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of desire, raiseth an emotion of the fame kind with that now mentioned: but the cause must be different ; for there can be no gratification where there is no desire. We have not however far to seek for a cause: it is involved in the nature of man, that he cannot be indifferent to an event that concerns hinı or any of his connections; if it be fortunate, it gives him joy; if unfortunate, it gives him sorrow.
In no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than upon
the removal of any violent distress of mind or body; and in no situation doth sorrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy. The sensibility of our nature serves in part to account for these effects. Other causes also concur. One is, that we can be under no violent distress without an anxious desire to be free from it; and therefore its removal is a high gratification: nor can we be poffeffed of any thing that makes us happy, without wishing its continuance; and therefore its removal, by crossing our wishes, must create sorrow. The principle of contralt is another cause: an emotion of joy:arising upon the removal of pain, is increased by contrast when we reflect upon our former distress : an emotion of forrow upon being deprived of any good, is increased by contrast when we reflect upon our former happiness :
Jaffier. There's not a wretch that lives on common charity,
But's happier than me. For I have known
Venice preserv'd, act. 1. sc. 1.
It hath always been reckoned difficult to account for the extreme pleasure that follows a ceffation of bodily pain; as when one is relieved from the rack, or from a violent fit of the stone. What is said, explains this difficulty in the easiest and simplest manner : cessation of bodily pain is not of itself a pleasure, for a non-ens or a negative can neither give - pleasure nor pain; but man iś so framed by nature as to rejoice when he is eased of pain, as well as to be forrowful when deprived of any enjoyment. This branch of our constitution, is chiefly the cause of the pleasure. The gratification of desire comes in as an accessory cause: and contrast joins its force, by increasing the sense of our present happiness. In the case of an acute pain, a peculiar circumstance contributes its part: the brisk circulation of the animal spirits occasioned by acute pain, continues after the pain is vanished, and produceth a very pleasant emotion. Sickness hath not that effect, because it is always attended with a depression of spirits.
Hence it is, that the gradual diminution of acute pain, occasions a njixt eniotion, partly
pleasant, partly painful: the partial diminution produceth joy in proportion; but the remaining pain balanceth the joy. This mixt emotion, however, hath no long endurance ; for the joy that ariseth upon the diminution of pain, soon vanisheth, and leaveth in the undisturbed possession, that degree of pain which remains.
What is above observed about bodily pain, is equally applicable to the distresses of the mind; and accordingly it is a common artifice, to prepare us for the reception of good news by alarming our fears,
NE feeling there is, which merits a delibe
rate view, for its singularity, as well as utility. Whether to call it an emotion or a paffion, seems uncertain : the former it can scarce be, because it involves desire; the latter it can scarce be, because it has no object. But this feeling and its nature will be best understood from examples. A signal act of gratitude produceth in the spectator, not only love or esteem for the author, but also a separate feeling, which hath not been much adverted to : it is a vague feeling of gratitude without an object; a feeling, however, which disposes the spectator to acts of gra
titude, more than upon ordinairy occasions. Let any man attentively consider his own heart when he thinks warmly of any signal act of gratitude, and he will be conscious of this feeling, as diftinct from the esteem or admiration he has for the grateful perfon. The feeling is fingular in the following respect, that it is accompanied with a desire to perform acts of gratitude, without having any object; though in this state, the mind, wonderfully bent upon an object, neglects no object upon which it can vent itself : any act of kindness or good-will that would not be regarded upon another occasion, is greedily seized; and the vague feeling is converted into a real passion of gratitude: in such a state, favours are returned double.
In like manner, a courageous action produceth in a spectator the passion of admiration directed to the author : and beside this well-known palfion, a separate feeling is raised in the spectator; which may be called an emotion of courage; because, while under its influence, he is conscious of á boldness and intrepidity beyond what is usual, and longs for proper objects upon which to exert this emotion :
Spumantemque dari, pecora inter inertia, votis
Æneid iv, 158.
Non altramente 'il tauro, que l'irriti
Tajo, canto 7. ft. $5.
So full of valour that they smote the air
Tempest, act.4. fc.4. The emotions raised by music independent of words, must be all of this nature : courage roufed by martial music performed upon instruments without a voice, cannot be directed to any object; nor can grief or pity raised by melancholy music of the same kind have an object.
For another example, let us figure some grand. and heroic action, highly agreeable to the fpećtator. Beside a singular veneration for the author, the spectator feels in himself an unusual dignity of character, which disposeth him to great and noble actions: and herein chiefly consists the extreme delight every one hath in the histories of conquerors and heroes.
This singular feeling, which may be termed the Sympathetic emotion of virtue, resembles, in one respect, the well-known appetites that lead to the propagation and preservation of the species. The appetites of hunger, thirst, and animal love, arise in the mind before they are directed to any object; and in no case whatever is the mind more D4