Puslapio vaizdai
PDF
„ePub“

The antecedent improbability that a miracle will occur, disappears in the case of Christianity. The issue relates to the miracles; but the ultimate source of the conflict is a false or feeble view, on the part of the unbeliever, of the primitive truths of religion. This will explain how a new awakening of conscience, or of religious sensibility, has been known to dispel the incredulity with which he had looked upon the claims of Revelation.

It is more and more apparent that the cause of Natural Religion, and that of Revealed Religion, are bound up together. But the native convictions of the human mind concerning God and duty cannot be permanently dislodged. Pantheism mocks the religious nature of man. It is inconsistent with religionwith prayer, with worship—with that communion with a higher Being, which is religion. It is inconsistent, also, with morality, in any earnest meaning of the term ; for it empties free-will and responsibility, holiness and sin, of their meaning. Everyone who acknowledges the feeling of guilt to be a reality and to represent the truth, and everyone who blames the conduct of another, in the very act denies the Pantheistic theory. Conscience must prove, in the long run, stronger than any speculation, no matter how plausible. In the soul itself, then, in its aspiration after the living God and its conviction of freedom and of sin, there is erected an everlasting barrier against the inroads of false philosophy, and one that will be found to embrace within its impregnable walls the cause of Christianity itself.

ARTICLE VII.-RELATIONS OF SEPARATE STATES TO

GENERAL JUSTICE.

Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht und Politik. Von ROBERT VON Monil.

Tübingen : 1860.

Two widely diverse views may be taken of the relations which the separate States of the world sustain toward general justice. One, which may be called the selfish view, regards the individual State as fulfilling its work, when it has observed all its obligations to other States, and has likewise taken the best means in its power to secure just conduct, on the part of those who are subject to its laws, towards the subjects of other States and towards these States themselves. Beyond this it has no work in the world outside of its own borders, unless control over what is done upon its ships on the high seas be an exception; and iť any wrong, anywhere abroad, is committed, it is in no way called upon to interfere, either for the help of the injured, or in the execution of the laws of another State. If, in the progress of civilization and of mutual trust, the intercourse between the inhabitants of neighboring States becomes closer, and their relations become more and more complicated, it has a right to use its own laws exclusively in its own courts, but if, instead of doing this, in certain cases it allows the laws of other States to regulate decisions, such complaisance is to be regarded as being by no means a right which other States can claim, but a concession for which they onght to be thankful, or which is paid for by equal concessions on their part. Thus the whole system of private international law, one of great and continually increasing importance, rests on no foundation of justice, but simply upon the comity of States. Again, when a crime has been committed within the limits of one State, and the offender escapes into another, he is, according to this same view, like any other emigrant: the State may harbor him, and

no foreign law or punishment can penetrate beyond its boundaries. If it surrender him up, this is not done to promote the interests of general justice, but either because the harboring of rogues is injurious at home, or the escape of them into foreign parts, where no rule of reciprocity prevails, will embolden transgressors within its own limits. Thus the extradition of criminals is not obligatory, but a matter of comity or convenience. And still again, when a State is at peace and two of its friends at war with one another, there are, indeed, well defined obligations as well as rights of neutrality, but it is not held to be necessary to hold a strict watch over the conduct of traders towards these friendly powers, and all the apparatus for carrying on war even to ready made ships may be exported, and, practically, the whole burden of executing justice lies on the foreigner: if he can catch the guilty ship, he may; otherwise it is sure of impunity.

