14. While on course 94° true, between buoy CD and CAA and to southward of them, making speed 18 knots, at about 3.37 p. m., the Paulding sighted two periscopes of a submarine, one point on her port bow distant about 75 yards from the bow of the Paulding. 15. The periscopes were moving toward and across the Paulding's bow and rising. 16. Immediately before sighting the periscopes, the officer of the deck had given orders to the helmsman to change course 5° to the left, but before the destroyer had started to swing to the left the order was given "right full." 17. As a result of commands given on the bridge, the Paulding was given "full right rudder" and backed at full speed. 18. At 3.37, when the superstructure was showing about one third of its height above the water, the S-4 was struck just forward of the 4-inch gun on the starboard side by the United States Coast Guard destroyer Paulding and sank with all hands on board, going down by the bow. 19. The Paulding at once lowered a boat to search for and rescue possible survivors, dropped a buoy to mark the spot of sinking, and took cross bearings. 20. At this time the visibility was excellent for surface craft, a fresh breeze was blowing, the sea choppy and considerable white caps. 21. The Paulding was damaged to the extent of $19,765, but able to proceed unassisted to an anchorage in Provincetown Harbor and later went to the Boston Navy Yard for repairs. 22. The testimony indicates that the S-4 was completing certain standardization runs between buoys on the trial course and was accustomed to swing out into fairway at the end of each run before circling on the return run. The runs were being made at prescribed depth, which means that the periscopes, painted in war colors and designed to make them invisible, were from two to four feet above water in a choppy sea. At each periscope there was supposed to be an observer on watch, one of them especially charged with the duty of scanning the horizon for approaching vessels. Under the conditions named the destroyer would be visible to this officer at a distance of about 5,000 yards. 23. Experts have testified that it is the duty of a submarine running at periscope depth to keep clear of surface craft. The S-4 had the Paulding on her starboard bow at all times prior to the collision, and in this situation was also required by the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea to keep clear of the Paulding. 24. The collision occurred approximately 400 yards southeast of the extension of the line of buoys and was approximately 440 yards 174° true from buoy CAA, indicating that the Paulding was following a course well clear of the line of buoys and outside of the course prescribed by the United States Coast Pilot for vessels entering Provincetown Harbor. 25. The Coast Guard district commander and the warrant officer in charge of the Wood End Station knew of the operations of the submarines simply by personal observation. Neither of them, and, indeed, nobody in the Coast Guard, was officially informed by anyone in the Navy of these submarine operations, or when they would begin or conclude, or at what hours of the day they would operate, or, indeed, anything about the matter. 26. The commander of the Conyngham, also commanding the Coast Guard division to which the Paulding was attached, and the commander of the Paulding testified that they had no knowledge that submarines were operating in the vicinity of Provincetown during those days. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS The board, in summarizing the foregoing facts, finds that: 1. On the afternoon of December 17, 1927, the S-4 and the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding were in collision while the submarine was on a submerged run over the measured mile course off Provincetown, Mass., resulting in the sinking of the S-4 with loss of all on board. 2. The Paulding was keeping a sharp and efficient lookout, as required by law, Coast Guard Reulations, and the practice of seamen; but, owing to choppy sea, the extreme difficulty of picking up an object purposely designed and painted to avoid detection, and the fact that no notice had been given of the operation of submarine in that vicinity, the periscopes were not identified in time to avert the collision. 3. The doctrine of the naval submarine service as testified to by naval expert witnesses is to the effect that the responsibility rests upon a submerged submarine to keep clear of all surface craft. 4. It was the duty of the S-4, under the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, to keep clear of the Paulding. OPINION The board is of the opinion that: 1. Eighteen knots in this fairway, in the open sea, and in the daytime, is not a high rate of speed for a destroyer, the testimony showing such speed to be normal and usual for Coast Guard destroyers on patrol duty. 2. The officers of the submarine had every opportunity by observations to see the destroyer at a considerable distance and seek immediate safety at a greater depth. A destroyer on the other hand, approaching a vessel admittedly designed to see and not be seen, and evidenced only by two periscopes a little above water in a choppy sea with considerable whitecaps, and those on the bridge of the destroyer having no reason to anticipate the presence of a submarine, can not be held to be negligent in failing to observe the periscopes in time to avoid collision as they approached slowly through the water. 3. The cause of the failure of the S-4 to sight the Paulding and take action in time to avoid collision must remain indeterminate since there are no survivors to testify. It is the experience of the members on the board that no mechanical appliance is infallible. It appears to be impossible to determine whether or not there was a failure on the part of the mechanical appliances of the S-4 prior to the collision. 