would accompany submarines when operating submerged; and that in the absence of such warning flags they had no reason to believe that a submarine was in the vicinity.

Under these conditions, with a choppy sea covered with white caps which made the sighting of a periscope difficult, if not impossible, and the "feather" not distinguishable from the white caps, the testimony of officers of the Navy showed that a submarine would not be observed by a lookout at more than 400 yards, or four lengths of the destroyer, a distance covered by the Paulding and the approaching submarine in approximately 30 seconds.

It must be borne in mind that a submerged submarine is an unusual object to be met in the course of navigation. It must also be remembered that periscopes are designed and painted to be invisible, "to see and not be seen." To determine when a lookout should see the periscope under the conditions stated above is a difficult problem that can not be determined by irrelevant facts. Subsequent observations as to the visibility of the periscopes of a submarine known to be in a particular spot have little probative value, and when these are made the basis for theoretical estimates concerning such visibility on the day of the accident they are at best only an indication of a possible maximum distance.

Not only, however, was it clear from the evidence that the commanding officer of the Paulding was free from blame, but the court of inquiry in its supplementary report makes statements of fact which are unwarranted on the evidence. example:

For

(1) It is stated that "the periscopes of the S-4 were observed from the Wood End Coast Guard station at least a minute before the collision," whereas the uncontradicted testimony shows that they were only observed for a few seconds before the collision and were then found with a high-powered telescope by an observer, not on a moving vessel in a choppy sea but on dry land, at a height greater than a bridge of a destroyer, and could not be even then followed continuously by the observer when he knew exactly where to look for them.

(2) It is stated that the inner measured trial course, near where the collision took place, was "plainly marked on the chart by white buoys and the legend 'measured mile"." This statement is not true. The chart was introduced in evidence and indicated only the outer measured course by legend and dotted lines but bore no legend or similar marks referring to the inner measured course. this connection it should be noted that on December 20, three days after the collision, a new chart was issued by the Coast and Geodetic Survey which for the first time indicated the inner trial course by dotted lines and legend;

In

(3) I note that the court emphasizes the statement in the Massachusetts Buoy Lists with reference to the buoys marking the outer measured course and the injuuction "masters of vessles must keep clear of them." The court implies that the Paulding was not obeying this warning, yet the evidence shows that it passed the outer course from 200 to 300 yards distant, and the buoy list contained no similar warning as to the inner course. Nevertheless, the Paulding was following a course well clear of these buoys also;

(4) The court states that it was convinced that "a well-trained lookout could and would have seen the periscopes and feather of the periscopes of the S-4 in ample time to avoid collision." Such a finding is not justified by the evidence of the naval officers who testified.

The court of inquiry to determine the relative visibility conducted two tests simulating the movements of the destroyer and the submarine, the first being on January 12 with a smooth sea and light breeze, and the second on January 17 when it is claimed that conditions were identical with those on the day of the collision. It was clear to the court that visibility on the first test threw but little light on the cause of the collision, and therefore, the second test was undertaken. However, the records of the Coast Guard station show that conditions were distinctly different on January 17 from those on December 17, there being less swell and a lighter breeze, which would mean less white caps and a less choppy sea. Therefore, neither test furnished a fair measure of the visibility of the periscopes, and we note that it is significant that no witnesses were called upon to testify as to the result of the second test, and the results thereof are to be found only in the conclusions of the court. With conditions as they existed on December 17 described carefully to them, the naval officers who testified estimated the distance at which a lookout on a destroyer, having no knowledge of the presence of a submarine, would see the periscopes, as follows:

With glasses, 250 to 400 yards; without glasses, 150 to 250 yards (Captain Cooke); less than 500 yards (Commander Dessez). Commander Lassing made no estimate except to state that it would probably be impossible to see the

feather at all and that under similar conditions he had seen a periscope at 700 yards at a time when he was looking for it. This summarizes all of the testimony of the Navy's own expert witnesses, and they were all on the deck of the destroyer Monaghan on January 12.

