submarine S-4, which occurred off Provincetown, Mass., on December 17, 1927, which board was appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of determining what responsibility for the collision, if any, rests upon the commanding officer of the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding or upon any officer or man on board that vessel. (The documents above referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:)

ABSTRACT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY CONVENED AT THE NAVY YARD, BOSTON, ON THE 4TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1928, IN CONNECTION WITH THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE COAST GUARD DESTROYER "PAULDING" AND THE SUBMARINE "S-4," NEAR PROVINCETOWN, ON DECEMBER 17, 1927

The court was constituted as follows:

Rear Admiral R. H. Jackson, United States Navy, senior member and a member of the General Board, Navy Department.

Rear Admiral J. L. Latimer, United States Navy, member of the Naval Examining Board, Navy Department.

Capt. J. V. Ogan, United States Navy, a submarine officer and at present on duty in the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department.

Commander L. E. Bratton, United States Navy, judge advocate.

The department detailed Lieut. Commander P. H. Dunbar, United States Navy, a submarine officer, as counsel for the judge advocate; and Lieut. Commander T. J. Doyle, United States Navy, a submarine officer, as counsel for the personnel who lost their lives on the S-4.

Commander Bratton, as judge advocate, the first witness, stated that he had made a request upon the Navy Department to facilitate in every way a full and complete inquiry into the accident. That the S-8, a sister submarine to the S-4, be present at the navy yard, Boston, for the use of the court, and suggested the desirability of the court going on board the S-8 at once for inspection of this vessel and examination of her equipment. The S-8 had preceded the S-4 in conduction of trials at Provincetown on the measured mile. The same officer from Washington who conducted the trials on the S-8 also conducted them the following day on the S-4 and lost his life as a result; that the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding was then at the navy yard (hauled on the marine railway) and available for inspection by the court; that the commanding officer of the Paulding as an interested party to the court, has been requested to station his men on the bridge of the Paulding in the same manner as they were at the time of the accident, in order that the court, in inspection, may visualize the conditions thereon.

The court then proceeded to inspect the Paulding and S-8. The crews of both vessels were stationed as outlined above and test made of the time to perform certain operations on board. The court examined the bow of the Paulding and the damage caused by the collision.

Lieut. Frank L. Worden, United States Navy, commanding officer of the U. S. S. S-8 was called as a witness. He submitted a set of blue prints showing the construction of the S-8 and S-4. He explained to the court the function of the different compartments and apparatus on the submarines. He explained the use of the periscope and the use of the central operating room from where the vessel is controlled while submerged. Since the position of the periscope as found on the S-4 excited considerable comment and specualtion, he was questioned at length on the probable conditions under which they were used just prior to the accident. It was brought out that with the submarine traveling submerged with its priscope out of the water about 4-feet there would be 20 feet of clearance over the deck of the submarine, and that had the S-4 remained as close as it could to priscope depth the Paulding would have passed over her without touching unless she happened to strike the priscope or the top of the conning tower.

He explained the use of the listening device on submarines, and give the standard practice for their use in the service while submerged, as far as he knew. The point was brought out that when a submarine has the use of its periscope, the listening device although usually manned, is not necessary, since the commanding officer is capable of seeing any ships in the vicinity on the surface.

In connection with the trials engaged in at Provincetown he pointed out that two periscopes were used-one for keeping a lookout and the other for observing the range marks on shore.

one.

He has had six years submarine duty and about 32 months in command of He explained the use of the salvage lines and their connections which were used in the rescue and salvage work of the S-4. He explained the sources of air and oxygen afforded in the submarine while submerged and that the normal air in the submarine should last the crew about 17 hours before they become uncomfortable. That there were compressed air reservoirs within the vessel holding considerable air at 2,800 pounds pressure per square inch which could be used. That there were oxygen bottles in the submarine containing oxygen of about 2,000 pounds per square inch for the use of the men. That as to the supply of soda lime which is used to purify the air, he carried none on the S-8 and believed there was none on the S-4. He stated that the S-8 had carried out trials on the measured mile at Provincetown from December 12 to 16 and explained the nature of these trials. Also he states that Lieut. Commander W. F. Callaway who, as a representative of the board of inspection from Washington, had charge of the trials. He explained the disposition of the crew within the submarine while conducting such trials and the special apparatus installed for getting the engine revolutions accurately.

He explained the use of the water-tight doors between the compartments in the submarine and their openings in the bulkheads; also the method of closing and making tight these builkheads in case of accident. That all water-tight doors could be closed in a few seconds after the alarm was given. That no surface vessel interfered with the trials of the S-8 and that in several cases surface craft saw his periscope and got out of his way.