4. The action of the Paulding in swinging right full rudder and backing her engines was the correct one as giving the greatest promise of passing clear. 5. When the S-4 was sighted by the Paulding upon its emergance 75 yards on the destroyer's port bow, collision was inevitable notwithstanding the immediate and correct maneuvers undertaken in accordance with the orders of the officer of the deck. 6. The failure to recognize the periscopes at a greater distance than 75 yards did not indicate an inefficient lookout since the difficulty of picking up and distinguishing small objects was greatly enhanced by the choppy sea and strong wind that covered the surface with whitecaps. 7. Had a submarine warning flag been displayed as shown on the Hydrographic Office Pilot Charts and in the Navy Signal Manual, or had the commanding officer of the Paulding knowledge of the operations of submarines in this vicinity at that time, no collision would have occurred. 8. The conduct of Lieutenant Commander Baylis in a most trying situation, attending and following the collision, not knowing whether his own vessel was in a sinking condition, was highly commendable in that he neglected no precautions for rescuing possible survivors of the S-4. 9. (1) The Paulding was maintaining a proper lookout. The Paulding was navigating in the open sea, in the daytime, in a fairway, with good visibility. The chief petty officer (junior officer of the deck) and the quartermaster were on the bridge, and were regularly assigned to act as general lookouts, and they were actively and vigilantly maintaining a lookout in the direction in which the vessel was proceeding. The officer of the deck was also vigilantly maintaining a lookout. (2) Furthermore, the position of the lookouts, though not on the forward deck, was a proper one for the observation of all vessels which might pass and of all obstructions to navigation; the bridge of the Paulding being located well forward. On this clear, cold December day, with a strong breeze blowing and a choppy sea, with spray coming over the bow ocasionally, the bridge was the most favorable position on the destroyer for a lookout to effectually perform his duty. (3) The bridge of the Paulding afforded the lookouts a clear and unobstructed view of the direction in which the vessel was proceeding. 10. The submarine is a distinctly unusual type of vessel, and if the person in charge of a surface vessel cruising on the open sea in the daytime in clear weather, with the sea choppy, were held to have incurred serious blame if he fails to sight the periscope of a submarine operating at periscope depth, he not knowing of the presence of the submarine in the vicinity, and there being no warnings displayed of any kind, and collides with such submarine as she suddenly emerges under the bows of his vessel, then, indeed, are the masters of all surface craft subject to unreasonable concern, responsibility, strain and danger, to which, in the interests of commerce and safety to life, they should not be subjected. 11. Under the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, vessels-when they can not be readily seen, such as at night, in a fog, or in thick weather-are required to make their presence known in a clear and unmistakable manner; that is, by lights, horns, bells, etc. Since a submarine has been so designed as "to see and not be seen "" when operating submerged, this board is of the opinion that it would be in accordance with the principle upon which the international rules in this respect are based to require a submarine operating submerged to make its presence known in some clear and unmistakable manner, or to assume the risk in the event a collission results from its failure to do so. The board finds that RESPONSIBILITY 1. No responsibility and no blame is to be attached to the commanding officer, the officer of the deck, or any other person on board the Paulding. RECOMMENDATION 1. It is recommended that no further action be taken and that Lieut. Commander J. S. Baylis, United States Coast Guard, be advised by appropriate official communication that neither he nor any person on the Paulding is held responsible for the collision between the Paulding and the S-4. A. L. GAMBLE, Captain, United States Coast Guard. Captain, United States Coast Guard. Engineer in Chief, United States Coast Guard. The proceedings, findings, opinions, conclusion as to responsibility, and recommendation of the foregoing board of inquiry are approved and respectfully forwarded to the honorable the Secretary of the Treasury. F. C. BILLARD, Rear Admiral, United States Coast Guard, Commandant. Approved May 5, 1928. A. W. MELLON, Secretary of the Treasury. Senator GERRY. I would like to ask some questions as to the policy of the Navy Department in regard to the submerging operations of submarines. Which of these gentlemen will answer? Commander HOOVER. Either of us will answer your questions. STATEMENTS OF COMMANDER J. H. HOOVER AND LIEUT. COMMANDER P. H. DUNBAR, UNITED STATES NAVY Senator GERRY. What I would like to know is as to the policy of the Navy Department in regard to the submerging operations of submarines; whether they submerge, in the process of carrying out their exercises in preparation for a national emergency, anywhere that the ships are operating at the time, regardless of traffic, unless something unusual is in sight. Commander HOOVER. The policy at present is that submarines submerge in the process of carrying out their exercises