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Animal love when carried into action by natural impulfe fingly, is neither focial nor felfifh: when exerted with a view to gratification, and in order to make me happy, it is felfifh: when the motive of giving pleasure to its object is fuperadded, it is partly focial, partly felfish. A just action when prompted by the principle of duty folely, is neither focial nor selfish. When I perform an act of justice with a view to the pleasure of gratification, the action is selfish: I pay my debt for my own fake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But let me fuppofe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereft, purely to oblige me: in this cafe, together with the motive of gratification, there arifes a motive of gratitude, which refpects the creditor folely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good; and the action is partly focial, partly felfifh. Suppofe again I meet with a surprising and unexpected act of generosity, that inspires me with love to my benefactor, and the utmost gratitude: I burn to do him good he is the fole object of my defire; and my own pleasure in gratifying the defire, vanisheth out of fight: in this cafe, the action I perform is purely focial. Thus it happens, that when a focial motive becomes strong, the action is exerted with a view fingly to the object of the paffion; and the selfish pleasure arifing from gratification is never once confidered. The fame ef fect of ftifling felfish motives, is equally remarkable in other paffions that are in no view focial, An

An action, for example, prompted by ambition confidered as a means to make me happy, is felfifh: but if the defire of exaltation wax ftrong, and inflame my mind, the selfish motive is no longer felt, and the action is neither selfish nor focial. A flight degree of refentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleasure arising to myfelf from gratifying the paffion, is justly denominated selfish: where revenge flames fo high as to have no other aim but the deftruction of its object, it is no longer felfish; but, in oppofition to a focial paffion, may be termed diffocial *.

When this analysis of human nature is confidered, not one article of which can with any fhadow of truth be controverted, there is reason to be furprised at the blindness of fome philofophers, who, by dark and confufed notions, are led to deny all motives to action but what arife from felf-love. Man, for aught appears, might poffibly have been fo framed, as to be fufceptible of no paffions but what have self for their object: but man thus framed, would be ill fitted for fociety. Much better is the matter ordered, by enduing him with paffions directed entirely to the

This word, hitherto not in ufe, feems to fulfill all that is required by Demetrius Phalereus [Of Elocution, fect. 96.] in coining a new word: first, that it be perfpicuous; and next, that it be in the tone of the language; that we may not, fays our author, introduce among the Grecian vocables words that found like those of Phrygia or Scythia.


good of others, as well as with paffions directed entirely to his own good.

Of felf, every one hath a direct perception; of other things, we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes: and hence it is, that of felf, the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and, for the reafon now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is not this fufficient to account for the prevalence of self-love? In the foregoing part of this chapter, it is fuggested, that fome circumstances make beings or things fit objects for defire, others not. This hint must be purfued. It is a truth afcertained by univerfal experience, that a thing which in our apprehenfion is beyond reach, never is the object of defire: no man, in his right fenfes, defires to walk on the clouds, or to defcend to the centre of the earth: we may amufe ourselves in a reverie, with building castles in the air, and wishing for what can never happen; but fuch things never move defire. And indeed a defire to do what we are confcious is beyond our power, would be altogether abfurd. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment with respect to things within reach, often inflames defire; yet where the prospect of attainment is faint, and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, seldom raiseth any strong defire: thus beauty or other good qualities in a woman of rank, feldom raise love in a


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ny man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach, raise emotions in different degrees; and when defire accompanies any of these emotions, its ftrength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its caufe. Hence the remarkable difference among defires directed to beings inanimate, animate, and rational: the emotion caufed by a rational being, is out of measure ftronger than any caused by an animal without reafon; and an emotion raised by fuch an animal, is ftronger than what is caused by any thing inanimate. There is a separate reafon why defire of which a rational being is the object should be the strongest it has means without end of gratification, by benefiting its object, or by harming it; and it is a wellknown truth, that our defires naturally fwell by exercise defire directed to an inanimate being, fufceptible neither of pleasure nor pain, is not capable of a higher gratification than that of acquiring the property. Hence it is, that though every emotion accompanied with defire, is ftrictly speaking a paffion; yet commonly none of these are denominated paffions, but where a fenfible being capable of pleasure and pain is the objećt.




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Caufes of the emotions of joy and forrow.


His fubject was purpofely referved for a feparate fection, because it could not, with perfpicuity, be handled under the general head. An emotion accompanied with defire is termed a pafion; and when the defire is fulfilled, the paffion is faid to be gratified. Now, the gra tification of every paffion must be pleafant, or in other words produce a pleafant, emotion; for nothing can be more natural, than that the accomplishment of any wifh or defire should affect us with joy; I cannot even except the cafe, where a man, through remorfe, is defirous to chaftife and punish himfelf. The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion, because it makes us happy in our prefent fituation, and is ultimate in its nature, not having a tendency to any thing beyond. On the other hand, forrow must be the refult of an event contrary to what we defire; for if the accomplishment of defire produce joy, it is equally natural that disappointment fhould produce forrow.

An event, fortunate or unfortunate, that falls out by accident without being forefeen or thought of, and which therefore could not be the object of

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