familiarity with the essential details of construction of submarines and a knowledge of the rescue vessel under his command, even though he may not have had any special knowledge of these types of vessels previously; that the lack of such knowledge on the part of Rear Admiral Brumby prevented him from contributing that superior and intelligent guidance, force, and sound judgment expected from an officer of his length of service, experience, and position; and that holding such an opinion, the court believed it was its duty to report that opinion to the Secretary of the Navy. The court further believed the usefulness of Rear Admiral Brumby as commander of the control force was so impaired by the lack of knowledge shown in his testimony that he should be detached from that command. Various details of Admiral Brumby's testimony were then quoted to show that he was not familiar with the details of the work. Admiral Brumby, who was at this time in charge of the control force operating in the Caribbean, was called upon for a statement regarding the unfavorable recommendation of the court in regard to himself. His statement is to the effect that prior to his appearing before the court at Boston the judge advocate had told him in a general way what he wanted to cover and that the testimony had been directed along these lines; that there were other officers at hand who could give technical details to the court and who were to testify afterwards; that he anticipated no technical questions and, therefore, could answer them only in general terms; that he invites the department's attention to the conditions prevailing at the scene of the disaster for the first few days and that a period of nearly four weeks had elapsed between that time and the date on which he testified before the court; that during this period his time and attention were fully occupied with the work at hand and that he feels it natural, under the conditions and press of circumstances, that some details should escape his memory; that when the court asked questions that he could not answer with absolute certainty he said that he did not know in order to save time and to avoid giving vague answers, although at the time of the operations he was fully conversant with the work going on and could have answered any technical questions regarding it. After considering the above report of the court of inquiry in revision, the Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, stated that he still disapproved the findings of the court that any personal responsibility rested on Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones of the S-4 and that he did not concur in the court's recommendation regarding Rear Admiral Brumby and recommended that no action be taken by the department along the lines set forth by the court. The S-4 was raised on the 17th of March, 1928, and was placed in dry dock in the Boston Navy Yard, March 19, 1928, at which time a board of investigation convened to make a careful and complete examination of the S-4 and report upon the condition of all machinery, position of all valves, fittings, and other operating equipment. The board found out very little of importance that had not already been ascertained by the divers while the vessel was on the bottom. On the 15th of March, Lieut. Commander Thomas J. Doyle, United States Navy, counsel for the personnel of the S-4 submitted a letter to the Secretary of the Navy protesting against the finding of facts and the opinion and recommendations of the court of inquiry. His point is that it was the radical changes of course and illogical handling on the part of the Paulding that caused the collision and that the S-4 was doing her best to avoid the Paulding. He insists that the S-4 tried to dive to get under the Paulding at the last minute. That when she first started to come to the surface she was far enough away to show herself properly to the Paulding and enable the Paulding to avoid her but that the Paulding was not keeping a lookout and did not see the S-4 until very close at which time the Paulding was swung to the right and ran into the S-4. In other words, that had the Paulding not swung to the right there would have been no collision. That there is nothing to show an error of judgment on the part of the S-4, any more than one might say an automobile driver's judgment is at fault to be driving his car at a time when another driver suddenly swerves his car over to the wrong side of the road and collides. On the 26th of March, 1928, the Secretary of the Navy directed that the court of inquiry reconvene at the navy yard, Boston, Mass., for the purpose of obtaining such additional information as might be then available since the S-4 had been raised. The court studied the report of the board of investigation previously mentioned, also the S-4 herself, and called various witnesses as follows: Lieut. Commander E. P. Eldridge, United States Navy, a submarine member of the board of investigation, told the court what was found inside the submarine. He stated that as far as he could see there was nothing in the S-4 to indicate loss: of control or lack of control of the ship and that the ship was in normal condition for operating at the time of the