In dealing with all questions between the two peoples there are thus established the methods of analysis and comparison before any attempt is made at selection and application. Points of contact are traced which will contribute to reciprocal integration and fusion. Sympathetic traditions and tendencies of thought are defined. in American culture; there is a statement of such processes in the foreign economic production as can be used and developed in American production; there is mutual study of such special characteristics of both peoples as determine the forms of their scientific achievement, and an application, wherever possible, of this knowledge to American science; and there is tested the identity between the bases of social relations in both nations, and between the function and operation of their political institutions.

The reciprocity which is thus created is complete not only between a single race and America, but between the various foreign races in America themselves. Some of the drama of the constant American recreation plays through this amalgamation. For the first time these races see one another under larger terms than the terms of factional difference. They have to measure, because of new frictions and new stimulations, the terms of their individual responsibility. Those things which the foreign-born looked upon in the older world as utopian principles here become the society's rightful contribution to every one: what he received as charity has here become for each man a practical right; what he formerly claimed. as benevolence he can now insist on as a basic justice. From the American side the gain is limitless. It is not only the gain for industrial and commercial life, of the inventive genius, the high operative practicality, the thrift and the steady capability of the foreign-born. There is a growth even more fund nental. In culture there is apprehension of the texture of another national mind; in economics there is the discovery of differences and identities of values; in science there is the establish

ment of like terms of definition; and in political science there is created a like sense of the coherent development of peoples. This means nothing less than the education and application of America's sense of composition.

The reeducation of our selective sense, in racial fusion, bids fair to put into more constant operation the selective principle. We have fallen back on a keener consciousness than ever before of what is essential-what in the throng of opposing currents of action and principles of thought will always stand for strength and for the power to perpetuate. What gives us pause in democracy is its profound mediocrity, its too general inclusiveness, its sacrifice, through the necessary leveling of opportunity, of character and quality. Every clean operation of the selective sense works against this mediocrity and against reversion to type; and as such it works against ultimate sterility.

The new adventure of the West is not to be inclusive alone. If it is to contain the real element of adventure, it must be of the newer adventure, the inner conquests and discoveries, and the application of these to the vast American machine. The application must be no less conscious and conscientious than the selection. There are two ways for a people to strengthen and concert their national genius, either by an intensive power to refuse, like the French, or by the power to accept and incorporate, which is significantly American. This power must be made intensive in its application. All the play of America's perpetual vision cannot exist without a scientific foundation. To this end there must be on both sides a ceaseless and fearless recognition of all that is involved, the weaknesses and the strengths and the basic reason for them; there must be a recognition that sees not only the elements which separate, but the spirit which joins -a recognition that, as it has defined without passion, selects without the personal, and accomplishes as its result not only an identity of interest, but a respect for the unlikenesses of mind and soul.

N

OW that the armistice conditions are being fulfilled and a peace congress has assembled, it becomes advisable to discuss and, as far as possible, to decide what our policies are to be in regard to the departments of the Government most affected by the war, in order that we may return as soon as possible to an economical administration of the country's affairs on a peace basis.

The problems connected with the navy are complicated by the fact that international as well as national considerations are of peculiar interest and importance. The navy has been rightly called our first line of defense, and care must be taken that we, in our eagerness to economize and to return to paths of peace, do not ourselves break that line.

In 1865, at the close of the Civil War, the United States possessed a large and, for its time, powerful navy. Its expansion during the war was comparatively as great as has been its expansion during the one just ending; indeed, perhaps greater. We had just passed through a long and terrific struggle, we were saddled with an enormous debt, our people were warweary, and many, as now, believed that there was little likelihood of our ever being involved in another war. Our merchant marine had virtually disappeared from the high seas, and in our interest in other great national problems the navy was permitted to dwindle away until by 1870 it consisted only of a number of obsolete coast-defense monitors and a few wooden frigates and cruisers long past their days of usefulness. The power of our navy in the seventies and for many years after was negligible in comparison with the more important navies abroad, where progress had been maintained, wood in the construction of ships abandoned for

iron and steel, and a tremendous advance made in armor and armaments.

Everlasting credit is due the naval officers of that day who through that depressing period kept the morale of the personnel at a high standard, never lost hope, and never ceased their efforts to bring about such a rehabilitation of the navy as would restore our sea-power to a plane commensurate with the rights and interests of our great country.

The time came, indeed, in the early eighties, humbly enough, to be sure, with the construction of the much-discussed despatch-boat Dolphin. In 1883 the cruisers Chicago, Boston, and Atlanta were authorized, and later these three vessels, with the Dolphin, formed the "White Squadron," which, under the command of the late Rear-Admiral J. G. Walker, U.S.N., cruised abroad. The enthusiastic and widely published accounts of this small squadron did much to arouse public interest, and from that time the building of a new navy has been assured.

