acquainted with these particular vessels. They also have a much higher average of intelligence and can be trusted to look out for themselves and use initiative. He has met very few divers in civil life who are in that same class.

He stated that he was familiar with the art of deep-sea diving and had made a study of it. He had learned to dive in deep water on the S-51 job. He had carefully studied the record of every submarine sinking of every navy in the world that was available. He had written for publication by the Navy Department a full report of the salvage operations on the S-51. He is thoroughly familiar with all salvage and rescue devices on our submarines.

He arrived at Provincetown on a destroyer from the Boston Navy Yard Sunday night and was with some difficulty gotten on board the Falcon by means of the Coast Guard lifeboat, which was the only boat able to live in the seas at that time. The Falcon was at this time moored over the wreck and had had divers down Sunday afternoon and evening. At the time he got on board Diver Michaels was unconscious and in the compression chamber. Weather conditions were at that time decidedly too bad for diving to be attempted. Early Monday morning Michaels was still very weak and the weather not improved; in fact diving was quite out of the question. Admiral Brumby, on the advice of the doctor and other officers, decided to take Michaels to Boston with the Falcon in order to save his life and return to Provincetown the same evening. He learned the conditions as found by the divers on the S-4 and that there were signs of life in the torpedo

room.

He heartily agreed with Admiral Brumby, Captain King, Commander Saunders, and Lieutenant Hartley of the Falcon in the decision to try to lift the whole boat first by means of blowing the ballast tanks. There was a chance to bring the submarine to the surface, which in the end was the only possible way to get any men out of her alive. He gives considerable testimony concerning valves, air lines for salvage and rescue purposes; also the qualifications of the divers, their training, care, etc., also the story of the divers in their remarkable work on the S-4, the very bad conditions with which they had to contend, etc., a complete story of the operations on the S-4 during the first week or so, and the reasons therefor.

He explained carefully, the reasons for every move made, including the consideration of all sorts of ideas and schemes; states that tunnels were started for passing chains under the bow on Thursday forenoon; gives considerable data regarding facilities of commercial salvage companies and how they compare with the equipment owned by the Navy; states that in commercial savlage work there is never any element of rescue involved; that in cases of marine disaster, rescue operations such as apply to submarines do not similarly occur in merchant vessels. He gives reasons why this is the case, and why a submarine is the only type of vessel which can sink and still have people alive in her; that Navy personnel furnishes the most efficient facilities for rescue operations in the case of submarine disaster; gives the facilities and provisions the Navy, makes for training divers and keeping submarine rescue equipment on hand. That the efficiency of a first class diver in 100 feet of water as to doing work is from 0 to 25 per cent of what he could do on the surface. That the divers who are engaged in the operations on the S-4 represent the best diving efficiency in the country at this time. That all of the equipment that was available was delivered at Provincetown as soon as physical conditions permitted. As to the promptness of the initiation of rescue operations after the accident he says, "I carefully examined all of the messages, letters and reports that were sent in connection with this accident, and in my judgment very speedy action was taken to mobilize and send to that point all the ships and material that would have been of the slightest benefit." He tells about the use of pontoons for rescue and salvage work; that pontoons arrived at Provincetown long before they were actually needed.

He tells at great length about the details of a diver's work in deep water, his equipment, etc.; how long divers can stay down; how many can be used at a time, etc.; how the rescue vessel Falcon is used in connection with this sort of work. He states that people in this country whether in or out of the Navy who know most about salvage and rescue work, and who were most competent were all on the scene of the disaster before he got there, that is Sunday night. He compares the adequacy of rescue and salvage devices and equipment belonging to the United States Navy with that of other navies. Discusses salvage ships; that is, vessels designed to lift sunken submarines by means of cranes or other mechanical means such as the German vessel Vulcan; discusses all sorts of safety devices, such as lifting eyes, rescue helmets, telephone marker buoys, etc. He states that no submarine of any nation in the world sunk in such a depth of water has been

raised by the efforts of her own crew, except the cases where the submarine was undamaged; that there is no vessel better qualified for rescue and salvage work than the Falcom; that the rescue operations at Provincetown were dependent to a great extent totally upon the Falcon; that the Falcon arrived on the scene of the disaster promptly; that the leading salvage company in the United States is the Merritt, Chapman & Scott Co. of New York; that the most effective way of salvaging submarines is by pontoons; that a vessel of about the size of the Falcon is the best type for rescue vessels in submarine work.