It would appear that the principal basis upon which the court attempts to justify its findings is the charge that no lookout was maintained on the Paulding "properly stationed so as to have an unobstructed view." The court finds, in direct contradiction of the evidence, that persons on the bridge of the Paulding who were supposed to keep a lookout had other primary duties which precluded their keeping a proper lookout. I note that the court failed to point out what other primary duties they believe these persons had which interfered with this primary duty. An examination of the evidence, however, shows that Chief Quartermaster Reed was on the right wing of the bridge performing the duties of lookout, using glasses when necessary, and standing in the open with absolutely nothing to obstruct the view. Nevertheless, in the face of this clear description of Reed's work and duties (testimony, p. 200), the court makes the unjustified statement that there was no lookout with an unobstructed view. In addition, on the bridge were two other persons besides the helmsman and the commanding officer, though the latter had for an instant stepped back into the adjoining chart house just prior to the collision. These men were engaged in the duties of lookout and were performing no other duties inconsistent with that of maintaining an efficient lookout. There is no evidence whatsoever that justifies the finding that there was not a proper lookout, that these men were not acting as lookouts, or that they had any other primary duties which interfered therewith. They were experienced, competent men, vigilantly performing their duties, the very essence of which was looking. If the doctrine of the court be accepted, it means that there was no proper lookout if at least one of these men charged with that duty did not unceasingly look for submarines and submarines only. Does the fact that one of these men glanced at a weather signal flying over the town, or that another observed the movements of surface vessel, or that a third looked ahead along the course the destroyer was following ipso facto disqualify them, even temporarily, as lookouts? To merely state this proposition is to demonstrate its utter absurdity.

Inasmuch as the court of inquiry has made no comment upon the statement contained in my previous letter with regard to the course of the submarine, I am forced again to call to your attention the fact that a collision with the Paulding or any other approaching vessel would have been avoided if at the end of the trial run the turn had been made to the right toward shore instead of turning to the left into the recognized fairway or channel.

While submarines are operating on the surface, they are, of course, subject to all the rules governing surface craft. While operating submerged, however, no rules are applicable except those that may be made by the Navy Department-which, alone, has jurisdiction. Accordingly, mariners should be able to rely upon the Navy to see to it that their navigating instructions, or the charts, etc., that they ordinarily use, are clear and unambiguous with respect to their duties in approaching submerged submarines or places where they might operate submerged. Also, the Hydrographic Office of the Navy, is charged with the duty of issuing “accurate" charts for the guidance of mariners, and it is to be expected that mariners will rely upon the Navy publications, when issued. The testimony indicates that the commanding officer of the Paulding did rely upon the publication issued by the Navy containing a legend relating to the operation of submarines, and that he was mislead thereby. The Navy court has found that the chart in question "may" be misleading. Accordingly, the position that he is to be seriously blamed for acting in accordance with his understanding of the chart is untenable.

In conclusion, I regret that the court of inquiry, instead of giving due weight to the facts as set forth in my previous letter, has, in attempting to justify its previous findings, made new findings of fact not warranted by the evidence and in some respects inconsistent therewith, thereby presenting an unfair and distorted picture which does great injustice to Lieut. Commander John S. Baylis, the commanding officer of the Coast Guard destroyer Paulding. The naval court has presented no fact or argument which convinces me of the soundness of its conclusion. Admirality courts have held that vessels operating in a fog or darkness must make their presence known by appropriate means, such as signals or lights. That similar warning should be given by a submarine submerged and therefore equally invisible is by analogy clearly evident. The Navy had 104672-28

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published to the world that warning flags would be displayed when a submarine was operating submerged. This simple rule for safety, formulated by the Navy itself, had, without any public announcement, been of late disregarded, as we now learn from the testimony for the first time. That it is a necessary precaution would seem to be indicated by the very fact of the collision When the officials of the Navy discarded this safety measure, without notice to mariners who had reason to believe that it was still in force, they of necessity assumed full responsibility for the consequence thereof.

I must therefore repeat my indorsement of the findings of the board of inquiry appointed by me, that Lieut. Commander Baylis was in no respect responsible for this most unfortunate collision.

Respectfully,

A. W. MELLON, Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I should like to introduce for such use as the committee sees fit to make of it a memorandum with respect to what we understand to be the practice of the British and French Navies in connection with submarines.

Senator ODDIE. That will be put in the record if you will furnish it to the reporter.

(The memorandum referred to is here printed, as follows.)

MEMORANDUM IN RE PRACTICE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH. REGULATIONS AND WARNINGS TO SHIPPING

At the hearing of May 9, 1928, Admiral Billard called to the attention of the committee the following information contained in the British Pilot for the mutual safety of surface craft and submarines operating submerged:

"Submarine vessels are being constantly exercised off the coasts of Great Britain.