accident. That no soda lime containers were found in the S-4. Lieut. Commander George B. Dowling, Medical Corps, attached to the Naval Hospital as pathologist stated that in his opinion the six bodies removed from the torpedo room indicated a death from drowning. Commander H. E. Saunders, Construction Corps, stated that he had accompanied the board of investigation when they examined the S-4 in dry dock and that from his investigation during the salvage operations and since, the watertightness and air-tightness of the vessel as a whole was remarkably good. He reconstructed for the court his idea of what happened within the S-4 at the time she went down. The court found that the bow of the Paulding pierced a hole in the pressure hull of the S-4, 22 feet long and 1 foot wide, on the starboard side, which permitted water to flow into the battery compartment of the vessel and also damaged one main ballast tank. That the control room of the submarine was completely flooded immediately after the flooding of the battery compartment by means of water passing through a ventilating pipe in the bulkhead. That this ventilating pipe and valves in it were clogged with débris washed in by the rush of water which prevented the valves from closing. That neither the ballast-tank salvage line or the compartment salvage line was damaged. That no soda lime was carried in the S-4. That all personnel in the S-4 died from drowning. That the S-4 at the time of the accident was in normal operating condition. The court considered the letter previously mentioned which had been submitted by Lieut. Commander T. J. Doyle, counsel for the personnel in the S-4, but made no remarks in regard to it. Early in April, 1928, the Secretary of the Navy disapproved the recommendation of the court of inquiry in regard to Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEDURE OF THE COURT 1. The court first met at 10 a. m. on January 4, 1928, at the navy yard, Boston, Mass., and decided to sit with open doors. 2. At the request of the court, the S-8 was at the Boston Navy Yard available for the use of the court under orders from the Navy Department. The S-8 is a sister ship of the S-4. During the period from December 12 to December 17 she had been engaged in standardization trials under orders similar to those under which the S-4 was acting and had finished these tests. 3. The Coast Guard destroyer Paulding, one of the vessels in collision, was hauled out on the ways at the Boston Navy Yard. The Monaghan, the sister ship of the Paulding, was also made available for the use of the court of inquiry. 4. The Falcon, Bushnell, and the S-6, another sister ship of the S-4, were at Provincetown, Mass., engaged in the salvage of the S-4. 5. The court determined to sit at the navy yard, Boston, where the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding and the U. S. S. S-8 could be used for reference during the taking of testimony. It also determined to visit the scene of the collision as frequently as might be necessary in order to inform itself as fully as possible of all facts surrounding the collision and rescue operations, holding practical demonstrations and reenactments as might be deemed desirable. 6. Having obtained testimony in regard to the movements of the Paulding and the S-4 through the captain of the Paulding, the captain of the S-8, and other testimony, a day was devoted to the reenactment of the events preceding the collision, using the Monaghan, the sister ship of the Paulding, and the S-6, the sister ship of the S-4. The movements of the vessels were regulated to correspond to those of the Paulding and S-4 on the day of the accident, restricted by certain limitations imposed to safeguard the crews; the speeds were identical and the hour of the day the same. 7. On the S-6 were four experienced submarine commanders and on the Monaghan were three experienced destroyer commanders, as observers; there were also on the Monaghan the captains of the Conyngham and Paulding. The court was on the tug Sagamore anchored in prolongation of the range of the standardization course about 350 yards from the buoy C-AA and 200 yards from the wreck of the S-4. 8. This reenactment under local conditions was made specially to study visibility, and if practicable, to show the distances at which a submarine could see a destroyer, and a destroyer see a submarine running with the periscopes exposed over the identical courses and at speeds that had been used by the vessels which collided. 9. The only variable factor likely to enter would be the weather conditions and the vigilance of the lookouts. The following day the court heard the testimony of the observing destroyer and submarine captains who appeared before the Court. 10. The weather conditions on December 17 were accurately described in the logs of the various vessels present on that date and in the log of the Wood End Coast Guard Station, all of which were available to the court. The weather in the forenoon of December 17 was also testified to by the commander of the submarine S-8. The weather during this reenactment differed from that of December 17 in that the wind was 1-2 instead of 5 and the sea "smooth" instead of "choppy." 