I have also been crusing off New London, where submarines are operating frequently, that being a submarine base, and there we see them many times; but this course here is infrequently used, so far as I know. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Do you know of any instructions that mariners should keep a certain distance away from the buoys marking the trial course that the S-4 was using? Commander BAYLIS. No, sir; there are no instructions that specify the distance to be kept off. This is not a prohibited or restricted area. There is nothing to show that on the charts, or in the publications, or anything else. The usual practice is, and it is the understanding of seafaring people, that if they are using it there will be a tender with them and a warning displayed that way. Take foreign nations; I have cruised in foreign waters, and on some of their charts I have seen where some areas are set aside for submarine practice, and vessels are warned to keep out of those areas; and if a tender is out with a flag marking the trial course, and so forth, foreign instructions are that they must give these vessels a certain distance; a mile off, I think. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. That is all. Senator ODDIE. The Secretary of the Treasury, in the findings in the Coast Guard inquiry, states that the Paulding was keeping a sharp, efficient, and proper lookout according to law, the Coast Guard regulations, and the practice of seamen. Will you state or produce the Coast Guard regulations permitting Coast Guard vessels to run without a regularly assigned lookout? Commander BAYLIS. I have not the regulations here. The regulations state that a lookout must be maintained at night and in thick weather, and so forth. Senator ODDIE. Will you place extracts from those regulations in the record? Commander BAYLIS. I have not the book here. Senator ODDIE. I will ask you to put those extracts in the record. Commander BAYLIS. The regulations, so far as I know, were made up in conformity with the law and good maritime practice. Senator ODDIE. Will you have them placed in the record? (The extracts referred to were later furnished and are here printed as follows:) EXTRACTS FROM REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, NOVEMBER 1, 1923 THE COMMANDING OFFICER ART. 827. When under way at night, he shall have a lookout stationed forward and others elsewhere if necessary. He shall see that the running lights are kept in order and burning brightly, unless it be expedient to conceal them. (Page 80.) ÁRT. 828. When at anchor at night, he shall have the proper lookouts stationed, and shall require that the anchor lights be kept burning brightly. He shall see that lookouts are stationed during the day as may be necessary, and shall always have at least one lookout stationed forward when underway in thick weather due to fog, mist, falling snow, heavy rainstorms, or other causes. In all cases the commanding officer shall require a strict compliance with the "Rules for preventing collisions." (Page 81.) OFFICER OF THE DECK ART. 968. The officer of the deck is the officer on watch. He shall be responsible for the safety of the ship, subject to any orders received from the commanding officer. (See arts. 824, 930, and 983.) (Page 97.) ART. 969. He is the representative of the commanding officer, and every other person on board subject to the orders of that officer, except the executive officer, shall be subordinate to him. (Page 97.) ART. 970. He shall, when the vessel is under way, and at all other times when sea watches are being stood, remain on deck and in charge until regularly relieved. He shall not engage in any occupation that will distract or tend to distract his attention from the care of the vessel. (Page 97.) He ART. 980. He shall see that the lookouts and other members of the watch are at all times alert, at their stations, attentive, and ready for duty and that they understand their duties; that every necessary precaution is taken to prevent accidents; that a boat is always ready for lowering and the life buoys ready for letting go; that the sails are trimmed to the best advantage, and that everything is ready for shortening sail, particularly in squally weather. He shall exercise great care that the ship is skillfully steered and kept on her course, and shall keep a correct account of the courses, the speed and leeway made. shall see that the running lights are kept burning brightly from sunset to sunrise, and that their condition is reported to him every half hour except, when for any reason they are not set (see article 1499-k), he shall have them ready for immediate use; that the provisions of law to prevent collisions are fully complied with when approaching vessels and at all other times; that such extra lookouts as may be deemed necessary are stationed; that nothing is placed near the compasses that will change their errors; and that the signals for closing the watertight doors and hatch covers are sounded at once when there is danger of a collision. (Page 99.) Senator ODDIE. Your immediate superior, Commander LeRoy Reinberg, testified before the naval court of inquiry that instructions are given in the regulations in regard to lookouts; that the commanding officer is required to maintain proper lookouts; that the custom is to have on the bridge while under way one commissioned officer, a chief petty officer as his assistant, a quartermaster, a lookout, and a man at the wheel; and that on December 17 his vessel, his ship the Coyningham, had a lookout stationed on the bridge. Commander BAYLIS. Yes, sir. This man he refers to, that I called the junior officer of the deck-that was more of a term of flattery than anything else his sole duty was to look out; but as he had the rating of a chief petty officer, a man of more responsibility, it added a little more dignity to