In other words, by a verdict of a general court-martial, whose verdict of guilty must be based upon circumstantial evidence, excluding every other reasonable hypothesis, it is manifest that Lieutenant Commander Jones would be acquitted. 6. The Navy Department has already had occasion to consider the conduct of Lieutenant Commander Jones at the inquest held on his remains wherein it was essential to determine whether or not his death was the result of his own misconduct. It was found that his death was not the result of his misconduct and in pursuance of that finding, the death gratuity due to the widow had already been paid to her.

7. If the officers of the S-4 were living, it would undoubtedly be proper and appropriate, in view of the findings of the court of inquiry, to order a trial by general court-artial of the commanding officer. It is equally manifest that if such a court were held without further or additional evidence tending to convict him of neglect, and without any additional evidence tending to exculpate him or explain the collision, he would be acquitted. In view of the fact that Lieutenant Commander Jones lost his life by this collision, and in view of the fact the evidence presented to the court of inquiry by reason of the loss of the whole crew of the S-4 would be insufficient to convict him of wrongdoing, in case the evidence was presented to a general court-martial, and in view of the fact that no such trial can be had, it seems unnecessary to expressly approve or disapprove of the finding against Lieutenant Commander Jones other than to point out that such finding is in accordance with the probabilities, but that these probabilities are insufficient to justify disciplinary action, assuming such action was possible. The only possible punitive action that could be taken by the department, based upon the misconduct of Lieutenant Commander Jones, would be the withholding of the gratuity to the widow, and it has already been determined that the evidence in this case did not justify such action and on the contrary it has been expressly found by the department that he was not guilty of misconduct.

8. The court of inquiry found the commander of the United States Coast Guard destroyer Paulding at fault for not maintaining a lookout in a position with an unobstructed view with no other duties to perform, and recommended that a copy of the evidence and findings be furnished to the Secretary of the Treasury. This has been done. The evidence with relation to the collision is clear and without substantial conflict. Inasmuch as the question of the conduct of the commander of the Paulding is a matter more particularly for the Treasury Department, it is unnecessary to do more than has already been done to advise the Secretary of the Treasury of the evidence and findings. In this connection it should be observed that while it is incumbent upon officers of the submarine in coming to the surface to exercise extraordinary care and precaution, and that while the failure to do so is culpable negligence, this does not excuse surface vessels from exercising the degree of care reasonably to be exepcted of them in their operations on the surface, and among these obligations is that of keeping a sharp lookout.

9. The court recommends that Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy, be removed from his command of the control force. This recommendation was not based upon any failure of the officers under his command to do all that was possible to do in the rescue and salvage operations, nor was it due to the failure to obtain supplies or equipment essential for those operations, but it is based upon the theory that Rear Admiral Brumby's testimony showed an insufficient familiarity with the details of the construction of submarines. The proceedings were referred to the court for a more definite statement of the basis of its recommendation, and in the supplemental findings the court includes some of the statements made by Rear Admiral Brumby upon which they based their conclusions. In item 43 of the court's supplemental findings it states as follows: "In the prepared statement of Rear Admiral Brumby, read to the court, he stated:

"The Falcon anchored near this boat, and bubbles were seen coming up right under the stern of the Falcon. Grapnels were thrown from the stern and caught on something and were hauled taut, and the line was used for the descending line for the first diver.'

"As a matter of fact, a Coast Guard picket boat caught its grapnel on the wreck and carried the line to the Falcon, which was used as a descending line." Just before this statement Rear Admiral Brumby's evidence was as follows: "The Falcon arrived at the scene of the wreck shortly after 7 a. m. on the 18th and planted buoys near the wreck. None of them were actually attached to the wreck. A Coast Guard boat that was dragging near the Falcon caught on

some heavy object."