"In order to minimize the risk of collision with other vessels, the vessel escorting the submarines will, when the latter are exercising, display a large red flag at the masthead.

"Every vessel seeing this signal should steer so as to give the escorting vessel a berth of at least 1 mile, and also to pass astern of her. When from any cause this can not be done the escorting vessel should be approached at a slow speed until warning is given by flags, semaphore, or megaphone, as most convenient, of the danger zone, a good lookout being kept meanwhile for the submarines, whose presence may be only indicated by their periscopes showing above the water."

He was reading from the 1922 edition of the West Coast of England Pilot. It was suggested that this rule or regulation might since have been changed, because of the development in submarines since 1922.

For the information of the committee, it appears pertinent to call attention to the fact that these publications are not annual publications. Supplements are issued annually containing any changes, and eventually the supplements are incorporated in a revised edition of the publication. (In the fore part of the publications of the Hydrographic Office, there are perforated slips entitling the holder of the book to annual supplements of the particular publication of the Hydrographic Office.)

The last British publication in the Library of Congress appears to be the Channel Pilot, Part II, ninth edition, published in 1927. This publication contains the same information as was found in the 1922 publication, above mentioned.

Finally, the publications issued by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy Department, and carrying information with respect to navigating off the coasts of the British Isles, contain this same information, unaltered by any of the supplements to 1928.

It is not without interest to note that there are trial courses over measured distances along the coasts of the British Isles, and that they are used by all craft whether making tests or not. However, if a ship is making a speed test, it is required to fly a prescribed flag to warn off other vessels who must keep clear. Unless such a flag is flown, other vessels are not expected to give the vessel making the test a wide berth.

The same is true in the matter of sweeping operations. Warnings to other craft are prescribed, and vessels are admonished, for their mutual safety, without violating the rule of the road, to keep out of the way of vessels flying such signals.

CHANNEL PILOT

Northwestern and north coasts of France from Pointe de Penmarc'h to Cap de la Hague, including the Channel Islands. Part II, 9th edition, 1927 (published for the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty).

REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO FRENCH SUBMARINES (P. 17)

When meeting other vessels, submarines navigating on the surface conform with the regulations for preventing collisions at sea.

Although submerged submarines may be met with in all French waters, masters of vessels should be particularly on the lookout for them, as regards the area covered by this volume, in the vicinity of Brest, St. Male, and Granville.

For the convenience of vessels making or leaving ports frequented by submarines, zones which are prohibited to submerged submarines have been established. Masters of vessels frequenting these ports are particularly recommended to navigate in these zones. The limits of the zones which are in the area covered by this volume are given on pages 42, 53, 59, 73 and 173.

When a submarine submerged is navigating in the roadstead of a naval port, she is escorted by a small vessel which carries in the fore part of the vessel a square flag, colored red and yellow, horizontally. Vessels in the vicinity must be navigated with great caution and a wide berth must be given to the escorting vessel.

SWEEPING OPERATIONS FRENCH REGULATIONS (P. 18)

Vessels are frequently engaged in sweeping operations off French ports. They carry two black balls and a green pendant, indicating that the sweep is about 112 cables astern of them, being marked by red floats. The vessels should be considered to be not under control and be given a berth of at least 11⁄2 cables.

MEASURED DISTANCES-FRENCH REGULATIONS (P. 18)

Vessels running measured distances on the French coast will fly the flag A of the International Code at the foremast. All vessels seeing this signal should keep out of her way. Trawling and fishing on the line of a measured distance is prohibited.

FAIRWAY RESERVED FOR TRAFFIC WHEN SUBMARINE VESSELS ARE
EXERCISING FRENCH REGULATIONS (P. 42)

When the flag with red and yellow bands is hoisted on a vessel escorting submarine vessels, to indicate that the latter are exercising submerged, all vessels wishing to enter or leave the Rode de Brest are earnestly requested to avoid entering the zone defined below which is the only part of the road in which submarine vessels are permitted to exercise submerged.

The zone is limited as follows (zone defined):

(Found at pages 102 and 103 of H. O. 133, Bay of Biscay Pilot.)