call him the junior officer of the deck. Senator ODDIE. In regard to these buoys, did you know that there had been submerged submarine practice there previously? Commander BAYLIS. No, sir; the only indications we had that there was a submarine trial course are those stated in the publications; and I have been going up there for a year and a half, and have never seen submarines operating submerged off Provincetown. Senator ODDIE. They might have been operating on days when you were not there? Commander BAYLIS. I have seen submarines operating in that vicinity, but never submerged. In fact, we have reports of submarines operating submerged with a tender following the submarine. That came up shortly after there was this trouble with the S-4. I have a report of a submarine that had come up suddenly near a vessel, and that the tender was following astern about three-quarters of a mile, displaying a flag. This followed just a few months after the Paulding got in there. The practice with all seafaring people is to expect a warning of that nature. All people that go to sea have no other warning. Senator ODDIE. You are familiar with the buoy list? Commander BAYLIS. Yes. Senator ODDIE. And the buoy list gave notice that these buoys were used to mark a trial course for the Navy? Commander BAYLIS. Yes, sir. Senator ODDIE. Was not that notice that they might have been used by submarines? Commander BAYLIS. Yes; it states that they are submarine trial buoys. Senator ODDIE. Under the circumstances, would it not have been likely that a submarine might have been operating there submerged? Commander BAYLIS. It would indicate that this trial course was used by submarines, but it would not be any indication that they were operating submerged, unattended, unless notice had been given. We have received notice of submarines operating south of Montauk, and have been requested to keep clear of those areas. Of course, New London is a submarine base, and they operate there frequently. But if this was a test course, as I understand it, it seems only the right thing to do that a warning of some kind must be displayed; because this is a harbor of refuge, it is used by coasting vessels, and may be used by foreigners, etc., who would not have that information; and they are accustomed to receive these warnings. This accident which I interpret to be just fate-could have happened to you or to a foreign ship that came in, or any vessel at all who would have had no warning whatever. Senator ODDIE. That completes my questions. I do not think there is anything further. Have you anything that you would like to put in the record? Mr. CUNNINGHAM. No, sir. Senator ODDIE. Will you get for the record the data I asked you for? Commander BAYLIS. Yes, sir. Senator ODDIE. The committee thanks you, Commander Baylis, for coming before us and giving this testimony. Commander Hoover, you have some data that the committee has requested you to secure. Commander HOOVER. Yes, sir. Senator ODDIE. I will ask you to put that in the record now. STATEMENT OF COMMANDER J. H. HOOVER, UNITED STATES NAVY-Resumed Commander HOOVER. The committee has asked that I submit certain official correspondence relating to the S-4 disaster and in connection with further criticisms of the Navy, made by Representative Griffin, of New York. The letters in question are as follows: CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, NAVY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, House of Representatives. MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The inclosures deal with criticisms of the Navy with respect to submarine safety, rescue, and salvage appliances sent by Representative Griffin, of New York, to your committee members. Special reference is made to the S-4 disaster, the inference being that had the S-4 been equipped with all of the devices mentioned and had the Navy owned salvage or lifting vessels such as those in Germany had at the end of the war, the results of the collision between the S-4 and Paulding would have been quite different. The most important result to be desired is the saving of lives, The Navy Department believes this to have been problematical in the extreme in this case and testimony by the country's best talent before the Senate Committee for Investigation of the S-4 disaster now in session brings out conclusively that no safety devices nor salvage apparatus known to be of practicable use anywhere in the world would have saved a single life under the conditions obtaining at Provincetown at the time of the accident and succeeding days. The Navy Department feels that Mr. Griffin has drawn erroneous conclusions from the replies to his questionnaire received from our naval attaches abroad. It may be of interest to discuss' briefly the items he mentions in the inclosed letter: (a) Germany has no submarines; nor has she had any since 1918. The statement that many of her submarines were fitted with lifting eyes before the war signifies little. We, too, had submarines fitted with lifting eyes. The vessels at that time were small and the whole problem quite different from what it is to-day. Both of the German salvage vessels referred to were destroyed after the war, being considered to be of insufficient value to the Allies to warrant retention. We favor the combination of a rescue and salvage vessel, equipped. with the most modern diving apparatus and specially trained divers. The vessel is also fitted to handle pontoons with which a damaged submarine of any size can be raised, we believe, more quickly and efficiently than by any other means.. It is significant that the British have no lifting vessels; nor does France contemplate building any more craft of this description; this in face of the fact that she has submarines much heavier than the capacity of her largest "lifting dock.' The reason for the evidenced lack of faith in this