in preparation for a national emergency, anywhere that the ships are operating at the time, regardless of traffic, unless something unusual is in sight. Senator GERRY. The question of submerging, then, is left entirely up to the commanding officer of the submarine? Commander HOOVER. The commanding officer of the submarine, or his superior in charge of the submarine force. Senator GERRY. Who would that be in the case where a submarine is cruising alone? It would then only be the commanding officer of the submarine? Commander HOOVER. Yes. Senator GERRY. Or might it be a superior officer-an admiral on shore at the base from which the submarine came? Commander HOOVER. A submarine cruising alone, unless he had special orders to the contrary, would submerge whenever he so desired, to drill his crew. He would naturally pick out places where the water had sufficient depth and was sufficiently clear from obstructions. Senator GERRY. By "obstructions" do you mean the usual navigation? Commander HOOVER. Navigation, and crowded shipping lanes, Senator GERRY. Shipping lanes; that is what I meant. If a submarine is maneuvering with a fleet, naturally the commanding officer of the fleet or the commanding officer of the squadron might issue instructions as to submerging? Commander HOOVER. Yes. Senator GERRY. But where the submarine is operating by itself, then practically the question of where it shall submerge is left to the commanding officer of the submarine? Commander HOOVER. Yes. Senator GERRY. There is no general instruction or regulation from the department in regard to this, except the general one of precaution? Commander HOOVER. No. Senator GERRY. And using due diligence? Senator GERRY. What is the theory upon which the department bases this latitude in allowing submarines to submerge in any waters? Commander HOOVER. The theory is that the submarine is a selfcontained and self-governing unit, the same as any other ship, and when acting singly, can be operated entirely at the discretion of the commanding officer. Senator GERRY. I do not think you entirely get the point that I am driving at. Naturally, allowing the submarine to submerge anywhere on the coast, and allowing the discretion to order this submerging to the officer in charge, adds to the risk of the submarine. In other words, if there were certain places with special safeguards to prevent collisions, that the submarine was directed to submerge in, the risk would be less; but there might be reasons of naval policy why the submarine did not want to pursue this policy; that is what I am trying to get at. Commander HoOVER. In the absence of Navy Department regulations as to these so-called areas which you have mentioned, the matter of risk and advisability as to where the submarine submerges, it is naturally left to the forces afloat. They are the ones most concerned in the risk. We have, so far as I know, no areas for submerging, except in some very minor cases. Consequently the submarines are free to operate anywhere in the ocean, the same as any other ship. Senator GERRY. It appears that formerly there was a regulation that where a submarine was submerged, her tender should fly a certain flag; and from the testimony in the investigation made by the department, it appears that this flag has not been flown in years. What was the reason of abandoning this principle of additional safety by warning other vessels? Commander Hoover. As I understand it, originally submarines were in a highly experimental stage, and very small, and did not engage in what we would now call tactical maneuvers or exercises. They thought they were doing enough if they went off close to the tender, and made submergence and came up. That is about all they did; and in that case the tender was in the immediate vicinity of the submarine when it submerged. Since then the submarines have grown entirely out of that stage, and are sea-going vessels; and as I said before, they take part in fleet maneuvers and exercises the same as any other ships. Consequently, it is entirely out of the question to have a surface vessel around where every submarine is operating. It would probably defeat the purpose of the maneuvers and the exercises, by indicating that the submarine was there; and also, there would never be enough surface vessels to have one near every submarine. Senator GERRY. By "fleet maneuvers' "do you mean that the submarine may be operating very far from the squadron? Commander HOOVER. Oh, yes. It may be hundreds of miles. Senator GERRY. Do submarines operate at long distances from the fleet in carrying out naval maneuvers? Commander HOOVER. Yes; sometimes hundreds of miles. Senator GERRY. In carrying out these operations, it is necessary for them to submerge? Commander HOOVER. Yes. Senator GERRY. Do these operations have to be carried on secretly? Commander HOOVER. Yes; that is, as far as the secrets of a game go. If they were to make known their presence, it would defeat the purpose of the exercise. Senator GERRY. These fleet maneuvers are only carried on at certain times of the year, are they not? Commander HOOVER. They are being carried on at all times of the year in various parts of the world. We have submarines at various places, from China to New York. Senator GERRY. Are these manuevers generally carried on when the entire fleet is maneuvering, or are they carried on in separate units at different times? Commander HOOVER. In both ways. Senator GERRY. The S-4 was not carrying on any maneuvers, as I understand it. She was undergoing certain tests on a laid out course? Commander HOOVER. Yes. Senator GERRY. This course has been laid out for a great many years? Commander HOOVER. About 23 years. |