distance. He may have thought he had sufficient time to blow. Conditions of the atmosphere affect the apparent distance of objects. On cloudy days, or dark days, an object appears much farther away than it does on a bright day. I remember in one case we built some periscopes through which we had beautiful vision from Bridgeport across Long Island Sound 17 miles. We took them over to Russia and we could not see well; we did not have natural vision because of the darkness of the days over there which made objects appear to be farther away than they really were.

So, there are many of those conditions that might have affected. the situation and on which we could speculate the Paulding changing her course the captain coming up so he could be near. Of course,

if he had gone down he probably would have been safe, but in times like that no one knows. It is an every-day occurrence with surface ships. Collisions are occurring right along, and it is not an unusual thing.

What attracted the attention of the whole world to this was that the men were alive for some days, which proves to my mind that the submarine is the safest type of boat there is because there is no other type of boat in which men can be submerged and remain alive for days.

These accidents prove to us that there are certain other things that should be done.

I think it is important that instead of having doors opening in one direction only, or closing in one direction only, there should be double doors that instantaneously close like check valves from either side; that immediately the water reached the depth of an inch on the floor the doors would close automatically or they could be closed by the pressing of a button by the commander in the conning tower.

Means to get air to these compartments should be provided and means to get the men out.

When these things are done, I believe we have got the safest kind of boats in submarines. They are the best defense we have, and we should not allow an accident of this kind to deprive the people of the United States of the best means of defense, I believe, that has been developed for coastwise protection.

Senator ODDIE. The idea is to try and make it safe, if it is possible. Have you something else to suggest?

Mr. LAKE. I think not, Senator.

Senator ODDIE. Commander Hoover, I would like to have the Navy Department make comment for the record on these suggestions that Mr. Lake has made. It will be helpful.

We thank you very much, Mr. Lake, for your valuable testimony. The committee will stand in recess until to-morrow morning at 10.30.

(Thereupon at 4.20 o'clock p. m. adjourned until 10.30 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, Thursday, May 24, 1928.)

INVESTIGATION OF SINKING OF THE SUBMARINE "S-4"

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1928

UNITED STATES SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in the room of the committee in the Capitol, Senator Tasker L. Oddie presiding.

Present: Senator Oddie (chairman).

Senator ODDIE. The meeting will come to order. Senator Gerry is engaged in a conference committee on the revenue bill and will not be able to be here until later. Senator Steiwer also is busy on official work.

The committee has decided that it will be advantageous to have the advice of the members of the Naval Consulting Board in conducting this investigation, and we appreciate the efforts that you gentlemen have made in coming before us. Will you give your full name and occupation and position on the board, Mr. Sprague; and then we will ask you to make your statement this afternoon when Senator Gerry can be here.

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. SPRAGUE, OF NEW YORK CITY

Mr. SPRAGUE. I am a member of the United States Naval Consulting Board, which was organized by Secretary Daniels, who was good enough to adopt certain suggestions which I made at the time.

This board is composed of about a score of men who were selected, two each as a rule, from various engineering societies of the country, and they therefore represent those societies, comprising a total membership of perhaps 60,000; not 60,000 individuals, but 60,000 memberships, some of which of course are duplicates.

I am an ex-naval officer, having graduated from Annapolis in 1878, just 50 years ago, and while at Annapolis two of my special studies were those relating to electricity and naval architecture.

I was a representative of the Navy at the Crystal Palace electric exhibition in 1882, and made the first report on modern electrical matters for the Navy.

I resigned in 1883, and since that time have been engaged in electrical development in pretty nearly all electrical fields; but I think it is unnecessary to go into any particulars with regard to these. I have had, however, a pretty wide experience in scientific development, and the development of apparatus for various purposes.

I have been the president of several of the technical societies, and for that reason, perhaps, was one of the members originally selected. While on the board, besides participating in the general discussions, I was the head of the committees on electricity and ship building, the duties of the board being more or less divided.

The Naval Consulting Board was brought into quite intimate contact with naval officers during the war. It unfortunately was not as constructive as many of us would have liked to have had it, and that was partly because of the urgent necessities of war and the conduct of a great organization carrying on war preparations and the conduct of war; but a number of individual members were given pretty wide latitude for experimental development. I was one of those who were fortunate enough to have a good deal of privilege in that respect. Mr. Edison was, and Mr. Sperry and some others.