It is obviously unimportant whether the first diver descended on the line Rear Admiral Brumby refers to as having been caught on some heavy object from a Coast Guard boat, or whether the line was one thrown over the stern of the Falcon. Admiral Brumby in response to the question of the court: "Why didn't Carr go down and connect up the air to the torpedo room?" answered: "I am not thoroughly familiar with the details of construction, but those who were there thought that the attempt that we were making was the proper one. The connection that we made to the torpedo room was not the ordinary air connection; it was through the signal tube.' Again the witness was asked: "You have testified that the air hose was connected up at 8.36 and that air started going in at 10.05. Why could not air have been going in at 8.36?" And he replied: "I don't know what the details were, but the technical people can tell you that." Rear Admiral Brumby in his opening statement testified with regard to what happened after the return of the Falcon to the scene of the disaster on the morning of the 21st. He stated that the S-4 was not located until about 4 p. m.; that the first diver went overboard not long after 5 o'clock; that the first hose was connected with the ship about 8.36 p. m. and that air was blowing into the compartment at 10.05 p. m. on the 21st. On cross-examination he was asked why could not air have been going in at 8.36 and replied as above, "I don't know what the details were, but the technical people can tell you that." It appears from the findings of the court of inquiry that the air connections were not made until 10.05 p. m. and that air was immediately started into the torpedo room. It is evident from the findings of the court that Rear Admiral Brumby was mistaken in his recollection concerning the exact hour when the connection was made by the divers below 100 feet below on the deck of the submarine. Another instance cited appears in item 88, wherein it was asked, "When Carr went down to connect up a connection to the tank salvage, did he have any particular difficulty in making that connection?" Rear Admiral Brumby replied, "I think not."

"Q. Then would it have been possible for him to have made a connection at that time to the compartment salvage?-A. I can't answer that question directly. My memory that every single one of those divers did just as much as one could do, and one diver would come and another would go down, and just the detail of it, as to exactly what happened, I can't submit. I think probably Captain King, when he appears, or Mr. Hartley, can tell you.

"Q. When was the compartment air line connected?-A. I don't know that the compartment air line was ever connected. That was the one they were attempting to connect the Sunday night that they had to give up the work."

10. In connection with these questions and answers it is to be observed that most of them call for hearsay evidence. Rear Admiral Brumby was asked to relate what had occurred upon the bottom of the bay and what difficulties the divers had encountered there. It is obvious that he could have no knowledge of these facts other than hearsay. While it would have been proper for him to have stated what reports had been made to him by the divers, either by telephone from the bottom or after returning to the surface, it is obvious that it would be better for the divers themselves to testify as to the work done on the bottom and the difficulties they encountered there. If, as appears, the divers reported to Mr. Hartley or Captain King, rather than to Rear Admiral Brumby personally, it was obviously more appropriate to have them testify than to have hearsay upon hearsay which would have been the result had Rear Admiral Brumby made the statement.

11. The findings of the court of inquiry were referred to Rear Admiral Brumby for comment. He makes the following statement:

"The judge advocate of the court of inquiry had told me in a general way what he wanted me to cover and I directed my efforts as regards my testimony to the points he had covered. There were officers at hand who could give technical details, and who were to testify after I had finished. I anticipated no technical questions, as I knew there were others who could testify in detail where I could only answer in general terms. So I prepared a statement that gave a running account of all that had happened.

"The department's attention is invited to conditions prevailing at the scene for the first few days. The Falcon, rescue ship, had left New London Saturday afternoon, December 17, within less than two hours of receipt of news of the sinking of a submarine off Provincetown. Steps had been taken by the Department, by the commander, control force, and by others in the Navy to provide everything that could be thought of as being of any possible assistance.

Divers had been requested from Newport and U. S. S. S-8 which had left Provincetown earlier in the day was turned back by dispatch. The Falcon proceeded through the Cape Cod Canal and arrived off Provincetown earlier on Sunday, the 18th. Normally, the Falcon has about 70 men abroad, with five officers. For several days the number was nearly doubled and there was generally 10 or more additionl officers. These included what was thought to be the best available talent in the Navy for such work. The Bushnell was there, also the Lark and Mallard and a number of other naval vessels, together with some vessels of the Coast Guard.

"When the Falcon arrived, the S-4 had not been located, though there were buoys in the vicinity. The small boats that were dragging located some heavy object and the Falcon anchoraged near the spot. A grapnel thrown from the stern of the Falcon caught on what proved to be the S-4, and the Lark and Mallard were anchored off the Falcon and preparations made for diving. Conditions of wind and sea were such that diving would not have been undertaken except for the possibility of saving life.

"The procedure to be followed in the rescue attempts had been fully discussed by all officers present, including myself, and in every case the decision reached was unanimous. I took active part in discussions and made final decisions. I see no grounds for criticisms of the fact that the decisions were made after receiving opinions from officers who were expert in their line and who were at the scene because of being experts.