Lieutenant Commander Bayliss, commanding officer of the destroyer Paulding, and an interested party to the proceedings, took the stand at his own request, and was shortly afterwards named as a defendant; stated that he had been going to sea since 1902 in sailing vessels and various merchant ships, and has been in command of vessels since 1919; has been in the Coast Guard since 1907; that no limits were placed upon him as to the speed of his ship while on patrol duty in Massachusetts Bay. He stated that on the afternoon of the accident, as it was getting a little late, he considered 18 knots necessary to cover his area before dark; gave a summary of his duties while patrolling, the size of his crew, and the duties of the individuals on board. He stated that it is required by law to have a lookout at night, but that a lookout is not required during the day; that there was no lookout on this day assigned as such; that the visibility was good; that it was overcast and blowing freshly from the northwest. The sea outside was quite rough and that inside there were considerable number of whitecaps. He gave all the details of the accident as he saw them from the bridge of the Paulding, and the measures that were taken to buoy the spot afterwards, also regarding the distress signals which he sent out immediately; says he is not familiar with submarines and he has seen very few of them operating along our coast; that after lowering a boat the Paulding proceeded into the harbor, since she was leaking very badly; says that the weather for a couple of days after the accident continued very bad, making boating practically impossible; that the Paulding had a draft forward of 10 feet 4 inches and aft 9 feet 10 inches.

Rear Admiral L. A. Bostwick, United States Navy, president of the board of of inspection and survey, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., was called as a witness. Lieut. Commander W. F. Calloway, who lost his life on the S-4, was a member of the above board of inspection and survey, and was carrying out the standardization trials under the direction of Admiral Bostwick. The witness gave the duties of Lieutenant Commander Calloway in connection with this work; showed the orders from the Navy Department under which the board was operating; gave the status of Mr. Ford, a civilian draftsman, assistant to Lieutenant Commander Calloway, and who also lost his life in this accident; gave the previous service and record of Lieutenant Commander Calloway, showing that this officer was an experienced submarine officer; showing the order under which the tug Wandank was operating, under the direction of Lieutenant Commander Calloway; states that had Lieutenant Commander Calloway desired the Wandank to act as station ship off Provincetown while S-4 was conducting her trials, he could have so directed her, states that the seasons of the year has little or nothing to do with the standardization trials on the Provincetown course; that the records show the standardization trials of 49 submarines which have been held in this place distributed over the various months of the year; that training in the Navy is not limited to any particular time of year or any particular kind of weather. In his judgment Provincetown is not in a sea lane; that the particular trials course in question is considered to be probably the most desirable course we have for submarines and small vessels. In his opinion the trials held by the S-4 did not require submergence below periscope depth, and that the submarines should have clear view of the horizon at all times. He explained what these standardization trials are and why it is necessary to hold them.

Ensign G. M. Phannanmiller, United States Coast Guard destroyer Paulding, was called as a witness. This officer was the officer of the deck at the time of the collision. He states that he has had three years' and eight months' service in the Coast Guard, was at the Coast Guard Academy three years, and was then assigned to the Paulding, February, 1928. He says that he has had considerable experience as deck officer when cruising at 18 knots.

That he had seen one submarine off Cape Cod during this time and off New London. That he had never seen submarines in submerged condition with periscope showing. He had received no special instructions regarding submarines. Says he knows the general appearance of a submarine and also the appearance of a periscope. Says that if he saw a submarine operating submerged at periscope depth he would not know instinctively what it was, but that he would know after looking at it for a second.

Gives the duties, as he understands them, of the officer of the deck of the Paulding while underway. That on the day of the accident, three men kept lookout, but that there was no specific lookout.

That the weather at the time of the accident was-sea, choppy; northwest wind force 4; visibility, good; cloudy. He believes it was overcast practically all of the time.

Says that he knew the measured mile range might be used by submarines. He had never seen any small vessels on the range for that purpose.

Gives all the details of the navigation of the vessel just prior to the accident and what he saw of the accident. Told what took place on the bridge of the Paulding before and after the accident, and what the personnel were doing.

Charles E. Reed, chief quartermaster, United States Coast Guard, was called as a witness. Stated that he was on watch as junior officer of the deck at the time of the accident. Stated that he was examining a vessel through a pair of binoculars and did not know anything was wrong until he heard some orders being given in the center of the bridge.

Says that he would be able to recognize a submarine operating at periscope depth. Says he first saw the S-4 when less than 100 feet ahead of the Paulding and that her periscopes were about 3 feet out of water a little on the port bow. States he took some bearings immediately after the accident while the tail of the submarine was still visible on the port side.

Says that when the Paulding hit the S-4 the impression was that she was sliding up over the top of something, and that he observed the bow of the submarine become higher, and that the destroyer slid off of the submarine and dropped down quite a good deal.

Walter C. Rheingans, seaman, first class, destroyer Paulding, was called as a witness. Stated that he had been in the Coast Guard service 172 months, with no prior experience on sea-going vessels.