The fairway reserved for traffic, when submarine vessels are exercising submerged, at Brest, is given in the same language as that contained at page 42 referring to Chenal du Four (p. 59). Raz de Sein. Same as for Chenal du Four, above (p. 73). (Found at page 113 H. O. No. 133 Bay of Biscay Pilot.) St. Malo and Granville. Same as for Chenal due Four, above (p. 173). (Found at page 136 in H. O. No. 132 North Coast of French Pilot.) No. 132 North Coast of France Pilot, 1917.

Pages 40 to 42 contain the following regulations and signals relative to French submarines:

"I. General regulations:

"1. When meeting other vessels, and except in the case hereinafter mentioned (when flying the submerged flag), submarines navigating on the surface must conform with the usual rules of the road.

"When, on the contrary, submarines are navigating submerged, all other vessels should give them a wide berth.

"2. The presence of submarines submerged is indicated by a square flag with 1 yellow and 1 red horizontal stripe, hoisted at any signal station, lighthouse,

fort, etc., in sight of which the submarines are maneuvering, or by a vessel, torpedo boat, or tug accompanying them.

3. When a vessel is navigating in a neighborhood where submarines are signaled submerged, the master must station special lookouts to watch the surface of the sea and report all floating objects.

"The periscopes (optical tubes of submarines) are distinguished from other objects usually met with, in that they appear like a round post standing vertically out of the water.

"4. Although submerged, submarines may be met in all French waters, masters of vessels should be particularly on the lookout for them in the neighborhood of Calais and Cherbourg, where submarine flotillas are stationed.

"5. In order to give every convenience to vessels making or leaving the ports frequented by submarines, zones have been fixed which are prohibited to submerged submarines. Masters frequenting these ports are earnestly requested

to navigate in these zones.

"II. Regulations and signals relative to submerged submarines.

"1. The signal stations hoist the flag (1 red and 1 yellow horizontal stripe) to warn vessels near the coast that submarines are submerged in the neighborhood. "2. Every vessel convoying a submerged submarine carries as a distinctive signal the aforesaid flag forward and a white ball aft in place of the national ensign.

"Every vessel observing these signals should steer to pass at least one-half mile astern of the convoying vessel.

"3. During submerged maneuvers the submarines carry forward the red and yellow flag and aft the national ensign.

Every vessel observing these signals should give a wide berth to the submarine, which, even should she be momentarily on the surface, is to be considered as exempt from the rules of the road.

"III. Regulations relative to firing torpedoes from submerged submarines.

"1. The target vessels, or vessels towing a target for submerged submarine torpedo practice, carry during the firing exercises, besides the ordinary large red firing flag, a large flag (1 red and 1 yellow horizontal stripe) hoisted in a clearly visible position.

"2. Vessels should give the route of the target a wide berth, passing at least one-half mile from it.

"3. When the target or towing vessel sees a vessel standing on a course dangerous to the submarines, it may hoist International Code M N (stop immediately) and fire a gun if necessary.

"The vessel signaled should immediately obey this signal. "The signal M H will intimate that she can continue her course. "The vessels convoying submarines may also, in case of emergency, of these signals.

make use

"4. When possible the target vessel is accompanied by a swift dispatch boat ready to convoy to vessels in sight any order by voice or by aid of a blackboard. "IV. Regulations and signals relative to the protection of submarines at moorings.

"1. All vessels and boats are forbidden to go alongside submarines anchored or moored in ports or roadsteads without a special permit.

"2. By night the submarines anchored or moored in ports or roadsteads carry in addition to the ordinary anchor lights 3 vertical lights (2 red above 1 white) 6 feet apart."

The 1928 supplement to this publication deletes this whole matter and substitutes the following at page 3 thereof:

66

'Regulations with regard to French submarines.-When meeting other vessels, submarines navigating on the surface conform with the regulations for preventing collisions at sea.

'Although submerged submarines may be met in all French waters, masters of vessels should be particularly on the lookout for them, as regards the area covered by this volume, in the vicinity of Cherbourg.

"For the convenience of vessels making or leaving ports frequented by submarines, zones, which are prohibited to submerged submarines, have been established. Masters of vessels frequenting these ports are particularly recommended to navigate in these zones. The limits of the zones which are in the one covered by this volume are given on pages 403, 479, 580.

"When a submerged submarine is navigating in the roadstead of a naval port, she is escorted by a small vessel which carries in the fore part of the vessel a square flag, colored red and yellow horizontally. Vessels in the vicinity must