11. On account of these differences the commanding officer of the S-8 was sent to Provincetown to keep the court informed of the weather conditions actually existing at that place and when the weather conditions simulated those of December 17 to inform the court. On Tuesday, January 17, such information was received; the court proceeded to Provincetown; took a position similar to that occupied on the previous occasion; the S-6 was again sent over the course to simulate the movements of the S-4 on December 17. On this test all of the members of the court, observing independently, sighted the "feather" of the periscope of the S-6 at a distance of about 2,500 yards and thereafter were able to keep it in sight with the naked eye during the entire run of the S-6 over the course. 12. The commanding officer of the S-8 had made numerous standardization runs over this course, passed end buoy C-AA and turned off the course planing toward the surface as a routine procedure. He was directed to carry out again this procedure on the S-6, putting over the steering rudders and the diving rudders at the angles found on the S-4, and to come to the surface after a given number of seconds as indicated by the movements of the S-4. This maneuver was made to check the testimony given by two eye-witnesses from the Wood End Light Station. 13. On the Paulding a reenactment with a stop-watch was had of the movements of the different men on the bridge from the time of sighting the submarine until the collision. The average time of these movements was 12 seconds, and in no case did the individual time differ by more than one second from the average time. 14. The Monaghan, the sister ship of the Paulding, was tested, while making a speed of 18 knots, to determine the time to come to a speed of less than 1 knot when engines were put full speed astern; and the angle through which the bow would swing in 12 seconds after the order "full right" to the helmsman. 15. The time of lowering periscopes on the S-8 from full height to positions found to exist on the S-4 was 11 seconds. 16. As a result of these data and the testimony given, the court was enabled to establish a clear picture of the movements of the vessels on the day of the collision and check in several ways the testimony of different witnesses as to elapsed times between important events; to plot the position of the ships on the chart with accuracy; and to establish critical points at which action was necessary to avoid collision and beyond which any action would be futile. 17. The court examined all persons that could be found that could throw any light on the collision or on the subsequent rescue operations, or who indicated in any way a desire to appear before it." 18. A letter was addressed to the mayor of Provincetown, Mass., requesting him to advise the court of the names of any persons who had witnessed the collision or who had submitted plans for the rescue. 19. The court gave the most liberal interpretation to its precept in order to obtain any evidence that might throw light on the matter of the inquiry, particularly that which might deal with the efforts to rescue the crew of the S-4. FINDING OF FACTS IN REGARD TO THE LOSS OF THE U. S. S. "S-4" The court finds that CONDITION OF "S-4" 20. The S-4 left the navy yard, Portsmouth, N. H., on December 15, 1927, to hold standardization trials in the vicinity of Provincetown. 21. The S-4 had just completed her annual overhaul, and all repairs requested by her commanding officer affecting the safety of the ship, operating either on the surface or submerged, had been made. 22. Just prior to leaving the navy yard the S-4 had undergone special tests to insure her water-tight integrity submerged to a depth of 200 feet. 23. She was fully manned by a competent crew of officers and men. 24. The S-4 left Provincetown Harbor at about 12.30 p. m. on December 17 1927, to commence her submerged standardization trials in obedience to lawful orders of the Navy Department. THE SUBMARINE TRIAL COURSE 25. The submarine course used by the S-4 at Provincetown is an official trial course maintained by the Navy. 26. This trial course was established in 1909 and has been continuously in use for the trials of submarines since that time. 27. The records of the board of inspection and survey show that as many standardization trials of submarines have been held in the month of December as in any other month of the year except September. 28. This trial course is particularly adapted for the purpose used, for the following reasons: (1) It is outside and removed from sea lanes; (2) there is but little shipping in and out of Provincetown passing adjacent to the trial course except small coasting and fishing vessels; (3) it is in close proximity to a sheltered harbor; (4) it has deep water over its entire course; (5) it is protected generally from prevailing winds; (6) it is free from conflicting tidal influences; and (7) it is close to two navy yards. 29. The course is primarily used as a submarine trial course. 30. It has been used for conducting trials of submarines during every month of the year except January and February. SUBMARINE WARNING FLAG 31. No submarine warning flag was displayed anywhere in the vicinity of the trial course during the trials of the S-4. 