follow the order which they do, beginning with the outward and working inward-beginning with the education of society, of the family, and of law, which, by its instruction and discipline, awakens but does not create the conscience; stimulates to the exercise of the moral nature, but does not thereby furnish its constituent elements.

We have not room to follow out the applications which the author makes of his principles to the vindication of the ways of God. It is not necessary that we should. If his analysis of the prime elements of moral good and evil is fundamentally defective, his applications of them cannot but be unsatisfactory to the consecutive and consistent thinker. That they are most unsatisfactory to the feelings, we need not say. It gives little relief to the earnest and troubled inquirer, to be told that in bodily pain, in sickness, in sorrow, and in death, there is this, and this only "soul of goodness," that they stimulate to noble doing and daring, and that in acting and bearing the soul feels itself to be strong. Still less are we satisfied with the doctrine that God must allow sin in order that the conscience may exist at all, for the inquiry springs at once to the thoughts, what so great good is there in having a conscience at such a price? Why not endow the race with unconscious natural goodness, if we can only be conscious of moral worth by the experience of moral guilt? Still less are we satisfied with the theory of Divine punishment which does not recognize the prevention of sin as its end, but makes it necessary that the Creator should create the sin which he punishes, and create it continually in order that he may keep alive the moral law, according to which he

condemns.

The author has evidently been led to adopt these extraordinary theories by the reaction of his own mind against the very vague and unsatisfying ethical and theological defenses of the Christian system which he has happened to encounter. But his heart seems to revolt against the logical conclusions to which his philosophy seems to impel him. Indeed, if we are not greatly mistaken, it is this conflict between his better convictions and sympathies on the one hand, and the logical deductions which he seems compelled to make from his too

scanty conceptions and too narrow assumptions-it is the presence of this conflict which imparts an almost dramatic interest to the Conversations which constitute the larger part of the volume. In these Conversations he seems all the while to be lingering upon the objections which may be urged against his views. He is ever desirous to do full justice to all that may be said or suggested in reply, and his own feelings seem to cleave to the construction of the topic that is more in harmony with the ordinary faith of men. Hence the eloquence with which the pleadings for the old faith are uttered by the warm-hearted Ada Newcome, and the apparent candor and truthfulness of many of the protestations of the Vicar of Gravenhurst. A kindly father of another age might say, in a pardonable conceit, of these two tendencies, that the philosophy of the author was Naomi stoically obeying the voice bidding her go back to the desolate mountains of Moab, while his promptings to faith were the voice of the reluctant and almost rebellious Ruth looking with eyes of love and hope toward the land of promise and of peace.

We began this notice of Gravenhurst, thinking to give a brief outline of its contents. We have been beguiled into these somewhat extended remarks by the interest of its principal theme. We cannot describe the interesting discussions, with the delightful pictures by which they are relieved, the eloquent discoursings which are constantly returning, the apposite illustrations which are so beautifully introduced, and the perfect style in which all these beauties are enshrined. To attempt to do this without copious extracts would be in vain, and for neither description nor extracts have we time or room. As we read these pages, we are reminded of a beautiful and inviting arbor overhung with a luxuriant vine and fragrant with the breath of flowers, decorated so beautifully within and without that for the leafy luxuriance we cannot see the bare and deformed structure of feeble scantling over which this covering is drawn, and of which it is at once the support and the ornament. One push of the foot, the withdrawal of a single prop, and this stately edifice for shelter and delight, will fall; yet still the beauty that made it attractive, in its seeming strength, will remain to decorate the prostrate ruin.

ARTICLE IX.-A LETTER FROM MR. HERBERT SPENCER.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW ENGLANDER.

SIR :-While recognizing the appreciative tone and general candor of the Article in your last number, entitled "Herbert Spencer on Ultimate Religious Ideas," allow me to point out one error of moment which pervades it. The writer correctly represents the leading positions of my argument; but he inadvertently conveys a wrong impression respecting my tendencies and sympathies.

