in placing the sovereignty, conceded by man on passing from the state of nature into society, in the community, instead of an absolute Prince. We have had occasion previously to observe how strongly Locke was affected by the writings of Hobbes, more often, to be sure, in the way of repulsion than attraction. A leading doctrine in Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, is the same that Hobbes endeavors to establish in the Leviathan, the doctrine that the substance of Christianity, as preached by the Apostles, is the proposition that "Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah." Before Locke, however, Algernon Sidney, in his Discourses concerning Government, had broached the theory of a contract. Montesquieu, though a friend of limited monarchy after the English model, is considered by Leo (who is a hater of free government) to have paved the way for the revolutionary philosophy of Rousseau, by making virtue a defining characteristic and only support of popular, as distinguished from Aristocratic or Monarchical government.* The word Contract, in a special application to the relation of king and people in the English Constitution, is found in the great vote of the Houses of Parliament, which declared vacant the throne of James I., and made room for the accession of William. In the medley of reasons (for all writers acknowledge it to be a medley) given for their act, James is charged with "having endeavored to subvert the Constitution of this kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people." Such a contract is thus declared to be involved in the English Constitution. Here a nice and interesting question arises, whether the reference was to a primary, unwritten contract, implied in the existence of a government of law, a social compact,-or to some positive feature and It is amusing to notice, by the by, how most German writers undervalue Locke, not seeing the noble points of his character in their dislike of his philosophical tendencies. Speaking of his general views, Leo says: "Experience to him is everything. It is a special retribution (ganz bensondere Strafe) inflicted by God upon the sins of the English nation in the seventeenth century, that their foremost minds must sink down to this wretchedness." S. 730. Most persons having English blood in their veins, will not be disposed to complain of such 'retributions" as John Locke. express provision of the English system. Hallam would seem to incline to the former interpretation. He says that this position was "rather too theoretical, yet necessary at that time, as denying the divine origin of monarchy, from which its absolute and indefeasible authority had been plausibly derived."* He also remarks: "they proceeded not by the stated rules of the English government, but the general rights of mankind. They looked not so much to Magna Charta as the original compact of society, and rejected Coke and Hale, for Hooker and Harrington."+ Macaulay, speaking of the inconsistent statements of the great vote, there being one reason put in for each section of the majority who were relied on to pass it, says that "the mention of the original contract gratified the disciples of Sidney." Macaulay defends the inexact and confused character of the vote, on grounds of expediency, as the proper way to secure unanimity; remarking that the essence of politics is compromise." But Mackintosh, with more reason, declares that it would have been manlier to fall back openly upon the right of revolution, instead of mixing up the pretense of an abdication.§ In the trial of Sacheverell, the sense of this vote and the character of the Revolution, of which it was a part, were deliberately expounded by the managers of the impeachment. Sacheverell had coupled with his doctrine of absolute submission the assertion that the revolution was not a case of resistance. But the managers of the prosecution did not allow him to shield himself by this mode of approving of the revolution. They affirmed that it was a case of forcible resistance, and that his principle of non-resistance, being a virtual condemnation of it, would overthrow the title of the reigning sovereign. Yet the ambiguity of the clause about the contract between king and people, is not cleared away. A leading manager, Sir Joseph Jekyl, said: "to make out the justice of the revolution, it may be laid down, that as the law is the only measure of the Prince's authority, * Hallam's Constitutional History, (Harper's Edition), p. 544. Hallam, p. 546. Macaulay's History of England, (Harper's Edition), Vol. II., p. 580. + and the people's subjection, so the law derives its being and efficacy from common consent; and to place it on any other foundation than common consent, is to take away the obligation this notion of common consent puts Prince and people under to observe the laws."