32. The Wandank was at Provincetown during the trials of the S-4 under the orders of the representative of the board of inspection and survey and was available to display the submarine warning flag had it been considered necessary or desirable. 33. Since 1907 the monthly pilot charts published by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy have borne a United States submarine warning flag with the following legend: "The submarine distinguishing and warning flag is hoisted on the tender or parent ship of the United States submarines to indicate that submarines are operating in that vicinity. It consists of a rectangular red flag with white center on which is the profile of a torpedo in black. Launches accompanying submarines also fly this flag. Vessels seeing this signal should give the escorting vessel a wide berth and keep a good lookout for submarines." 34. The Navy Signal Manual, 1920, Navy Department, C. S. P. 293, page 125, section 661, has the following: "The submarine warning flag is hoisted on the tender or parent ship of submarines or on launches accompanying them to indicate that submarines are operating submerged in that vicinity.' 35. Owing to modern developments and improvements in submarine construction, particularly since the World War, enabling these vessels to look out for themselves, the use of special warnings regarding the proximity of submarines is not considered necessary or desirable by officers of submarine experience. STANDARDIZATION TRIAL PROCEDURE 36. The knowledge obtained from standardization trials is essential to the efficient and safe operation of submarines. 37. The standardization trials were to be conducted under the immediate direction of a representative of the board of inspection and survey, Navy Department, namely, Lieut. Commander W. F. Callaway, United States Navy, an officer of long experience in submarines. 38. In conducting standardization trials the representative of the board of inspection and survey gives the commanding officer a program of procedure. The commanding officer is at all times responsible for the handling and safety of his ship. 39. During submerged standardization trials both periscopes are exposed from 2 to 6 feet (periscope depth); one periscope is used for observing range marks; the other for lookout and navigational purposes. The deck of the S-4, when running at periscope depth (2 to 6 feet of periscope exposed), is about 20 feet below the surface of the water. 40. A man looking through a periscope can see surrounding objects as well as a man with one eye sitting in an open boat looking through a telescope. 41. Conducting standardization trials by submarines is no more hazardous than other submarine operations. 42. The depth of water on the inner trial course, where the S-4 was operating at the time of the collision, was about 100 feet, sufficient to permit her safely to pass beneath surface vessels of any draft. 43. The S-4 on the inner trial course, running at periscope depth, could see a surface vessel approaching Provincetown, as was the Paulding, at a distance of about 5,000 yards or for at least six minutes before meeting, if the surface vessel were making 18 knots and the submarine 6 knots directly toward each other. 44. Until the Paulding changed course at buoy CD to the true course of 94°, her course was well clear of the path of the S-4. 45. The normal procedure for a submarine when at the end of a run making submerged standardization runs is to put the rudder over to turn away from the course and then turn with opposite rudder rounding to on the reverse course for the next run. 46. It is the training and duty of the commanding officer of a submarine running at periscope depth to keep clear of surface vessels. TRIAL RUNS OF "S-4" 47. The S-4 was seen by the lookout at the coast guard station at Wood End at various times during the afternoon of December 17, running such trials over the inner trial course between white buoys C-AA and C-BB. 48. Shortly before 3.30 she was seen making a submerged run at periscope depth to the southwestward over the inner trial course (from buoy C-BB to buoy C-AA). 49. The S-4 finished the run, passed buoy C-AA, and following the normal procedure, turned at the end of the run and changed course to the left. 50. After passing buoy C-AA she also began to come to the surface. 51. It was a normal and proper action to come to the surface to show herself to an approaching destroyer if ample time remained for the destroyer to pass clear or after having completed the day's work. 52. At 3.37, when the superstructure was showing about one-third of its height above the water, the S-4 was struck just forward of the 4-inch gun on the starboard side by the United States Coast Guard Destroyer Paulding and sank with all hands on board, going down by the bow. RESULTS OF COLLISION 53. The S-4 lies on the bottom in latitude 42° 00′ 39′′ north, longitude 70° 10' 57'' west; depth of water, 102 feet. 54. As a result of the collision and the sinking of the S-4 the following lost their lives: OFFICERS Jones, Roy K., lieutenant commander. Fitch, Graham N., lieutenant (junior grade). MEN Bethke, Clarence F., engineman (first class). |