My contact with naval officers during that period was a very agreeable and instructive one, partly because of my early naval training, and partly because of a recognition on their part that those of us who had gone into civil life and still retained a love for the Navy were willing to lend whatever aid they could in any form, which brought us a little closer to them than some others, perhaps.

I have taken occasion at different times to go out with various fleets. I spent a month with Captain Rodman when he was in command of the New York during battle maneuvers, on the way to and at Guantanamo, Cuba, some years ago, and made a report to the Navy Department of certain observations noted during that experience.

Later, at the time of the bombing of the German ships off the Delaware Capes, I was a guest of Admiral Hilary Jones, and had the opportunity of getting the reaction of himself and the other officers to the then very fast coming developments in aviation.

Later it was my privilege to go out on the Memphis on her first cruise, by way of the Panama Canal and to the Hawaiian Islands, as a guest of its captain, and in company with Admiral Rodman after his return from command of the battleships in the English Channel. I would not put myself forward in any way as an expert on submarine construction, or salvaging of submarines in case of disaster. I took, as every other man in the Navy, and as, perhaps, every other man, woman, and child that was of thinking age in the United States, intense interest in the circumstances surrounding the loss of the S-4, following the disaster to the S-51 some two years before, and disasters to other submarines both abroad and in this country. I followed, so far as the newspaper comments permitted, their story of what occurred and what was done, both at the time of the accident and afterwards.

I noted, of course, the flood of criticism-and quite natural criticism and the anxious suggestions which flooded the country, and I noted also some of the conclusions arrived at by the board of inquiry which investigated the conditions surrounding the sinking.

The Navy Department, of course, at once ordered, as it is required to do, a board of inquiry to ascertain the facts; and then, if I remember rightly, Congress took up very actively the question of an independent investigation, either directly under its own auspices-the auspices of the Senate as against the suggestion of an independent investigation by a board to be appointed either by the Secretary of the Navy or by the President on the suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy.

I felt at the time, inasmuch as a board of inquiry was under way, that undue haste in the appointment of some independent body was not likely to be constructive, and I took the liberty of wiring Secretary Wilbur, and suggested that it might be well, simply as a pre

caution, and for such aid as a board might give him, to call on it, also stating that I would like to come to Washington; to which he replied that if I had any suggestions about the appointment of a board he would be very glad to hear them.

Later, in talking to him on the telephone, I said I had no suggestions as to appointments, but I did wish to make some suggestions as to procedure, and the thought I had in mind was that he and they— the Naval Consulting Board-get together a group of 18 or 20 men, and discuss the situation. I thought that by attrition of minds they might make some suggestions of a constructive character. Nothing came of this suggestion, and I did not see the Secretary. I found I was unable to get to Washington, so I contented myself with telegraphing him pretty fully. Since that time I have taken no constructive steps of any character, aside from the fact that day before yesterday I was communicated with by Secretary Robins of the Consulting Board and asked if I could come down here and appear before the Senate committee. I felt a little reluctant, because unless I had something really constructive to add, over and above that which has already been presented to the committee or to the Navy Department, I thought I could not add very much of value. However, he said that the committee wished to talk to some members of the Naval Consulting Board, if they could be here, and I said that I would be very glad to be here and answer any questions that I could; premising, however, as I said, that I am not an expert on naval construction, as no man can be who is not actively engaged in the work.

Senator ODDIE. Now that we have the preliminaries in the record, we will recess until 2.30. Senator Gerry would like to be with me when we consult you.

(Thereupon, at 11 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The subcommittee reconvened, pursuant to the taking of the recess, at 2.30 o'clock p. m., Senator Tasker L. Oddie (chairman) presiding.

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. SPRAGUE, OF NEW YORK CITY

Resumed

Senator ODDIE. Mr. Sprague, we have a very limited time at our disposal for this work, and we would like to have you make a statement in as condensed form as possible, giving your views as to the various phases of the accident to the S-4, your opinion as to whether the Navy has used all the diligence possible, or whether it has been guilty of negligence in any way, and your opinion as to the various safety devices in use on submarines, or which might be used. That is quite a large contract, but it gives you a very wide latitude. You understand our purpose, to get material in the record that will be helpful and constructive.

Mr. SPRAGUE. I think that is a pretty large question you put up to me, Senator.