* This sounds like the Lockian Social Compact. The revolution, the same manager said, occurred in " a case that the law of England could never suppose, provide for, or have in view." Said another manager, Sir John Hawles: "when a government is brought out of frame by the extraordinary steps of a Prince, it is a vain thing to hope that it can ever be set right by regular steps." "The reformation," it was said, "cannot be urged as an instance of the lawfulness of anything, but of resisting the supreme executive power acting in opposition to the laws." But when challenged to produce the contract between king and people, Sir Joseph Jekyl refers to the history of the coronation oath, of the oath of allegiance, to ancient customs and forms, which involve such a contract. That is to say, he makes his appeal to usages and peculiarities interwoven with the Constitution, as if the contract were a positive thing, a feature of the English system of government, rather than the underlying basis of all civil society, at least where there is monarchy. This is insisted upon--that there was no law providing for the revolutionary action. It was an exercise of power not provided for by any existing statute. But it was an act of the community, having for its end the recovery of the Constitution and Laws. The right to perform such an act is not extended beyond the case in question, where there was an actual necessity of restoring the government and of saving the Constitution from being overthrown. It is only this right of conservative revolution that is claimed. There is nothing, therefore, in their mode of stating the English right of resistance to determine with certainty whether the managers held that the contract between king and people is a positive and special characteristic of English insti State Trials, Vol. XV., p. 98. † lb. p. 110. tutions, or a fundamental part of all monarchical society. At the time of the revolution, when the question of the condition in which things were left, by the departure of James, was under debate in Parliament, some one suggested that they were left in a state of nature. But it was immediately replied that such a view would dissolve all laws and abolish all franchises. The truth appears to be, that so far as the act of dethroning James and enthroning William is concerned, they could properly plead only the right of revolution. The precise meaning when they spoke of the breach of contract between king and people, was probably apprehended by few, if any of the actors themselves. The Social Compact is a fiction,-convenient as other legal fictions may be, for certain purposes, as a form of representation; leading, however, when taken for anything else than a fiction, to false and mischievous consequences. When we interpret it, with Burke, as a mode of saying that every rational will is presupposed to coincide with the right order of things; or, with Blackstone, as a way of asserting that reciprocal duties are laid upon rulers and the governed, it conveys a truth. When we take another step, and affirm that no government which was not established by general or unanimous consent, can claim allegiance, and further maintain that the assent of every generation, nay, of every individual, is the condition of his obligation to obedience, we introduce a political heresy, the influence of which is very likely to be disastrous. The true view to take is, that the existing form of the state, regarded as a fact, may, or may not, be due to an express agreement at some former epoch.. But the obligation of the individual to obedience does not depend on his having had a share in forming the state, or on his having a share at present in the management of it. This, be it observed, is not to approve the denial of political power to those who are capable of exercising it. It is easy to suppose cases where the withholding of all share in the government from those who can safely be trusted with political power, is both arbitrary and inexpedient. What form of government is best, can only be decided by reference to the character and history of the par ticular nation. We are speaking now only of what the individual may demand, as a condition of his obeying "the powers that be." For one born under a particular system, it is only necessary to know that the established system secures the great ends of government, and lays upon him no command inconsistent with his duty to God. Yet, in supposable cases, even the withholding of political rights may be so flagrant an evil as to warrant resistance. We require some guaranty that Natural Rights shall not be violated. Such a guaranty may be afforded by the actual possession of a share of political power, especially when the individual is one of a class-the wealthy class for example-who are thus enabled, by uniting their political strength, peacefully to counteract threatened injustice. But when Political Rights are claimed as a guaranty for the secure possession of Natural Rights, the claim is equiv alent simply to a demand for a government that shall defend the latter. Political Rights are thus claimed only as a means to an end. The two categories of Rights are properly distinguished. The fallacy of merging Political under Natural Rights, is most frequently met with in this country, in connection with expressions upon the right of suffrage. The right to vote is tacitly put in the same category with the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is forgotten that the limiting of the privilege of voting to the male members of society, with the further condition that they shall have reached the age of twenty-one years, would be a flagrant piece of injustice, provided voting were a natural, inborn, universal right. The extent to which this fallacy prevails and the confusion it induces, are capable of easy demonstration. There is one State, indeed, where the distinction of which we are reminding our readers is definitely apprehended. In Rhode Island, the question whether the right to vote belongs as an original right to every adult male citizen, was brought to an issue in the Dorr rebellion, and the insurgents who renounced their allegiance on account of the limitation of the suffrage, were effectually put down. That movement never could have |