Had been
Also

Had the duty of quartermaster on watch at the time of the accident. looking at a schooner through a pair of binoculars just before the accident. looking at some storm signals flying ashore through a pair of glasses. Stated he saw two periscopes about 50 to 75 yards ahead of the Paulding about 3 or 4 feet out of the water, and thought they were markers for fishing buoys or lobster pots, and that at the same time the officer of the deck saw them and gave the order "Full right rudder.

James C. Milazzo, seaman, first-class, destroyer Paulding, was called as a witness. This man was the helmsman at the time of the accident. Stated he had been in the Coast Guard for two years and four months. Did not see anything of the submarine before vessel struck. Was looking at his compass all the time. Ensign James A. Tyler, United States Coast Guard, destroyer Paulding, was called as a witness. This officer was engineer officer of the Paulding at the time of the accident. Has had four years and four months service. He saw the submarine on the port side with her stern out of water shortly after the accident.

Lieut. C. J. Flotte, Medical Corps, United States Navy, was called as a witness. This officer has specialized on diving and the care of divers and was ordered to the Falcon for the rescue and salvage operations.

Stated that he had specialized since 1923 in deep-sea diving, the training of divers, the study of the cause and treatment of caisson diseases and other diseases of divers. Has treated many cases of caisson disease for the tunnel workers at New York. States that there are only two other officers in the Navy who have any knowledge of this work, and that there are very few in civil life.

Stated that he had orders on December 18 to proceed immediately to Provincetown and report for duty in connection with the rescue operations on the S-4. He arrived there at 1 p. m. on the 19th, from Philadelphia. Said he had great difficulty in getting on board the Bushnell, since the seas were running very high and the ship was practically covered with ice. Stated that from his experience on the S-51 job he would consider diving operations on Monday as suicidal. That conditions were the same on Tuesday. That conditions on Wednesday were much better, and that diving was resumed. That at this time of year it is considered unsafe to expose a diver more than one hour at the bottom due to the temperature of the water. That there has been very little diving done in cold weather, and that the air lines tend to fill up with frost and soft ice. That after a diver has been down 100 feet for one hour it takes about one and onehalf hours to decompress him.

Gives a great deal of data about diving and the difficulties encountered at Provincetown due to the unfavorable weather conditions. Gives data on the amount of free air, oxygen, CO2, etc., in submarines, and how long these gases

will last, and the effect on the personnel, etc. Also the use of soda lime for air purification.

States there is no pain in connection with death by carbon dioxide.

States that he believes everything was done at Provincetown that was humanly possible.

Harry C. Coffee, chief machinist's mate, destroyer Paulding, was called as a witness. This man was on watch in the engine room of the Paulding at the time of the accident. States that he has been in the Coast Guard for two years; previous service four years in the Navy as a gunner's mate. Held the rate of machinist for 14 years in civilian life.

Stated that he was in charge of the engine room at the time of the accident. Explained the use of the engine-room telegraph system from the bridge.

States that he is positive the engines were turning astern at the instant of collision. States that he was at the throttle at the instant of impact, but that after hearing the signal from the bridge it took him one minute to get there from where he was working in another corner of the engine room.

Rear Admiral Philip Andrews, United States Navy, commandant of the Navy yard, Boston, and first naval district, was called as a witness.

The shore end of the rescue and salvage operations was handled from Boston by Admiral Andrews. He gave in detail the things that were done by his authority as soon as the first word of the accident was received at 3.49 on the afternoon of December 17. Many telegraph messages and radio dispatches were sent in all directions to ships and shore stations, including the Navy Department. Destroyers at the navy yard were utilized as dispatch vessels to take material and personnel to Provincetown. Officers and men were taken from various ships and sent where they could best be used in connection with the accident.

States that he had considered that he had full authority to buy or procure any services that might be of assistance without red tape. That everything needed by the salvage officers was considered urgent. All of this is set forth in great detail.

George C. Manning, lieutenant commander, Construction Corps, United States Navy, was called as a witness. This officer is on duty at the navy yard, Boston. He made a report on the damage as found on the destroyer Paulding as a result of the collision. This report is marked "Exhibit No. 17."

Harvey F. Johnson, lieutenant commander, United States Coast Guard, was called as a witness. This officer is attached to the Boston Navy Yard and submitted a report as to the damage sustained by the destroyer Paulding as a result of the collision. Exhibit No. 17.

Capt. H. D. Cook, United States Navy, assistant commandant, first naval district, Boston, Mass., was called as a witness. This officer conducted some tests with another submarine and another destroyer off Provincetown in order to try to simulate conditions obtaining at the time of the accident to the S-4.