That there was no surface craft stationed for warning purposes during the trials of the S-8 and that he did not consider such a vessel necessary or desirable. That he considered if a vessel had been so stationed for that purpose it would have been just one additional vessel to have kept a watch on and keep clear of, and that having two periscopes available there was no reason why any ship should have been there to give warning. That during the trials of the S-8 the naval tug Wandank was at Provincetown Harbor for the use of the officer conducting the trials. That during the period the S-8 was conducting trials they saw little or no shipping. That it is very usual for submarines to operate where there are surface craft. That submarines get a great deal of training by operating in such areas as they are trained to see and at the same time not be seen. During a war being seen would probably be fatal, and for that reason all of the training is in getting in to make an attack and getting away without being

seen.

That he had made no objection to holding the trials as ordered on account of the weather and he saw no reason why submarines should not operate in cold weather. That it is disagreeable, but submarines have to operate in all kinds of weather all through the year.

That at the end of the run on a measured mile the S-8 came partly to the surface while making a turn to run back over the range in order that any fishing vessels in the vicinity might plainly see the submarine. That in normal procedure in holding the submerged runs in question the submarine would not come to the surface.

His estimate as to the speed being made by the S-4 at the time of the accident was between 6 and 8 knots. That the S-8 in making her trials ran as close to the range buoys as possible and when passing the last buoy made a cirlce with the left rudder in order to reverse the course and make another run in the opposite direction. That the point where the S-4 sank is roughly on a circle the submarine would normally make in turning to the left, as mentioned above.

That the S-8 was in Provincetown up until noon of the day of the accident. That the wind was about 20 miles an hour and the sea choppy and that the white caps would somewhat reduce the chances of seeing the periscope from the conditions obtaining on a calm day. That the destroyer would not be able to see a periscope more than 1,000 or 1,500 yards if the lookout were on the alert.

He estimated that the submarine should have had the Paulding plainly visible for about six and a half minutes before the accident. He gave testimony regarding certain passages in the Submarine Manual regarding the use of the periscope, listening gear, keeping a lookout, and safety precautions in general having to do with submarines, and that submarine commanders in general follow closely the provisions of this manual. That there is an endeavor being constantly made in

the submarine force of the Navy to standardize the practice within the boats so that conditions existing on one would exist on another. That he did not ask to have the tug Wandank to warn ships off the trial course, but that she remained at anchor in the harbor.

That it would be possible to hear a destroyer making 18 knots at a distance of about 16 miles under most favorable listening conditions, with the listening apparatus installed, but that conditions at Provincetown were far from favorable. Rough weather, character of bottom, speed of submarine, etc., sometimes make detection of propeller sounds practically impossible. That the approximate heading of a submarine submerged with two periscopes showing can not be estimated very closely. That about the only thing to be distinguished about a submarine submerged with periscopes out is the feather or wake made by the periscope as it comes through the water at the surface. He believes it is always the practice of submarine officers to keep a lookout all around the horizon while running at periscope depth and that it is taught throughout the submarine service that the greatest danger is the possibility of a collision while running submerged. That from his personal acquaintance with the commanding officer of the S-4, Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones, he considered him to be very cautious and careful, and at times overly cautious in the performance of duty.

That it is absolutely necessary for the person controlling the movements of a submarine, in order to avoid collision, to have some idea of the course and speed of the other vessel. He read from the Atlantic Coast Pilot Chart for January,

19128, a legend as follows:

"United States submarine warning and submarine distiniguishing and warning flag is hoisted on the tender of parent ship of United States submarines to indicate that submarines are operating in that vicinity, which consists of a rectangular red flag with white center on which is a profile of a torpedo in black. Launches accompanying submarines also fly this flag. Vessels seeing this signal should give such vessels a wide berth and keep on lookout for submarines.”

The witness stated that the practice of flying this flag does not now prevail when a submarine is operating independently. That the S-8 on her trials sent out only a radio to the Navy Department at Washington indicating her arrival at Provincetown. That when running the trials on S-8 he swept the whole horizon with the periscope on an average of once a minute and that he was looking ahead and on each bow two-thirds of the time. That the trial course under consideration is in the fairway for vessels entering Provincetown. That Provincetown is not a steamer lane as he understands it.

