Animal love when carried into action by natural impulse singly, is neither social nor selfish: when exerted with a view to gratification, and in order to make me happy, it is selfish: when the motive of giving pleasure to its object is fuperadded, it is partly focial, partly selfish. A just action when prompted by the principle of duty folely, is neither focial nor selfish. When I perform an act of justice with a view to the pleasure of gratification, the action is felfish : I pay my debt for my own fake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But let me suppose the money has been advanced by a friend without interest, purely to oblige me: in this cafe, together with the motive of gratification, there arifes a motive of gratitude, which respects the creditor solely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good; and the action is partly social, partly selfish. Suppose again I meet with a surprising and unexpected act of generosity, that inspires me with love to my benefactor, and the utmost gratitude: I burn to do him good: he is the fole object of my defire; and my own pleasure in gratifying the defire, vanisheth out of fight: in this cafe, the action I perform is purely focial. Thus it happens, that when a focial motive becomes strong, the action is exerted with a view singly to the object of the paffion; and the selfish pleasure arifing from gratification is never once considered. The fame effect of stifling selfish motives, is equally remarkable in other paffions that are in no view focial.

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An action, for example, prompted by ambition confidered as a means to make me happy, is felfish: but if the defire of exaltation wax strong, and inflame my mind, the selfish motive is no longer felt, and the action is neither selfish nor social. A flight degree of resentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleasure arifing to myself from gratifying the paffion, is justly denominated selfish: where revenge flames so high as to have no other aim but the deftruction of its object, it is no longer felfish; but, in oppofition to a focial paffion, may be termed diffocial *.

When this analysis of huunan nature is confidered, not one article of which can with any fhadow of truth be controverted, there is reason to be furprised at the blindness of some philosophers, who, by dark and confused notions, are led to deny all motives to action but what arife from self-love. Man, for aught appears, might pofsibly have been so framed, as to be fufceptible of no passions but what have self for their object: but man thus framed, would be ill fitted for fociety. Much better is the matter ordered, by enduing him with paffions directed entirely to the

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good of others, as well as with paffions directed entirely to his own good.

Of self, every one hath a direct perception; of other things, we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes: and hence it is, that of felf, the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and, for the reason now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is not this sufficient to account for the prevalence of self-love?

In the foregoing part of this chapter, it is suggefted, that fome circumstances make beings or things fit objects for defire, others not. This hint must be pursued. It is a truth ascertained by universal experience, that a thing which in our apprehenfion is beyond reach, never is the object of defire: no man, in his right senses, defires to walk on the clouds, or to descend to the centre of the earth: we may amuse ourselves in a reverie, with building castles in the air, and wishing for what can never happen; but such things never move defire. And indeed a defire to do what we are conscious is beyond our power, would be altogether absurd. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment with respect to things within reach, often inflames defire; yet where the prospect of attainment is faint, and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, seldom raiseth any strong defire: thus beauty or other good qualities in a woman of rank, seldom raise love in a

ny

ny man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach, raise emotions in different degrees; and when defire accompanies any of these emotions, its strength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its cause. Hence the remarkable difference among defires directed to beings inanimate, animate, and rational: the emotion caused by a rational being, is out of measure stronger than any caused by an animal without reason; and an emotion raised by fuch an animal, is stronger than what is caused by any thing inanimate. There is a separate reafon why defire of which a rational being is the object should be the strongest: it has means without end of gratification, by benefiting its object, or by harming it; and it is a wellknown truth, that our defires naturally swell by exercise: defire directed to an inanimate being, fufceptible neither of pleasure nor pain, is not capable of a higher gratification than that of acquiring the property. Hence it is, that though every emotion accompanied with defire, is strictly speaking a paffion; yet commonly none of these are denominated passions, but where a fenfible being capable of pleasure and pain is the object.

VOL. I.

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SECT.

201

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:

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His fubject was purposely reserved for a parate fection, because it could not, with perfpicuity, be handled under the general head. An emotion accompanied with defire is termed a paffion; and when the defire is fulfilled, the paffion is faid to be gratified. Now, the gratification of every paffion must be pleasant, or in other words produce a pleasant emotion; for nothing can be more natural, than that the ac complishment of any wish or defire should affect us with joy; I cannot even except the cafe, where a man, through remorse, is defirous to chaftife and punish himself. The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion; because it makes us happy in our present situation, and is ultimate in its nature, not having a tendency to any thing beyond. On the other hand, forrow must be the result of an event contrary to what we defire; for if the accomplishment of defire produce joy, it is equally natural that disappointment should produce forrow.

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An event, fortunate or unfortunate, that falls out by accident without being foreseen or thought of, and which therefore could not be the object

of

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