A large number of experienced observers were taken out on the vessels for this purpose and the tests conducted on two different days. The testimony of Captain Cook and the following named officer observers bears on the result of these tests: Commander J. H. Dessez, United States Navy, a destroyer officer; Commander W. H. Lassing, United States Navy, a destroyer officer; Lieut. William Wakefield, United States Navy, a submarine officer; Lieut. Commander W. M. Quigley, United States Navy, a submarine officer; Lieut. Clark Withers, United States Navy, a submarine officer; Lieut. Frank L. Worden, United States Navy, a submarine officer.

These tests were carried out in great detail, indicating that the periscopes could be seen at considerable distance, particularly when using binoculars. The destroyer could also be seen readily from the submarine at considerable distances.

Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy, commander of the control force, was called as a witness.

Admiral Brumby is in charge of submarines on the Atlantic coast, and was in charge of the rescue and salvage operations on the S-4 for a considerable period of time from the beginning until the latter part of January. Stated that he graduated from the Naval Academy 321⁄2 years previous.

He gave in a general way the procedure followed upon receipt of news of the disaster at 4.30 p. m. on the 17th of December. He was then at New London, Conn., as was also the rescue vessel Falcon. Stated that he had the best possible help with him in Captain King, Commander Saunders, Lieutenant Commander Ellsberg, and Captain Hartley of the Falcon, and that in every case there was

unanimity of opinion as to what should be done, and that the final decision was his in each case, as was also the responsibility.

Does not attempt to go into details of the rescue and salvage work with any great accuracy as to times. Also states that the testimony as regards technical details be left to others who can probably answer them better than he can. On certain details he stated that he did not know or that he did not remember. Stated that he was not thoroughly familiar with the details of construction of the submarines. That he had had command of them for only six months.

That to his knowledge there is no vessel in the world better equipped for rescue and salvage work than the Falcon. He would have had no hesitation in calling on any other ship if he had needed it. Considered that he had full authority to send for anything that he wanted.

Stated that he kept two derricks belonging to the Merritt & Chapman Co. for some time but was unable to use them; there was nothing they could do; that he had them there in case there should be something they could do.

Stated that pontoons were started immediately from New York yard and Norfolk yard and arrived in plenty of time.

Stated that he had received many recommendations from civilian personnel as the means that might be employed in the rescue or salvage operations; that they had all received careful consideration and that not one of them could be used on the S-4. That when diving was discontinued Sunday night the wind was blowing about 48 miles an hour. That the only way to save the lives of the men in the submarine was to get the boat to the surface. That there was no disagreement as to the connections made to the air lines.

States that he thinks there was absolutely nothing left undone. Thinks that everything that could have been done by anybody was done.

Howard Wilcox, United States Coast Guard, was called as a witness.

This officer has duties at headquarters of the district commander of the second Coast Guard district, having 22 Coast Guard stations embracing the coast of Massachusetts from Plum Island to Woods Hole, including Cape Cod.

Gave testimony as to the duties of the Coast Guard station at Woodend, which is close to the scene of the S-4 disaster, and from which station Coast Guard men saw the collision take place.

Stated that Coast Guard stations do not make report of all ships they observe; only things out of the ordinary are reported, such as distress signals.

Stated that he was in Provincetown on December 17 and had no knowledge of any submarine in that vicinity. Stated later, however, that he saw two submarines either on the 16th or 17th of December. He made no report of the presence of these submarines to his division commander. Produced a certified log of the Coast Guard station at Woodend, which shows particularly the weather obtaining about the time of the accident and afterwards.

Stated that since he has been in Provincetown, a little over two years, súbmarines in that vicinity have operated on the surface and submerged at different periods of each year. He considered it as an ordinary performance and the Coast Guard in that vicinity so considered it.

Boatswain E. F. Gracey, officer in charge of the Woodend Coast Guard lifesaving station, was called as a witness.

This officer witnessed the collision of the S-4 and the Paulding from the shore about 1,200 yards away, and gives a very good account of the accident seen from some little distance, but does not bring out anything more than we have gotten from other witnesses. He immediately had a life-saving boat manned and stood by the place where the S-4 sank all through the night, up until about 10 o'clock Sunday forenoon, and was the means of locating the S-4 in order that divers could proceed with their work.

Frank E. Simmons, surfman, Woodend Coast Guard station, was called as a witness.

This man also witnessed the accident and gives about the same testimony as other witnesses.

Capt. E. J. King, United States Navy, commanding U. S. S. Wright, was called as a witness.

Captain King had general charge of the salvage operations of the S-51. He was ordered immediately to Provincetown to assist Admiral Brumby, where he arrived at about 11 a. m. on Sunday. After Admiral Brumby left Provincetown, the latter part of January, Captain King remained in charge of the work and raised the S-4.

Captain King stated that he had been in the naval service for about 30 years and had had considerable duty in connection with submarines since 1922.