"A period of nearly four weeks elapsed before I testified at the court of inquiry. During this period my time and attention were fully occupied with the work at hand. Under the existing conditions I feel that it is natural, that due to press of circumstances, some details may have escaped my memory. When the court asked questions that I could not answer with absolute certainty I said that I did not know, rather than give answers more or less vague, although at the time of the operation I was fully conversant with the work going on and could have answered technical questions regarding it. This procedure saved time and I know that some of my assistants soon to follow me on the witness stand would be able from their records to give details that might be required. In my opinion such action on my part does not warrant the findings of the court or its recommendations concerning me."

12. Rear Admiral Brumby was appropriately called upon for testimony as to the minute details of the salvage operation which had been going on for more than a month and was asked to give exact times of certain incidents in the operation and may readily have been mistaken in his testimony. If he had been advised, either by being made a party to the proceedings, or in any other way, that in the opinion of the court his testimony was being considered to its effect upon his professional career or professional intelligence, it is obvious that he could and probably would have answered some questions which he felt might be more appropriately answered by those having more direct and first-hand information. He was not advised at any time that the court considered his conduct such as to require investigation or action of any kind. If his attention had been called to his mistake with reference to the delay in getting air into the torpedo room he would have been in a position to correct such mistake. It is probable that the court failed to do this because at that time the facts had not been fully brought to their attention. Rear Admiral Brumby not only had charge of the operation but he remained on board the Falcon in constant contact with all of those engaged in the work and he states that in his conferences the decisions were unanimously arrived at and carried out. There is nothing in his conduct in connection with the rescue or salvage operations which is considered blameworthy or other than commendable, and under all the circumstances any errors or oversight or failures in his testimony are insufficient to overcome his splendid record of achievement covering more than 31 years of service in the Navy, approved as it has been by his superior officers and also by the selection boards whose recommendation resulted in his recent promotion to the rank of rear admiral.

13. It is directed that the record of the court of inquiry in this case be referred to all material bureaus of the Navy Department as well as the Chief of Naval Operations for considerations and such recommendations as appear to be warranted.

14. Subject to the above, the proceedings, findings, opinion, and recommendations in the court of inquiry and court of inquiry in its first and second revisions and the remarks and the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the Chief of Operations are approved.

CURTIS D. WILBUR.

Hon. TASKER L. ODDIE,

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 8, 1928.

Chairman Senate Subcommittee Investigating S-4 Disaster,

United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: A copy of the proceedings and findings of the board appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of determining what responsibility, if any, rested upon the commanding officer of the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding, or upon any officer or man aboard that vessel, for the collision resulting in the loss of the U. S. submarine S-4, has been furnished Captain Hooper of the Navy Department, pursuant to his request. It is understood that Captain Hooper is acting as technical adviser to your committee.

Very truly yours,

OGDEN L. MILLS, Undersecretary of the Treasury.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY MELLON

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

Monday May 7, 1928.

Secretary Mellon has just made public the findings of the board appointed by him to inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss of the U. S. submarine S-4, which occurred off Provincetown, Mass., on December 17, 1927. That board was appointed by him for the purpose of determining what responsibility for the collision, if any, rests upon the commanding officer of the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding or upon any officer or man on board that vessel. The board of inquiry consisted of Capt. Aaron L. Gamble, United States Coast Guard, as president; and of Capt. William J. Wheeler, United States Coast Guard; Engineer in Chief Robert B. Adams, United States Coast Guard; and Commander (engineering) Charles S. Root, United States Coast Guard, as members; also of Commander Russel R. Waesche, United States Coast Guard, as member and recorder.

The findings and recommendations of the board have been approved by Rear Admiral F. C. Billard, United States Coast Guard commandant, and by Secretary Mellon.

It will be recalled that Secretary of the Navy Wilbur, in announcing the findings of the Navy Department, stated that the matter of the responsibility of the Paulding for the collision was being referred to the Treasury Department for attention.

The complete findings of the board are set forth below:

FINDING OF FACTS IN REGARD TO THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE PAULDING AND THE U. S. S. "S-4"

The board finds that—

1. The S-4 left Provincetown Harbor at about 12.30 p. m., on December 17, 1927, to commence her submerged standardization trials in obedience to lawful orders of the Navy Department.

2. The submarine course used by the S-4 was the inner trial course on the approach to Provincetown Harbor, marked by white buoys designated as CAA, CBB, SCC. Neither Coast and Geodetic Survey Charts 1208 nor 341 (Provincetown Harbor) carries any notation indicating that the course used by the S-4 is an official trial course maintained by the Navy. The Buoy List published by the Lighthouse Service, referring to four white trial-course buoys on the outer course (not the one used by the S-4), carries the following remarks: "United States Navy trial course. In fairway from Race Point to Provincetown Harbor; masters of vessels must keep clear of them." The same Buoy List, referring to three white submarine trial-course buoys along the line of course that was used by the S-4, contains the remark: "Maintained by the United States Navy." It does not contain any injunction relative to keeping clear of these buoys.

