obftacle to the formation of focieties. Wifely therefore is it ordered, and agreeably to the fyftem of Providence, that we should have nature for our inftructor. Manifold and admirable are the purposes to which the external figns of paffion are made fubfervient, by the author of our nature: what are occafionally mentioned above, make but a part. Several final causes, remain to be unfolded; and to this task I proceed with alacrity. In the firft place, The figns of internal agitation that are difplay'd externally to every fpectator, tend to fix the fignification of many terms. The only effectual means to afcertain the meaning of any doubtful word, is an appeal to the thing it reprefents: and hence the ambiguity of words expreffive of things that are not objects of external fenfe; for in that cafe an appeal is denied. Paffion, ftrictly fpeaking, is not an object of external fense: but its external figns are; and by means of these figns, paffions may be appealed to with tolerable accuracy: thus the words that denote our paffions, next to thofe that denote external objects, have the most diftinct meaning. Words fignifying internal action, and the more delicate feelings, are lefs diftinct. This defect with refpećt to internal action, is what chiefly occafions the intricacy of logic: the terms of that fcience are far from being fufficiently afcertained, even after much care and labour beftow'd by an eminent writer * writer to whom however the world is greatly indebted, for removing a mountain of rubbish, and moulding the fubject into a rational and correct form. The fame defect is remarkable in criticifm, which has for its object the more delicate feelings; the terms that denote these feelings being not more diftinct than those of logic. To reduce the fcience of criticifm to any regular form, has never once been attempted: however rich the ore may be, no critical chymist has been found, to analyfe its constituent parts, and to distinguish each by its own name. In the fecond place, Society among individuals is greatly promoted by this univerfal language. Looks and geftures give direct access to the heart; and lead us to felect, with tolerable accuracy, the perfons who are worthy of our confidence. It is furprising how quickly, and for the most part how correctly, we judge of character from external appearances. Thirdly, After focial intercourfe is commenced, thefe external figns, which diffuse through a whole affembly the feelings of each individual, contribute above all other means to improve the focial affections. Language no doubt is the most comprehensive vehicle for communicating emotions: but in expedition, as well as in power of conviction, it falls fhort of the figns under confideration; the involuntary figns efpecially, which * Locke. are are incapable of deceit. Where the countenance, the tones, the gestures, the actions, join with the words in communicating emotions, thefe united have a force irrefiftible: thus all the pleafant emotions of the human heart, with all the focial and virtuous affections, are, by means of these external signs, not only perceived but felt. By this admirable contrivance, converfation becomes that lively and animating amufement, without which life would at best be infipid: one joyful countenance, fpreads chearfulness inftantaneously through a multitude of spectators. Fourthly, Diffocial paffions, being hurtful by prompting violence and mischief, are noted by the most confpicuous external figns, in order to put us upon our guard: thus anger and revenge, especially when fuddenly provoked, difplay themfelves on the countenance in legible characters *. The Rough and blunt manners are allied to anger, by an internal feeling, as well as by external expreflions resembling in a faint degree those of anger: therefore fuch manners are easily heighened into anger; and favages for that reafon are prone to anger. Thus rough and blunt manners are unhappy in two respects: they are firft readily converted into anger; and next, the change being imperceptible, because of the fimilitude of their external figns, the perfon against whom the anger is directed is not put upon his guard. It is for these reasons a great object in fociety, to correct fuch manners, and to bring on a habit of sweetness and calmness. This temper has two oppofite good effects. First, it is not easily provoked to wrath. Next, the interval being great between ir and real anger, a perfon of this temper who receives an affront, has The external figns again of every paffion that threatens danger, raise in us the paffion of fear: which frequently operating without reafon or reflection, moves us by a fudden impulfe to avoid the impending danger *. In the fifth place, These external signs are, in a curious manner, made fubfervient to morality. A painful paffion, though virtuous or innocent, is accompanied with external figns that, being difagreeable to every spectator, muft produce in them a painful emotion: but then this emotion is attractive, and connects the spectator with the person who fuffers. Difagreeable paffions only, are productive of repulfive emotions, involving the spectator's aversion, and frequently his indignation. This artful contrivance makes us cling to the virtuous, and abhor the wicked. Sixthly, of all the external figns of paffion, thofe of affliction or diftrefs are the most illuftrious with respect to a final caufe; and defervedly merit a place of distinction. They are illuftrious by the fingularity of their contrivance; and also by inspiring sympathy, a paffion to which human fociety is indebted for its greatest bleffing, that of providing relief for the diftreffed. A fubject so interesting, deferves a leisurely and atten has many changes to go through before his anger be inflamed: these changes have each of them their external fign; and the of fending party is put upon his guard, to retire, or to endeavour a reconciliation. See chap. 2. part 1. fect. 5. tive examination. The conformity of the nature of man to his external circumstances, is in every particular wonderful: his nature makes him prone to fociety; and fociety is neceffary to his well-being; because in a folitary state he is the most helpless of beings, deititute of fupport, and in his manifold diftreffes deftitute of relief: but mutual fupport, the shining attribute of society, is of too great moment to be left dependent upon cool reafon; it is ordered more wifely, and with greater conformity to the analogy of nature, that it should be inforc'd even instinctively by the paffion of fympathy. Here fympathy makes a capital figure; and contributes, more than any other means, to make life eafy and comfortable. But however effential the fympathy of others may be to our well-being, one thinking of it beforehand, would be puzzled how it could be raised by external figns of diftrefs: for confidering the analogy of nature, if thefe figns be agreeable, they must give birth to a pleasant emotion leading every beholder to be pleafed with human woes; if difagreeable, as they undoubtedly are, ought they not naturally to repel the fpectator from them, in order to be relieved from pain? Such would be the reafoning beforehand; and fuch would be the effect, were nan purely a felfish being. But the benevolence of our nature gives a very different direction to the painful paffion of fympathy, and to the defire involved in it Inftead of avoiding diftrefs, we fly to it in order |