These examples show the influence of a narrow view of national obligations; on the other hand, a very wide view has been entertained, which may be even called cosmopolitan. According to this theory nations are the individuals composing a world-wide community or virtual confederation, united together by principles of justice, and bound to give a helping hand in the execution of justice, as far as the power of each member extends. The laws of every State, therefore, ought to be sacred in the eyes of every other, so far forth as they are regarded to be just. In the conflict of foreign and domestic law there is a principle of justice, which demands, in certain circumstances, that the latter give way to the former. When a crime is committed in any country, the fugitive criminal ought to find no refuge from just punishment in any other part of the world. When war breaks out between two States, those States which remain neutral are obligated not only to maintain a rigid neutrality themselves, but, by an effective police and by sufficient penalties, to keep their subjects from all contraband trade, and from every violation of the law of blockade. Nor does this principle stop here, but it must also maintain, if carried out to an extreme, that inasmuch as there is a right and a wrong side in every conflict, whenever that can be

ascertained, neutrality itself is wrong, and all States ought to take a part with the injured belligerent. And, still farther, the right of interference in the internal affairs of any State, will, according to the same principle, lie open to every other State, which regards a government as oppressive, or a people as engaged in an unjust revolt. Nor is it necessary that an invitation should go forth from one government to another when help is needed; the interference is equally right when uncalled for, if dictated by the feeling of justice. And thus every State has a vocation, like a knight errant, to defend the oppressed, -to take the cause of the injured, wherever in this world oppression and injustice can be found.

It is obvious from this exposition that the second of these principles is unsafe, and even, when carried to an extreme, unjust. But it is not so obvious that the first, which is safer and has been the rule for the general practice of nations, deserves equal condemnation. This we shall attempt to show, and then it will be time to ask whether a middle ground between these extremes,-a rule which admits the obligations of States to aid one another in preventing wrong and securing the interests of justice, and yet limits these obligations by the independence of nations and in other ways,-may not be the juste milieu, the equitable plan, in accordance with which the law 'of nations, if defective at present, may be reformed.

Let no one urge that this is an abstract and useless speculation. It is not abstract, but eminently practical ; for if every State has a part to act in the justice of the world outside of its own territory, the knowledge of such a calling must awaken a sense of obligation, and put the nations upon the track of common rules, by which their obligations of this sort can be discharged, as well as be brought into consistency with their functions as separate States. Or, to take another view, if nations can be made to feel a certain sort of brotherhood and unselfish community, they will aid one another in the great work of well-doing, and if they render such mutual aid, the feeling of brotherhood will be awakened still more. The proper result of a Christian civilization is to awaken and extend through mankind such a feeling of brotherhood. If, in a

a

а

better day, nations can be made to feel it, the leading spirit of all international law will be not to maintain separate sove. reignties against invasion, nor to defend just rights; nations will have outgrown these inferior principles, just as, when the individual las reached the higher stages of his character, love takes the place of obligation. The enquiry then will be, how can the common welfare of the States of the world,- of this great confederation bound by ties of mutual regard, -be best promoted ?

In our enquiries into the duties of States towards general justice, we shall avail ourselves of the rich materials furnished by M. Von Mohl, in an essay on the “International Doctrine of Asylum,” contained in the work placed at the head of this Article. The opinions of this writer on public law entitle him to high respect.

In his Geschichte von Staatswissenschaften, (history of political sciences), in three volumes, he gives a condensed view of the newest literature in those departments with valuable criticisms on the leading writers. In his Encyclopädie von Staatswissenschaften, Encyclopedia of political sciences), he exhibits the method and leading principles of polity, including international law. In the work to which we shall have especial reference, Staatsrecht Völkerrecht und Politik, (the doctrine of the State, the law of nations and politics), he brings together a number of independent monographies, most of which had appeared in German journals before, but which are here elaborated, and express his views in the year 1860. These and several other writings, which are more occupied with the interior of the State or with his own country,--" the political system of the kingdom of "Wurtemberg," "the responsibility of ministers united with a representative system in the government of a State," " the science of police according to the principles of a State founded on justice,” and “the system of preventive justice, or jural police,"--all of them extensive works,--show his industry, and place him among the most active and learned publicists now living.

The first point which meets our eyes, when we enquire into the relations of States to general justice, is the territoral char

« AnkstesnisTęsti »