3. It appears from the testimony taken before the naval court of inquiry that this trial course was established by the Navy in 1909, and that standardization trials for 49 submarines have been held there, or an average of one submarine in approximately 42 months. It also appears from the testimony taken before the naval court that none of the officers and men on board the Paulding had ever seen a submarine operating there submerged.

4. The United States Coast Pilot, Atlantic coast, section A, under "Directions, Provincetown Harbor," contains no reference whatever to either of these trial courses. It directs the mariner bound into Provincetown Harbor to follow the trend of the shore between Wood End and Long Point lighthouses, giving it a berth of three-eighths mile. The trial course that was used by the S-4 runs parallel to the stretch of beach between Wood End and Long Point and about half a mile from the beach. Therefore the mariner who carries out the instructions contained in the Coast Pilot while entering Provincetown Harbor would proceed in close proximity to this said trial course. It is a matter of common knowledge that all shipping coming into Provincetown from around Race Point, or bound out of Provincetown around Race Point, will pass closely adjacent to this trial course, there being no inhibitions, whatever, against such action, but, on the contrary, such action being suggested by the Coast Pilot.

5. According to the testimony of the officer in charge of the Wood End Coast Guard Station who quoted from official records, there came in and out of Provincetown Harbor in the years 1925, 1926, and 1927, approximately 33,000 boats of more than 5 tons, and approximately as many boats of less than 5 tons; that schooners, destroyers, ships, barges, and, last summer, the battleship Texas, anchored there, and quite often large freight steamers came in and anchored from stress of weather.

6. Since 1907 the monthly pilot charts published by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy have borne a United States submarine warning flag with the following legend: "The submarine distinguishing and warning flag is hoisted on the tender or parent ship of the United States submarine to indicate that submarines are operating in that vicinity. It consists of a rectangular red flag with while center on which is the profile of a torpedo in black. Launches accompanying submarines also fly this flag. Vessels seeing this signal should give the escorting vessel a wide berth and keep a good lookout for submarines.'

7. The Navy Signal Manual, 1920, Navy Department, C. S. P. 293, page 125, section 661, has the following: "The submarine warning flag is hoisted on the tender or parent ships of submarines or on launches accompanying them to indicate that submarines are operating submerged in that vicinity."

8. No submarine warning flag was displayed anywhere in the vicinity of the trial course during the trials of the S-4.

9. The Navy tug Wandank was at Provincetown during the trials of the S-4, under the orders of the representatives of the board of inspection and survey, and was available to display the submarine warning flag.

10. According to testimony given before the naval court of inquiry, owing to modern developments and improvements in submarine constructions, particularly since the World War, enabling these vessels to look out for themselves, the use of special warnings regarding the proximity of submarines has not in recent years been considered necessary or desirable by officers of submarine experience. However, the fact that the submarine warnings were no longer regarded as necessary by the Navy was not published, nor was the fact that practice had been discontinued communicated to the Coast Guard.

A

11. On the day of the collision the Paulding in the usual course of her duties of inspecting a large area, including Provincetown Harbor, for violation of customs and other laws, rounded Cape Cod shortly after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. strong wind was blowing with heavy swell and white-capped waves, the sky being overcast. The destroyer followed the course prescribed by the published manuals for approaching Provincetown Harbor, using the fairway indicated and in regular use by all vessels bound for Provincetown.

12. On the bridge of the Paulding were the commissioned officer of the deck, the junior officer of the deck (the latter a chief quartermaster of 10 years' experience, mostly on Navy destroyers), the quartermaster, and the man at the wheel. Moreover, the commanding officer was on the bridge at the time of the collision, although he had stepped into the chart inclosure for an instant to consult the chart a few seconds before the presence of the submarine periscopes was observed. The officer of the deck, junior officer of the deck, and quartermaster were actively and vigilantly maintaining a lookout in the direction in which they were proceeding. The lookout maintained was a proper and sufficient lookout under the circumstances.

13. The Paulding followed a course parallel to the outer trial course buoys at a distance of two to there hundred yards. She passed the buoy CD on the port beam, at a distance of 500 yards, and changed course to 94° true at 3.33 p. m.