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I can make nothing of this action, till I difcover with what intention the money is given: if it be given to discharge a debt, the action pleases me in a flight degree: if it be a grateful return, I feel a ftronger emotion; and the pleafant emotion rifes to a great height, when it is the intention of the giver to relieve a virtuous family from Actions are thus qualified by intention: but they are not qualified by the eyent; for an action well intended gives pleasure, whatever be the confequence. Further, human actions are perceived to be right or wrong; and this perception qualifies the pleasure or pain that refults from them*. Emotions


In tracing our emotions and paffions to their origin, my first thought was, that qualities and actions are the primary caufes of emotions; and that these emotions are afterward expanded upon the being to which thefe qualities and actions belong. But I am now convinced that this opinion is erroneous. An attribute is not, even in imagination, feparable from the being to which it belongs; and for that reafon, cannot of itself be the cause of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or fubftance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agree able to us otherwise than by their means. But still, when an emo

apprehend the matter,

tion is railed, it is the being itself, as we that raifes the emotion; and it raises it by means of one or other of its attributes. If it be urged, That we can in idea abstract a quality from the thing to which it belongs; it might be answered, That an abstract idea, which ferves excellently the purposes of reafoning, is too faint and too much trained to produce any fort of emotion. But it is fufficient for the prefent purpose to answer, That the eye never abftracts: by this organ we perceive things as they really exift, and never perceive a quality as feparated from the


Emotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions of others, but alfo by their feelings I cannot behold a man in diftrefs, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure.

The beings or things above described, occafion emotions in us, not only in the original furvey, but also when recalled to the memory in idea: a field laid out with tafte, is pleasant in the recollection, as well as when under our eye: a generous action defcribed in words or colours, occafions a fenfible emotion, as well as when we fee it performed and when we reflect upon the diftrefs of any perfon, our pain is of the fame kind with what we felt when eye-witnesses. word, an agreeable or difagreeable object recalled to the mind in idea, is the occafion of a pleasant or painful emotion, of the fame kind with that produced when the object was prefent: the only difference is, that an idea being fainter than an original perception, the pleasure or pain produced by the former, is proportionably fainter than that produced by the latter.

In a

fubject. Hence it must be evident, that emotions are raised, not by qualities abstractly confidered, but by the fubftance or body fo and fo qualified. Thus a spreading oak raises a pleasant emotion, by means of its colour, figure, umbrage, &c. it is not the colour ftrictly speaking that produces the emotion, but the tree as coloured: it is not the figure abftractly confidered that produces the emotion, but the tree confidered as of a certain figure. And hence by the way it appears, that the beauty of fuch an object is complex, refolvable into feveral beauties more simple. C 3



Having explained the nature of an emotion, and mentioned feveral caufes by which it is produced, we proceed to an obfervation of confiderable importance in the science of human nature, That define follows fome emotions, and not others. The emotion raised by a fine landscape, a magnificent building, or a number of fine faces. in a crowded affembly, is feldom accompanied with defire but the bulk of emotions are accompanied with defire, provided only a fit object for defire be fuggefted; which is remarkably the cafe of emotions raised by human actions and qualities: a virtuous action raiseth in every spectator a pleasant emotion, which is generally attended with defire to befriend the author of the action: a vicious action, on the contrary, produceth a painful emotion, attended with defire to punish the delinquent, Even things inanimate often raise emotions accompanied with defire; witnefs the goods of fortune, which are objects of defire almoft univerfally; and the defire, when immoderate, obtains the name of avarice: the pleafant emotion produced in a spectator by a capital picture in the poffeffion of a prince, is feldom followed by defire; but if fuch a picture be expofed to fale, defire of having or poffeffing is the natural confequence of the emotion.

It is a truth verified by induction, that every paffion is accompanied with defire; and if an emotion be fometimes accompanied with defire, fometimes not, it comes to be a material inquiry, in


what refpect a paffion differs from an emotion. Is paffion in its nature or feeling diftinguishable from emotion? I have been apt to think that there must be a distinction; but after the strictest examination, I cannot perceive any fuch diftinction: what is love to a miftrefs, for example, but a pleasant emotion raised by a fight or idea of the perfon beloved, joined with defire of enjoyment in what else confifts the paffion of refentment, but in a painful emotion occafioned by the injury, accompanied with defire to chaftife the author of the injury? In general, as to paffion of every kind, we find no more in its compofition but the particulars now mentioned, an emotion pleasant or painful, accompanied with defire. What then fhall we fay upon this fubject? Are paffion and emotion fynonymous terms? This cannot be averred; because no feeling nor agitation of the mind void of defire, is termed a paffion; and we have discovered that there are many emotions which pafs away without raifing defire of any kind. How is the difficulty to be folved? There appears to me but one folution, which I relish the more, as it renders the doctrine of the paffions and emotions fimple and perfpicuous. The folution follows. An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it paffeth away without defire, is denominated an emotion: when defire follows, the motion or agitation is denominated a paffion. A fine face, for example, raiseth in me a pleasant feeling: if this feeling



feeling vanish without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion; but if the feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become fufficiently strong to occafion defire, it is no longer termed an emotion, but a paffion. The fame holds in all the other paffions: the painful feeling raised in a fpectator by a flight injury done to a ftranger, being accompanied with no defire of revenge, is termed an emotion; but this injury raiseth in the stranger a ftronger emotion, which being accompanied with defire of revenge, is a paffion external expreffions of diftrefs produce in the spectator a painful feeling, which being fometimes fo flight as to pass away without any effect, is an emotion; but if the feeling be fo ftrong as to prompt defire of affording relief, it is a paffion, and is termed pity: envy is emulation in excefs; if the exaltation of a competitor be barely disagreeable, the painful feeling is reckoned an emotion; if it produce defire to depress him, it is reckoned a paffion.


To prevent mistakes, it must be observed, that defire here is taken in its proper fenfe, viz. that internal act, which, by influencing the will, makes us proceed to action. Defire in a lax fense refpects alfo actions and events that depend not on us, as when I defire that my friend may have a fon to reprefent him, or that my country may flourish in arts and fciences: but fuch internal act is more properly termed a wifh than adefire. Having diftinguished paffion from emotion, we


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