He says of me-"The spirit of his philosophy is evidently that of the so-called positive method, which has now many partial disciples, as well as some zealous adherents, among the thinkers of England." Further on, I am tacitly classed with "the English admirers and disciples of the great Positivist; and it is presently added that " in Mr. Spencer we have an example of a Positivist, who dares not treat the subject of religion with supercilious neglect." Here, and throughout, the implication is, that I am a follower of Comte. This is a mistake. That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine and method elaborated by science, and has applied to it a name which has obtained a certain currency, is true. But it is not true that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature and limits, are appreciably different from what they were before. If they are Positivists, it is in the sense that all men of science have been more or less consistently Positivists; and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them no more makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to the men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote make these his disciples. My own attitude towards M. Comte, and his partial adherents, has been all along that of antagonism. In an essay on the "Genesis of Science," published in 1854, and re-published with other essays in 1857, I have endeavored to show that his theory of the logical dependence, and

historical development of the sciences, is untrue. I have still among my papers the memoranda of a second review, (for which I failed to obtain a place), the purpose of which was to show the untenableness of his theory of intellectual progress. The only doctrine of importance in which I agree with him—the relativity of all knowledge-is one common to him and sundry other thinkers of earlier date; and even this, I hold in a different sense from that in which he held it. But on all points that are distinctive of his philosophy, I differ from him. I deny his Hierarchy of the Sciences. I regard his division of intellec tual progress into the three phases, theological, metaphysical, and positive, as superficial. I reject utterly his Religion of Humanity. And his ideal of society I hold in detestation. Some of his minor views I accept; some of his incidental remarks seem to me profound; but from everything which distinguishes Comtism as a system, I dissent entirely. The only influence on my own course of thought, which I can trace to M. Comte's writings, is the influence that results from meeting with antagonistic opinions definitely expressed.

Such being my position, you will, I think, see, that by classing me as a Positivist, and tacitly including me among the English admirers and disciples of Comte, your reviewer unintentionally misrepresents me. I am quite ready to bear the odium attaching to opinions which I do hold. But I object to have added the odium attaching to opinions which I do not hold. If by publishing this letter in your forthcoming Number you will allow me to set myself right with the American public on this matter, you will greatly oblige me.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

LONDON, November 21, 1863.

HERBERT SPENCER.

It is fair that we comply with Mr. Spencer's request; and we gladly record his emphatic dissent from some of the distinguishing features of M. Comte's system. In justice to the reviewer, however, it should be noticed that those whom he classes as English Positivists are said to be "not generally blind adherents" of M. Comte, and that some of them were said to "follow him afar off." If there was an apparent impli

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cation in the review, that Mr. Spencer is merely "a follower of Comte," it was certainly unintentional. That he is an independent thinker, and that his system differs in several important respects from that of the French philosopher, are facts too obvious to be overlooked. Not only in the essay alluded to, on the "Genesis of Science," but in Part II. of the First Principles, the elements of a different (and, we think, a better) theory of scientific evolution are presented; and it was one purpose of the reviewer to indicate certain other points of disagreement. In describing In describing "the spirit of his philosophy," therefore, as that of Positivism, this term was used in that broad sense which it now so commonly bears, as inclusive of opinions and modes of thought differing in various respects, but agreeing in the same general attitude towards the objects and means of theological inquiry which was assumed by the method of M. Comte. Partially to characterize this attitude, we may say that it consists in utterly refusing to recognize, in the supposed marks of design in Nature, anything more than conditions of existence under general laws, which bind together in one category all the phenomena both of matter and of mind, excluding the possibility of spiritual freedom; also, in assuming that the belief in a personal Deity is inconsistent with a scientific state of mind, and must finally be abolished by the progress of the intellect. It is true that these characteristics were not original in the philosophy of M. Comte; which, however, embodied them so fully as very naturally to have given name to that general style of philosophizing to which they belong. That it is not the style adopted by "all men of science," illustrious examples of Theistic and Christian naturalists, in our own day, abundantly show. It appears that Mr. Spencer regards the theory of the three phases of intellectual progress as superficial, and that he has criticised it (in an unpublished essay) as untenable; yet his own theory of intellectual progress, as bearing on religious belief, manifestly tends to a very similar result. Much more might be said on these points; but to proceed farther would lead us into an argument rather than an explanation. Since Mr. Spencer objects to the title of Positivist, it is certainly proper that it should no longer be applied to him.