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of the Governor to that of the humble functionary who superintends the working of some mass of steam-drawn machinery, who "walks about with a little tin vessel of oil and pours in a drop here and a drop there as occasion or the creaking of a joint may require." Hard things have been said of Liberal Governments in connection with their attitude towards the Empire; at least this may be put to the credit side, that a Liberal Government gave Canada the Governor-General who did more to render the Imperial connection at once imposing and attractive than could have been done by any other man. With singular tact, Lord Beaconsfield, in choosing his successor, did not attempt to find one who should vie with Lord Dufferin in purely intellectual qualities. The choice of Lord Lorne was a public recognition of how remote was the fear of friction between the Governor-General and the Canadian Executive or Parliament, since otherwise the presence of the Queen's son-in-law would have been most inexpedient. Under the new régime the presence of Princess Louise served only to intensify Canadian loyalty and to strengthen the ties which, as Canada grows in population and importance, must more and more depend, not upon British constitutional or parliamentary ascendency, but upon a common respect of common interests and sentiments.

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CHAPTER II

The WITH the full granting of responsible government it is obvious that British policy must less and less concern itself Imperial with the internal politics of the Colonies. The general upon the rule of course still holds good that no Colonial legislative constitu- body is competent to pass a law, at variance with or velopment repugnant to any Imperial Statute which extends in its of the operation to the particular Colony. Neither can such body Colonies. exceed the bounds of its assigned jurisdiction. The right of veto, however, has been very sparingly exercised. It would nevertheless be most erroneous to hold that, even with regard to questions of internal management, the rôles of the Colonial Governor and of the British Secretary of State have become merely ornamental. Indeed, in the case of the Australian Colonies, there were causes at work which rendered the existence of the English authorities of the utmost importance. Allusion has already been made to the suggestive passage wherein Sir E. Head pointed out the use of the Canadian Union as a training ground in political moderation. No such training had been received by the Australian colonists, and, in consequence, amongst them political warfare was carried to extreme lengths. But it must at once be apparent how ill suited were constitutions moulded on the British for Oct. 14, such methods of procedure. In Lord J. Russell's words, 1839. " Every political constitution in which different bodies share the supreme power is only enabled to exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is distributed.

The Sovereign using the prerogative of the Crown to the utmost extent, and the House of Commons exerting its powers of the purse to carry all its resolutions into im1 See supra, p. 309.

mediate effect would produce confusion into the country in less than a twelve-month."

In the Colonies the great cause of strife arose from the rival claims of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Legislature. Much argument has been expended upon the respective merits of a nominated or elected Upper House; but, in fact, neither system can work unless there is present a spirit of compromise and of give and take. Moreover, the frequent changes of Ministry blunted the edge of the sense of ministerial responsibility. Between 1856 and 1876 there were in Victoria no less than eighteen administrations; in New South Wales and New Zealand there were seventeen; and in South Australia there were as many as twentynine. In this state of things, the Australian Colonies were a fire in which to test the characters of English Governors for independence as well as for tact.

Under the New South Wales Constitution, the Upper House had the right to amend as well as to reject money Bills. In 1858 the Ministry of the day proposed to swamp the Upper House by an addition to its members of thirty per cent. Sir W. Denison was willing to fill up vacancies, but "objected altogether to the principle of putting in members for the purpose of giving the Ministry of the day a majority."1 The succeeding Governor, Sir John Young, was more complaisant, and was prepared to add twenty-one new members 1861. to the Council, nominated with the express intention of carrying through a Land Bill. The attempt, however, was defeated by the action of the President of the Council and of the majority, in resigning their seats. The Parliamentary papers of the day are silent on this incident, but in 1872 the Governor 2 stated that the action of his predecessor had been regretted by the Secretary of State as not appearing "to be justified by the urgency of the occasion." 3 Council had been nominated for five years, so that it now devolved upon Sir J. Young to nominate a new Council. Fortified by royal instructions, and repenting of his momen

1 Varieties of Viceregal Life, Vol II. p. 435.

The

2 Sir H. Robinson.

* See Rusden, Hist. of Australia, Vol. III. p. 263.

tary weakness, Sir J. Young was careful that the new Council should not be the mere creation of the Ministry but should consist of "gentlemen of various political opinions, who were at the time prominent in Parliament or in possession of much general influence." 1 Most appropriately Wentworth was appointed President. The incident thus closed happily, but it served to strengthen the hands of those who were in favour of an elective Upper House.

The leading case, however, in the conduct to be pursued by a Governor and by the Secretary of State, where there has been an actual breach of the law by the Colonial Ministry, is that of the unfortunate Sir C. Darling. It has been already noticed that a special difficulty in working English constitutional models arose in Victoria from the character which the rapid development of gold-mining had given to its population. In these circumstances, though the risk of refusing responsible government would have been infinitely greater, the dangers attached to its introduction were assuredly great. In Victoria the Upper House might reject but not amend Money Bills. Being elective, it claimed, no less than the Assembly, to reflect the public opinion of the Colony. In the state of warfare thence ensuing, the Ministry in 1865 proposed to cut the Gordian knot by 'tacking' to the Appropriation Bill resolutions imposing a protective tariff. The expectation was that the Council would pass the measure sooner than allow the ordinary needs of the various public departments to remain unprovided for. The Council, however, rejected the Bill on the broad ground that it was unconstitutional "that any clause of appropriation should be introduced into a Bill of Supply."2 The Ministry retaliated by giving the same effect to the resolutions of the Assembly as if they had been the Act of the Legislature. They sanctioned the levying of the new duties, although the decision of the Courts was that they were wholly illegal.

1 Extract from despatch of Feb. 16, 1865, contained in despatch of Sir H. Robinson, Aug. 27, 1872, quoted by Rusden, Vol. III. p. 264.

2 Motion of Mr Fellows, July 25, 1865, in Council, see Rusden, Hist. of Aust., Vol. III. p. 305.

They arranged with a private bank, so that moneys might be provided for the public service, to be recovered from the Government by a collusive suit. All this was done with the sanction and approval of the British Governor. Such conduct received its judgment in the words of Mr Cardwell,1 "I look with extreme apprehension on a state of things in which the Governor of a British Colony is engaged in collecting money by mere force from persons from whom the Supreme Court has declared that it was not due. . . . It was for one or other of the local Legislatures to yield, or for both to compromise their differences. . . . It was not for you to give a victory to one or the other party by a proceeding unwarranted by your commission, or by the laws of the Colony." Again, difficulties were "not to be removed by irregular acts of power. Anarchy, indeed, may ultimately result from continued opposition between two constitutional authorities, each obstinately insisting on its extreme rights. But anarchy has come already when the executive Governor, entrusted with power for the maintenance of public order and the protection of private rights, uses that power for the purpose of illegally setting aside the authority of one branch of the Legislature, of overruling the decisions of the Supreme Court, and of depriving the subject, even for a time, of that which the Court has decided to be his." "The Queen's representative is justified in deferring very largely to his constitutional advisers in matters of policy, and even of equity; but he is imperatively bound to withhold the Queen's authority from all or any of those manifestly unlawful proceedings by which one political party, or one member of the body politic, is occasionally tempted to establish preponderance over another. . . ... It will be for the gentlemen who guide the opinions of the Colony, or form the majorities in the two Houses, to . . . ascertain, and you will, of course, afford them every opportunity of ascertaining how the government of the country is to be carried on. It is for you to take care that all proceedings taken in the Queen's name, and under your authority, are consistent with the law of the Colony."

1 Parl. Pap., 1866.

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