pains of hell," because the author says elsewhere, that he does not use the word punishment in such a connection, in a retributive sense. He does not assert that God may inflict on an innocent creature the punishment of hell, but only the infinite torments thereof; that is, he is at liberty to torment an innocent creature as he pleases, but it would be improper to ascribe such torments to his justice as their source Thus in arguing against an illogical order of the divine decrees laid down by Piscator, he says that "the condemnation of the reprobate has greater adaptedness [congruen

hardly less revolting, he says, "The sin of Adam, I acknowledge, was not ours as if committed in our proper persons, it was rather the sin of our nature than of our persons. But we existed even then in the loins of Adam, as Levi in the loins of Abraham, when he paid tythes to Melchizedeck, and this sin is made ours by the imputation of God, so that it has exposed innumerable infants, guilty of this sin and no other, to divine wrath. ** * *These judgments of God are tremendous, I confess, but just. Nor are they to be brought before the tribunal of human wisdom or justice, or to be weighed or set aside by our rules of reason or equity. Especially since God the Creator is at liberty to treat a creature, however innocent, in any manner he pleases, whether he is pleased to annihilate him, or to inflict upon him any torture whatever."(a) Now to affirm that God is not bound to manifest his justice and assert that he may inflict infinite torments on innocent creatures, would seem to be not very far from denying his justice altogether. No one, therefore, will be surprised, we think, to hear him say, that "there is no justice in God properly so called in respect to his creatures; that is, by which he is bound to respect them;" and still more emphatically, "I acknowledge no other justice in God but that by which he wisely [fitly] orders all things to effect his own purposes."(b)

This, it is very true as our readers, we suppose, need not be told, is not justice, or any thing like it. Nevertheless, it is all that Calvinism allows for the comfort of the human creature. Nor will it be denied, we think, that what is so emphatically asserted by this living expositor to whom we have referred, cannot be very far from the intention of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith.

We have now only to inquire how we know, on the principles of Calvinism, that the judge of all the earth will do right? What evidence have we of all this? So far as we can discern, none whatever. To say that he will be just to himself, and faithfully do whatever is necessary to accomplish his own detrain] to the manifestation of the divine justice. For condemnation is the act of the judge, and should proceed according to retributive justice. But justice does no: appear in the damnation of the reprobate. For justice condems none but the guilty. But to be a reprobate, by no means signifies to merit damnation."-Lib. I. Pars. I. sec. 4, p. 52: the meaning of which we take to be that justice may condemn only the guilty; but the divine sovereignty may damn the innocent.

(a) Lib. III. Sec. 5, Errat. 6. p. 687.

(b) Lib. II. Pars. I. 5, pp. 325-426. Elsewhere he says, "I conclude, therefore, that that justice [in respect to the creature] by which it is pretended the divine liberty is bounded, is a chimera, founded on none, or no tolerable reason or right." -Lib. I. Parstat. Digr. I. p 287.

crees, is to say nothing to the purpose. The great question with which we are concerned is, whether he will be just to others besides himself;-whether he will be just to his creatures after having given them existence without their consent. To pretend that he will do righteously, when it is denied that he possesses any other attribute of justice but that by which he is bound to respect himself, is to follow a method not very unlike that of certain sermons we have lately seen, which after demonstrating that man has naturally no moral ability to obey the will of God, make it the first inference that he is inexcusable for not obeying. We ask it again, what surety have we that God will deal justly with his creatures? How do we know that it is not consistent with the divine glory that a race of beings should be created as the express victims of the divine vengeance, and that we are not such beings? What surety have we that he has not revealed to us his laws in the spirit of bitter mockery, aware that he has created us with such natures that its impossible we should obey them? How do we know that he may not have created us with such dispositions that we shall inevitably sin and only sin, forever, and at the close of our mortal career, as the foreordained consequence of this necessary sin, be plunged without remedy into the gulf of everlasting agonies? In fine, how do we know that he is not an "almighty torturer?"* If Calvinism be true we cannot tell. Possibly we may belong to the few elect. But we cannot know it, we are at the mercy of a being of whose moral character we know nothing; and he is only bound to reepect himself.

We have only another word to say. Of all the questions in agitation between Unitarianism and orthodoxy, none are so important as those which concern the moral character of God. For this is the central subject of religion. All other questions compared with these are of inferior moment. Whether God exists in one or three persons-what metaphysical view we are to take of his nature-is a subject, which in its own sphere is interesting, and important. But the great question, the question with which we are most concerned is, what is God to us? What is his moral nature? What are the grounds of our confidence in him? And what the ground of moral and spiritual union with him? Here, we believe, Unitarianism and Calvinism are totally opposed, having hardly a sentiment in common. Calvinism, as we understand it, rests on the divine sovereignty, and on that alone; Unitarianism as we understand it, recognises the same attribute as the centre of all (a) Channing.