But the fubject is not exhausted: on the contrary, the profpect enlarges upon us, when we take under view the effects these relations produce in the mind. Congruity and propriety, where-ever perceived, appear agreeable; and every agreeable object produceth in the mind a pleasant emotion incongruity and impropriety, on the other hand, are difagreeable; and of courfe produce painful emotions. Thefe emotions, whether pleasant or painful, fometimes vanish without any confequence; but more frequently occafion other emotions, which I proceed to exemplify. When any flight incongruity is perceived, in an accidental combination of perfons or things, as of paffengers in a stage-coach, or of individuals dining at an ordinary; the painful emotion of incongruity, after a momentary existence, vanisheth without producing any effect. But this is not the cafe of propriety and impropriety: voluntary acts, whether words or deeds, are imputed to the author; when proper, we reward him with our esteem; when improper, we punish him with our contempt. Let us fuppofe, for example, a generous action fuited to the character of the author, which raifes in him and in every spectator the pleasant emotion of propriety: this emotion generates in the author both felfesteem and joy; the former when he confiders his relation to the action, and the latter when he confiders the good opinion that others will entertain of him: the fame emotion of propriety, produceth duceth in the fpectators, esteem for the author of the action; and when they think of themfelves, it also produceth, by means of contrast, an emotion of humility. To difcover the effects of an unfuitable action, we must invert each of thefe circumstances: the painful emotion of im→ propriety, generates in the author of the action both humility and fhame; the former when he confiders his relation to the action, and the latter when he confiders what others will think of him the fame emotion of impropriety, produceth in the spectators, contempt for the author of the action; and it also produceth, by means of contraft when they think of themselves, an emotion of felf-esteem. Here then are many different emotions, derived from the fame action confidered in different views by different perfons; a machine provided with many springs, and not a little complicated. Propriety of action, it would feem, is a chief favourite of nature, or of the author of nature, when fuch care and folicitude is bestow'd upon it. It is not left to our own choice; but, like justice, is required at our hands; and, like juftice, is inforced by natural rewards and punishments: a man cannot, with impunity, do any thing unbecoming or improper; he suffers the chastisement of contempt inflicted by others, and of fhame inflicted by himfelf. An apparatus fo complicated, and fo fingular, ought to roufe our attention: for nature doth nothing in vain; and we may conclude with great certainty, that this curious branch of the human conftitution is intended for fome valuable purpose. To the discovery of this purpose I shall with ardor apply my thoughts, after difcourfing a little more at large upon the punishment, for I may now call it fo, that nature hath provided for indecent and unbecoming behaviour. This, at any rate, is neceffary, in order to give a full view of the fubject; and who knows whether it may not, over and above, open fome track that will lead us to what we are in queft of? A grofs impropriety is punished with contempt and indignation, which are vented against the offender by correfponding external expreffions: nor is even the flightest impropriety fuffered to pafs without fome degree of contempt. But there are improprieties, of the flighter kind, that provoke laughter; of which we have examples without end, in the blunders and abfurdities of our own fpecies: fuch improprieties receive a different punishment, as will appear by what follows. The emotions of contempt and of laughter occafioned by an impropriety of this kind, uniting intimately in the mind of the spectator, are expreffed externally by a peculiar fort of laugh, termed a laugh of derifion or fcorn *. An impropriety that thus moves not only contempt but laughter, is distinguished by the epithet of ridiculous; and a laugh of derifion or fcorn is the • See chap. 7. punishment punishment provided for it by nature. Nor ought it to escape observation, that we are fo fond of inflicting this punishment, as fometimes to exert it even against creatures of an inferior fpecies: witness a turkycock fwelling with pride, and ftrutting with display'd feathers; a ridiculous object, which in a gay mood is apt to provoke a laugh of derifion. We must not expect, that these different improprieties are feparated by diftinct boundaries: for of improprieties, from the flightest to the moft grofs, from the most risible to the most serious, there are degrees without end. Hence it is, that in viewing fome unbecoming actions, too risible for anger, and too serious for derifion, the spectator feels a fort of mixt emotion, partaking both of derifion and of anger; which accounts for an expreffion, common with respect to the impropriety of fome actions, That we know not whether to laugh or be angry. It cannot fail to be observed, that in the cafe of a rifible impropriety, which is always flight, the contempt we have for the offender is extremely faint, though derifion, its gratification, is extremely pleasant. This difproportion between a paffion and its gratification, feems not conformable to the analogy of nature. In looking about for a folution, I reflect upon what is laid down above, that an improper action, not only moves our contempt for the author, but alfo, by means of contraft, fwells the good opi nion we have of ourselves. This contributes, more than any other article, to the pleasure we have in ridiculing follies and abfurdities; and accordingly, it is well known, that they who put the greatest value upon themselves, are the most prone to laugh at others. Pride, which is a vivid paffion, pleasant in itself, and not lefs fo in its gratification, would fingly be fufficient to account for the pleasure of ridicule, without borrowing any aid from contempt. Hence appears the reafon of a noted obfervation, That we are the most difpo ed to ridicule the blunders and abfurdities of others, when we are in high fpirits; for in high spirits, felf-conceit difplays itself with more than ordinary vigor. Having with wary fteps traced an intricate road, not without danger of wandering; what remains to complete our journey, is to account for the final caufe of congruity and propriety, which make fo great a figure in the human conftitution. One final cause, regarding congruity, is pretty obvious, that the fenfe of congruity, as one principle of the fine arts, contributes in a remarkable degree to our entertainment; which is the final caufe affigned above for our fenfe of proportion *, and need not be enlarged upon here. Congruity indeed with refpect to quantity, coincides with proportion: when the parts of a building are nicely adjusted to each other, it may be * See chap. 3. |