In 1890 the battle-ships Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon were authorized by Congress; but so great was the prejudice against having anything but a navy for coast defense that they had to be designated as "coast-line battle-ships" to satisfy the critics of an extended building policy. Opposition to a continued expenditure of large sums for construction and maintenance has always existed and at times made itself extremely evident, but a majority of the American people and of Congress has generally favored a navy adequate to the protection of our rights and the forwarding of our just policies.

Since 1890 the building of a new navy has more or less steadily proceeded. At the present time our sea-power may be roughly estimated as half that of Great Britain.

The General Board of the navy, to which I shall frequently refer, was created in 1900 by John D. Long, secretary of the navy at that time, and has been continued by all succeeding secretaries to the present time. The admiral of the navy, George Dewey, was the first and, indeed, only president of the board, for since his death two years ago no successor has been officialy designated. The board is advisory in its character and has no executive power.

The study of naval policies, organization, progress, and employment at home and abroad, with recommendations to the secretary of the navy on these and such other subjects as may be referred to it, is its chief function. Throughout its career of eighteen years it has generally held the confidence and received the support of the secretaries of the navy and of the naval committees of Congress.

In February, 1903, the General Board rendered the following opinion as to the upbuilding of the navy:

The General Board is of the opinion that the defense of the coasts, insular possessions, commerce and general maritime interests of the United States requires the maintenance of a fleet based upon an effective strength of 48 first-class battle-ships. The numbers of other classes ought to bear a definite proportion to the number of battle-ships, and the General Board is of the opinion, further, that for every 4 battle-ships the fleet should be composed of 2 armored cruisers, 4 scout cruisers, 4 large, seagoing, quick turning torpedo-boat destroyers, together with the necessary auxiliaries, such as colliers, supply ships, repair ships, etc.

The General Board recommends the adoption of a continued naval policy to be pursued by Congress in making appropriations, whereby the strength of the fleet shall be increased regularly at the annual rate of four first-class battle-ships, with vessels of other types in the proportions named, until it reaches the limit above stated.

The building policy of the navy has since followed this course, though the aver

age of four battle-ships a year has not been obtained.

In July, 1915, the secretary of the navy, Josephus Daniels, called upon the General Board for its opinion of the policy which should govern the future development of the navy, and the following was submitted:

The Navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. It should be gradually increased to this point by such a rate of development, year by year, as may be permitted by the facilities of the country, but the limit above defined should be attained not later than 1925.

Since 1915 the General Board has uniformly had this policy in mind when making its annual recommendations for our naval construction. Some of the considerations in support of such a policy may be briefly summarized as follows:

Sea-power will always remain a factor of vast importance in international relations.

The United States is rapidly building a great merchant marine and again seems about to compete for a fair share of the carrying trade of the world. The logical reason for a great navy is to provide protection for the merchant marine of the nation to which it belongs.

Equality of sea-power does not necessarily mean the institution of a competitive building policy among nations. On the contrary, limitation of naval establishments beyond that necessary for self-defense and the maintenance of the peace of the world might be more easily arrived at by agreement under such a policy. Equality of sea-power should be preventive of, rather than incitive to, war.

In the event of the establishment of a league of nations for peace, naval power will be the principal instrument to give effect to its decisions; and the United States, because of its wealth and power, will be called upon, and should be able to supply its full share of the international police force to render such a league effect

ive. After international relations become strained, increase of existing naval or military establishments cannot be made without danger of producing the very results such establishments with us are intended to prevent.

The United States should at all times be in a position to care for its own maritime and other interests without having to depend upon the good offices of a more powerful nation.

The great naval lesson of the war has been that the nation possessing the most powerful navy was able in a few weeks to drive the German merchant flag from the seas and to keep open her own trade routes. When the war began, Germany possessed the second most powerful navy in the world. The second best navy proved to be not good enough. The blockade, which she was not able to break, was the greatest contributing cause of her ultimate collapse. With her military preparations of half a century, if she could have kept her own ports or the ports of her allies open, or even partly open, for the importation of food and raw materials, the war might have been lost to the Allies. Certainly it could have been greatly prolonged. The relentless pressure of superior sea-power, without even a great and decisive naval battle, gave to the Allies freedom of the seas, gained time for the organization and transportation of their

armies, and brought about a result which history teaches us was inevitable.

In the rebuilding of our navy, the socalled three-year program, strongly urged by Secretary Daniels, and embodied in the act of August 29, 1916, was a long step in advance. In a letter dated November 9, 1915, the General Board said, in part:

A navy in firm control of the sea from the outbreak of war is the prime essential to the defense of a country bordering upon two great oceans. A navy strong enough only. to defend our coasts from actual invasion is not the only function of the navy. It must protect our sea-borne commerce and drive that of the enemy from the sea. The best way to accomplish all of these objects is to find and defeat the hostile fleet or any of its detachments at a distance from our coast sufficiently great to prevent interruption of our normal course of national life. The current war has shown that a navy of the size recommended by this Board in previous years can no longer be considered adequate to the defensive needs of the United States. Our present navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in time of peace nor to enforce its policies in war.

The three-year building program referred to above provided for ten battleships, six battle-cruisers, ten scout-cruisers,