That the trial officer, Lieutenant Commander Callaway, had told him that Provincetown was the best range on the coast. That the trial range at Provincetown he considers to be the safest and most satisfactory place to conduct trials on submarines. That since the war submarines have improved greatly in allaround efficiency and ability to take care of themselves and that since that time the submarine warning flag has not been used.

That the Submarine Manual places a high degree of responsibility on a submarine and her commanding officer. It is entirely his responsibility as to how he handles his boat. That there is no need for a vessel to pass close to the range buoys to enter Provincetown Harbor. He believed that in the case of the S-4 had she carried soda-lime the period of life of the crew would only have been extended three to five hours longer.

Commander E. W. Strother, United States Navy, commanding submarine division 12, of which the S-4 was a unit, was called as a witness. He stated that his flagship was the tender Bushnell, which was in Portsmouth Navy Yard at the time of the accident. That he had been in command of the division about a year and a half. That the S-4 had just completed an overhaul and repair period at Portsmouth the day before her trials and was in first-class material condition. That he has inspected the S-4 a number of times and found her well administered and her commanding officer to be excellent and very careful. That there were four officers attached to the S-4, namely, Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones, commanding_officer; Lieut. J. A. McGinley, executive officer and navigator; Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Weller, chief engineer; and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Fitch, torpedo officer. That the station of the commanding officer would normally be at the periscope. That the executive officer and the chief engineer would be in the control room and that the torpedo officer would be in the torpedo room. That on December 17 the Bushnell was in Portsmouth Navy Yard with three of her submarines administering to their needs.

That the trial course at Provincetown is not in a steamer lane and that there is a general absence of ships there. That it is a favorable location for a trial course. That he considered it would probably be more pleasant to hold trials in warm weather and in warm water but that submarines do not operate always under ideal conditions and in training for war service, the waters in which the submarine operates can not be fixed. That it is endeavored in handling and

operating submarines to operate them in all kinds of weather during all times of the year. That the submarines at the school at New London operate all the year around except when the river is so full of ice that they can not go out to dive. That the tests which the S-4 was holding at Provincetown were not being made under any unusual operating conditions. He gave the story of what happened on the Bushnell, upon receiving word of the accident Saturday afternoon. That he was ashore and was gotten by telephone about 5 o'clock. A hurried conference between the commandant and the various officers in authority at Portsmouth outlined what they thought should be done while the Bushnell was getting up steam and preparing to leave for Provincetown. All available divers were assembled with diving gear. The tug Wandank was called by radio and ordered to drag for the S-4. The S-8 was called by radio and told to return to Provincetown. The Bushnell left Portsmouth at 7 p. m., having on board special equipment and officers from the navy yard and from other craft there. Commander Saunders, Construction Corps, who is an expert on rescue and salvage work, also in the design of submarines was on the Bushnell. She arrived at Provincetown at 1.15 a. m., Sunday. Having used the radio considerably en route, had a conference upon arrival, with the commanding officers of the Wandank, S-8, destroyer Paulding, and Coast Guard boat which had been watching the position where the S-4 sank.

The seas were so heavy upon arrival at Provincetown that the Bushnell could not lower a boat and had to go inside the harbor to hold a conference.

The Coast Guard shore boat continued to drag all night with grapnels. She got the S-4 once but lost her again. This was the only boat that could operate outside the range that night. Buoys had been placed in the evening close to the wreck. When the Falcon arrived bringing Admiral Brumby, the commander of the force, about 7 a. m., he took charge of the situation. The scene of the accident during the night was being covered by searchlights from mine sweepers Lark and Mallard which vessels, with the S-8, remained at anchor in the vicinity of the wreck.

The S-8 reported she could hear nothing from the S-4 during the night and that at daylight when the Bushnell proceeded to the wreck they had still heard nothing. About two o'clock Sunday afternoon when the first diver went down, the S-8 reported that she heard distinct tappings from the S-4.

The Bushnell did not have on board divers qualified for the depth of water in question. The Falcon had such divers and proper equipment.

The Bushnell remained at Provincetown all during the rescue and salvage work, close to the wreck, and acted as a depot, supply and repair ship for the force engaged in the work. The S-4 had been in commission since 1919. If the Bushnell had gone to Provincetown with the S-4 she would have remained in the harbor during the trial and acted as a place for the Board of Inspection to work from and in which to live. If she had gone to Provincetown with the S-4 she could not have done the work she was to do for the other submarines in Portsmouth. There were six submarines attached to the Bushnell. The tender can not be with them all during their operations. He stated as an example how impracticable it would be for a tender to be with any submarine that was operating since at New London when the division was diving during the fall each boat had a different area to work in, the area covering many square miles. He explained the difference between a tender and a rescue ship.

