ed favour, burns for an opportunity to exert his gratitude, without having any affection for his benefactor: neither does defire of vengeance for an atrocious injury, involve averfion.

It is perhaps not eafy to fay why moderate pleasures gather ftrength by cuftom: but two caufes concur to prevent this effect in the more intense pleasures. Thefe, by an original law in our nature, increase quickly to their full growth, and decay with no lefs precipitation *; and cuftom is too flow in its operation to overcome this law. The other cause is not less powerful: exquifite pleasure is extremely fatiguing; occafioning, as a naturalift would fay, great expence of animal fpirits †; and of fuch the mind cannot

1

the middle of the army, and pulling off her vail, demanded at the Bahas with a fierce look, whether they had ever beheld fuch a beauty? After an awful pause, Mahomet with one hand laying hold of the young Greek by her beautiful locks, and with the other pulling out his fimitar, fevered the head from the body at one ftroke. Then turning to his grandees, with eyes wild and furious, "This fword," fays he," when it is my will, knows to cut the "bands of love." However ftrange it may appear, we learn from experience, that defire of enjoyment may confift with the most brutal averfion, directed both to the fame woman. Of this we have a noted example in the first book of Sully's memoirs; to which I chufe to refer the reader, for it is too grofs to be tranfcribed.

*See chap. 2. part 3.

Lady Eafy, upon her husband's reformation, expreffes to her friend the following fentiment. Be fatisfy'd; Sir Charles has "made me happy, even to a pain of joy."

Bb 4

bear

bear fo frequent gratification, as to fuperinduce a habit if the thing which raises the pleasure return before the mind have recovered its tone and relish, disgust enfues inftead of pleasure.

A habit never fails to admonish us of the wonted time of gratification, by raising a pain for want of the object, and a defire to have it. The pain of want is always firft felt; the defire naturally follows; and upon prefenting the object, both vanish inftantaneously. Thus a man accuftomed to tobacco, feels, at the end of the ufual interval, a confused pain of want; which at first points at nothing in particular, though it foon fettles upon its accustomed object: and the fame may be observed in perfons addicted to drinking, who are often in an uneafy restless state before they think of their bottle. In pleasures indulged regularly, and at equal intervals, the appetite, remarkably obfequious to custom, returns regularly with the ufual time of gratification; not fooner, even though the object be prefented. This pain of want arifing from habit, feems directly opposite to that of fatiety; and it must appear fingular, that frequency of gratification fhould produce effects fo oppofite, as are the pains of excefs and of want.

The appetites that refpect the prefervation and propagation of our fpecies, are attended with a pain of want fimilar to that occafioned by habit: hunger and thirft are uneafy fenfations of want, which always precede the defire of eating or drinking;

drinking; and a pain for want of carnal enjoyment, precedes the defire of a proper object. The pain being thus felt independent of an object, cannot be cured but by gratification. Very different is an ordinary paffion, in which desire precedes the pain of want: fuch a paffion cannot exist but while the object is in view; and therefore, by removing the object out of thought, it vaniheth, with its defire, and pain of want *.

These natural appetites above mentioned, differ from habit in the following particular: they have an undetermined direction toward all objects of gratification in general; whereas an habitual appetite is directed to a particular object: the attachment we have by habit to a particular woman, differs widely from the natural paffion which comprehends the whole fex; and the habitual relish for a particular dish, is far from being the fame with a vague appetite for food. Notwithstanding this difference, it is ftill remarkable, that nature hath inforc'd the gratification of certain natural appetites effential to the fpecies, by a pain of the fame fort with that which habit produceth.

The pain of habit is lefs under our power, than any other pain that arises from want of gratification hunger and thirst are more easily endured, efpecially at firft, than an unusual intermiffion of any habitual pleasure: perfons are often

:

See chap. 2. part 3.

heard

heard declaring, they would forego fleep or food, rather than tobacco, or any other habitual trifle. We must not however conclude, that the gratification of an habitual appetite affords the fame delight with the gratification of one that is natural far from it; the pain of want only, is greater.

The flow and reiterated acts that produce a ha bit, ftrengthen the mind to enjoy the habitual pleasure in greater quantity and more frequency than originally; and by this means a habit of intemperate gratification is often formed: after unbounded acts of intemperance, the habitual relifh is foon restored, and the pain for want of enjoyment returns with fresh vigor.

The caufes of the pleafant emotions hitherto in view, are either an individual, fuch as a companion, a certain dwelling-place, a certain amufement; or a particular fpecies, fuch as coffee, mutton, or any other food. But habit is not confined to thefe. A conftant train of trifling diverfions, may form fuch a habit in the mind, as that it cannot be eafy a moment without amusement: variety in the objects prevents a habit as to any one in particular; but as the train is uniform with respect to amusement in general, the habit is formed accordingly; and this fort of habit may be denominated a generic habit, in opposition to the former, which may be called a fpecific habit. A habit of a town-life, of country-fports, of folitude, of reading, or of business,

business, where fufficiently varied, are inftances of generic habits. Every specific habit hath a mixture of the generic; for the habit of any one fort of food, makes the taste agreeable; and we are fond of that tafte, where-ever found. Thus a man deprived of an habitual object, takes up with what most resembles it; deprived of tobacco, any bitter herb will do, rather than want : a habit of punch, makes wine a good refource; accustomed to the sweet society and comforts of matrimony, the husband, unhappily deprived of his beloved object, inclines the fooner to a fecond. In general, when we are deprived of a habitual object, we are fond of its qualities in any other object.

The reafons are affigned above, why the caufes of intense pleasure become not readily habitual: but now it must be observed, that these reafons conclude only against fpecific habits. In the cafe of a weak pleasure, a habit is formed by frequency and uniformity of reiteration, which, in the cafe of an intenfe pleasure, produceth fatiety and difguft. But it is remarkable, that fatiety and difguft have no effect, except as to that thing fingly which occafions them: a furfeit of honey produceth not a loathing of fugar; and intemperance with one woman, produceth no difrelish of the fame pleasure with others. Hence it is easy to account for a generic habit in any intense pleasure: the delight we had in the gratification of the appetite, inflames the imagi

mation,