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Di cacciarla dal cor, fugge nel volto.
Paftor Fido, act 2. Sc. 5.

Emotions indeed, properly fo called, which are quiefcent, produce no remarkable figns externally. Nor is it neceffary that the more deliberate paffions fhould, because the operation of fuch paffions is neither fudden nor violent: these however remain not altogether in obfcurity; for being more frequent than violent paffion, the bulk of our actions are directed by them. Actions therefore display, with fufficient evidence, the more deliberate paffions; and complete the admirable fyftem of external figns, by which we become fkilful in human nature.

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Next in order comes an article of great importance; which is, to examine the effects produced upon a spectator by external figns of paffion. None of thefe figns are beheld with indifference; they are productive of various emotions, tending all of them to ends wife and good. This curious article makes a capital branch of human nature: it is peculiarly useful to writers who deal in the pathetic; and with respect to hiftory-painters, it is altogether indifpenfable.

It is mentioned above, that each paffion, or clafs of paffions, hath its peculiar figns; and with refpect to the prefent article it must be added, that these invariably make certain impreffions on a fpectator: the external figns of joy, for example, produce a chearful emotion; the exterDd 3 nal

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nal figns of grief produce pity; and the external figns of rage, produce a fort of terror even in those who are not aimed at.

Secondly, It is natural to think, that pleasant paffions fhould exprefs themselves externally by figns that to a spectator appear agreeable, and painful paffions by figns that to him appear difagreeable. This conjecture, which Nature fuggefts, is confirmed by experience; unless pride be an exception, the external figns of which are difagreeable, though it be commonly reckoned a pleasant paffion: but pride is not an exception, being in reality a mixed paffion, partly pleasant partly painful; for when a proud man confines his thoughts to himself, and to his own dignity or importance, the paffion is pleasant, and its external figns agreeable; but as pride chiefly confifts in undervaluing or contemning others, it is fo far painful, and its external figns difagreeable.

Thirdly, It is laid down above, that an agreeable object produceth always a pleafant emotion, and a disagreeable object one that is painful*. According to this law, the external figns of a pleasant paffion, being agreeable, must produce in the fpectator a pleasant emotion; and the external figns of a painful paffion, being difagreeable, must produce in him a painful emotion.

'Fourthly, In the prefent chapter it is obferved, that pleasant paffions are, for the most part, expreffed externally in one uniform manner; but * See chap. 2. part 7.

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that all the painful paffions are distinguishable from each other by their external expreffions. The emotions accordingly raised in a fpectator by external figns of pleafant paffions, have little variety these emotions are pleasant or chearful, and we have not words to reach a more particular defcription. But the external figns of painful paffions produce in the fpectator emotions of different kinds the emotions, for example, raifed by external figns of grief, of remorfe, of anger, of envy, of malice, are clearly diftinguishable from each other.

Fifthly, Paffions raifed in the fpectator by external figns of painful paffions, are fome of them attractive, some repulfive. Every painful paffion that is also disagreeable *, raises by its external figns a repulfive paffion, repelling the fpectator from the object: thus the paffion raised by external figns of envy and rage, is repulfive. Painful paffions that are agreeable produce an oppofite effect their external signs, it is true, are difagreeable, and raise in the spectator a painful paffion but this painful paffion is attractive, producing in the fpectator good-will to the man who is moved by the paffion, and a desire to relieve or comfort him; witnefs diftrefs painted on the countenance, which inftantaneously inspires the fpectator with pity, and impels him to af

*See paffions explained as agreeable or difagreeable, chap. 2. part 2.



ford relief. The caufe of this difference among the painful paffions raised by external signs of paffion, may be readily gathered from what is laid down, chapter, Emotions and passions, part 7.

It is now time to look back to the queftion propofed in the beginning, How we come to understand external figns, fo as to refer each fign to its proper paffion? We have feen that this branch of knowledge, cannot be derived originally from fight, nor from experience. Is it then implanted in us by nature? The following confiderations will incline us to answer this question in the affirmative. In the first place, the external figns of paffion must be natural; for they are invariably the fame in every country, and among the different tribes of men: pride, for example, is always expreffed by an erect pofture, reverence by prostration, and forrow by a dejected look. Secondly, we are not even indebted to experience for the knowledge that thefe expreffions are natural and univerfal for we are fo framed as to have an innate conviction of the fact: let a man change his habitation to the other fide of the globe, he will, from the accustomed figns, infer the paffion of fear among his new neighbours, with as little hesitation as he did at home. But why, after all, involve ourselves in preliminary obfervations, when the doubt may be directly folved as follows? That if the meaning of external signs be not derived to us from fight, nor from experience,



there is no remaining fource from whence it can be derived but from nature.

We may then venture to pronounce, with fome degree of confidence, that man is provided by nature with a fenfe or faculty, which lays open to him every paffion by means of its external expreffions. And we cannot, I imagine, enter→ tain any reasonable doubt of this fact, when we reflect, that the meaning of external figns is not hid even from infants: an infant is remarkably affected with the paffions of its nurse expressed on her countenance; a fmile chears it, a frown makes it afraid: but fear cannot be without apprehending danger; and what danger can the infant apprehend, unless it be fenfible that its nurse is angry? We must therefore admit, that a child can read anger in its nurfe's face; and it must be fenfible of this intuitively, for it has no other mean of knowledge. I do not affirm, that these particulars are clearly apprehended by the child; for to produce clear and diftinct perceptions, reflection and experience are requisite: but that even an infant, when afraid, must have some notion of its being in danger, is extremely evident.

That we fhould be confcious intuitively of a paffion from its external expreffions, is conformable to the analogy of nature: the knowledge of this language is of too great importance to be left upon experience; because a foundation fo uncertain and precarious, would prove a great obftacle

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