method of submarine salvagelies in the inability to use a surface lifting vessel for handling such heavy weights in anything but sheltered and absolutely still water. (b) The separate compartment air inlets reported by the British, we believe, refers to their new submarines. Recent United States submarines also have these fittings, and they are likewise to be installed in older types in the near future. (c) The telephone buoys reported as being in use by the French and Italian Navies were also used by United States submarines at one time. Their use was discontinued, however, upon recommendation from the submarine personnel afloat. Our experience in the use of these buoys has led us to the conclusion that in order to be theoretically effective there should be one in each compartment of the submarine (six or more), and that since the chances of their being of any practicable important use are so remote, we are not justified in sacrificing the large amount of valuable space and weight they would occupy in our submarines to the necessary exclusion or reduction of other more important material or military features. (d) Automatic or self-contained diving apparatus is available for use in United States submarines, though to date its practicable application for submarine rescue work in deep water has not been satisfactorily demonstrated. Exhaustive research has been carried on for some time in this connection, and some recent results seem to indicate that we may yet find a reasonably safe method whereby entrapped personnel may be enabled to escape from a submarine at considerable depth. The exit locks for escape purposes reported by the Italians to be installed in their new construction are also fitted to the more modern United States submarines and will, of course, be continued in our new construction. In regard to the S-4 (and this applies equally to almost all of our present submarines), it must be borne in mind that she was designed in 1916. Methods of construction and devices which are commonplace to-day were not known at that time. Unlike a surface ship, very little of importance can be done to improve or change a submarine after it is once built. Again the S-4 was not of sufficient. size to have incorporated in her all the appliances which are easily installed in newer and larger vessels. Consequently, it is unreasonable and unfair to class such old vessels with new construction and by comparisons deduced criticise the Navy's submarine activities and design. Sincerely yours, C. D. WILBur. Hon. CURTIS D. WILBUR, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Doubtless you have all of the information contained in the letter inclosed herewith from Congressman Griffin, anent safety devices for submarines, but it occurred to me that you might be interested to glance at what he is apparently sending to all members of our House Naval Affairs Committee. Sincerely yours, A. PIATT ANDREW. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: I address you as a member of the committee on submarines of the House Naval Affairs Committee. If you have not read my remarks in the Congressional Record of May 17 on pages 9276-79, I would deem it an honor if you would do so at your earliest convenience. I think you will be interested in the subject because I included a questionnaire, which I forwarded, through the courtesy of the State Department, to our naval attaches in Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome, with the replies thereto, showing that the foreign navies are better equipped with submarine safety devices than our own, thus confirming my charges made at the time of the S-4 disaster. The German Navy, for instance, equips its submarines with grappling rings, marker buoys, air inlets and diving chambers, and further has built two salvage vessels with a lifting capacity of 1,200 tons. If we had such a vessel the S-4 could have been lifted bodily, as her dead weight was 1,000 tons. You will recall that she was actually lifted with six pontoons having a lifting capacity of 480 tons. In the British Navy we find the British submarines are equipped with a separate salvage air inlet to each compartment. The French submarines are equipped with telephone buoys and a separate air inlet for each compartment. In addition to that they have folding life boats and automatic diving apparatus. The French Navy has three lifting or salvage docks with a lifting capacity of from 500 to 1,000 tons. In the Italian Navy all sumarines of new construction will have two teleopone signal buoys, one at the bow and the other at the stern. Each compartment is provided with separate air inlets and two exit locks for the escape of the crew, one at the bow and the other at the stern. Even the turret is so constructed as to serve as an exit lock. I will appreciate it if you will be good enough to cooperate and use your influence to have some action taken on the Butler resolution before the adjournment of Congress. With best wishes, ANTHONY J. GRIFFIN. The committee has also asked me to give them a little more information about the pontoon situation. As I stated previously, we are to have five sets of pontoons, one situated on the Atlantic coast, one in the Canal Zone, one on the Pacific coast, one in the Hawaiian Islands, and one in the Philippines. Each set consists of 10 pontoons of 80 tons lifting capacity each. The question was asked as to why only one set was assigned to the Atlantic coast, and what we expected to do should a V boat sink, which is of two or three thousand tons displacement, and what we expected to do should two submarines sink at the same time. In answer to these questions I will say that Admiral Hughes authorizes me to inform the committee that the department does not feel justified in recommending the building of any more pontoons than stated above. Each set costs between $150,000 and $200,000. |