It is frequently the case that a submarine may have two or more officers attached to her, qualified to command the vessel. All submarine officers are graduated from the Submarine School and are able to perform and practice all different duties on board. The S-4 had two officers qualified to command and another one who was to have qualified very soon. Other trial courses he had been familiar with were in traffic lanes such as the one near San Pedro, Calif. In operation with the fleet, the submarines operated independently or in groups of two or three boats in a section, and that during this time the mother ship or tender was stationed probably 40 to 50 miles away. The submarines did not see her from the time they left for the maneuver until they returned some days later.

When the S-4 left the Portsmouth Navy Yard on December 16 she had no items of work uncompleted which had to do with the safety of the vessel.

Lieut. Commander Leroy Reinburg, United States Coast Guard was called as a witness and stated that

He was commander of division 3 of the Coast Guard destroyer force, operating in New England waters. The Paulding was one of the ships of his division. He told the court the duties of the Coast Guard destroyers in their normal work.

The duties were numerous and that prevention of smuggling and rum-running was included.

The individual destroyers work in certain areas in accordance with orders given just previous to their sailing from port and inspect all shipping they see or suspicion. They steam at reasonably high speed in order to cover the territory in a reasonable time and that 20 knots is about the average speed for his destroyers on this duty. The Paulding was assigned an area which took in all of Massachusetts Bay and the shore of Cape Cod. There were four other destroyers of the division at sea the day of the accident. The area assigned was to be covered in one day. A vessel which was known to be a notorious offender had been seen in the vicinity of Cape Cod a short time before and if the Paulding had steamed at a low speed such as 10 knots he would not have finished covering his area on that day as ordered.

The commanding officer of the Paulding has served in the division under his command for three years and has performed his duties in an excellent manner. He considers the commanding officer of the Paulding to be one of the best seamen in the Coast Guard and was commended last winter for some rescue work in a northeast gale.

The Coast Guard Regulations require the commanding officer to maintain proper lookouts and the custom is to have on the bridge, while under way, one commissioned officer, a chief petty officer, a quartermaster, a lookout and a man at the wheel and that at times when maximum visibility prevails, the station of the man on lookout is aloft in the crows nest. On the day of the accident he had the lookout on his ship, inside the screens, on the bridge on account of it being a very cold day and a rather high wind.

He stated that he had been operating around Boston for 34 months and did not know that submarines were operating in the waters around Provincetown submerged. He has seen them in that area but always on the surface. He has never seen submarines in this area submerged. He has seen them submerged around New London. He understands that the area around New London is a submarine area and expects to see them there. He has never discussed the question of submarines with his officers. He has heard of submarines operating on the surface unaccompanied by a mother ship. He is familiar with the chart of Provincetown Harbor and the fact that the measured mile exists there for the use of the Navy.

Mr. Edward Ellsberg, chief engineer of the Tidewater Oil Co. of New York, was called as a witness. He stated that

He had previously been a lieutenant commander, Construction Corps, United States Navy, and as such had been in charge of the salvage work on the S-51 and that immediately upon hearing of the accident to the S-4, had volunteered his services and had enrolled in the Naval Reserve on December 18 and proceeded immediately to Provincetown.

He told the court of his duties in connection with raising the S-51, which was a similar job to the one on the S-4. He was actually in charge of the operations on the S-51 and received letters of commendation and the distinguished service medal for his work in connection therewith.

The submarine is a type peculiar to the Navy and has no place in the merchant marine. The salvage operations in connection with them are peculiar to the Navy. A study of the problem in this country and abroad shows definitely that there is no salvage company that could do the work that is required for raising submarines at sea and in this country in particular, no commercial salvage concern has had any such experience. No commercial concern has any equipment that is adaptable to submarines outside of harbor waters.

In the case of the S-51 a certain commercial company bid on the job and included in the contract that they wrote up that the Navy must furnish all equipment and that all the company would furnish was one tugboat, four divers, and wreck master.

One commercial concern worked on the S-51 job the first week but they were unable to do anything. As a result of their experience they came to the conclusion that if they attempted the job they could not use the equipment they had and desired the Navy to obtain the equipment for them. Their need and use for such equipment was so rare that they would get no adequate return from it on other jobs. They had four divers, only one of whom had previously gone down to the depth in which the S-51 lay (120 feet).

Navy divers have considerable advantage over commercial divers in that they are usually torpedo men or machinist mates by trade and understand naval vessels. Nearly all of our divers have served on board submarines and are