Ch. VIII. at the flame of a candle, was originally a sprightly fimile, but which by frequent ufe has loft all force; love cannot now be compared to fire, without fome degree of difguft: it has been justly objected against Homer, that the lion is too often introduced in his fimiles; all the variety he is able to throw into them, not being fufficient to keep alive the reader's furprise.

To explain the influence of comparison upon the mind, I have chofen the fimpleft cafe, that of two animals of the fame kind, differing in fize only, feen for the first time; but to complete the theory, other circumstances must be taken in. And the next fuppofition I fhall make, is where both animals, feparately familiar to the fpectator, are brought together for the first time. In this cafe, the effect of magnifying and diminishing, will be found remarkably greater than in that firft mentioned. And the reafon will appear upon analyzing the operation: the first thing we feel is furprise, occafioned by the uncommon difference of two creatures of the fame fpecies: we are next fenfible, that the one appears lefs, the other larger, than they did formerly; and this new circumftance is a fecond caufe of furprise, augmenting it fo as to make us imagine a still greater oppofition between the animals, than if we had formed no notion of them beforehand.

I fhall confine myfelf to one other fuppofition; That the fpectator was acquainted beforehand

with one of the animals only; the lapdog, for example. This new circumftance will vary the effect; for instead of widening the natural difference, by enlarging in appearance the one animal, and diminishing the other in proportion, the whole apparent alteration will reft upon the lapdog the furprise to find it lefs than judged to be formerly, will direct our whole attention to it, and make us conceive it to be of a most diminutive fize: the mastiff in the mean time is quite neglected. I am able to illuftrate this effect by a familiar example. Take a piece of pa per or linen reckoned to be a good white, and compare it with a pure white of the fame kind ; the judgement we formed of the first object is instantly varied; and the furprife occafioned by finding it lefs white than was thought, produceth a hafty conviction that it is much lefs white than it is in reality: withdrawing now the pure white, and putting in its place a deep black, the furprise occafioned by this new circumstance carries us to the other extreme, and makes us conceive the object first mentioned to be a pure white and thus experience compels us to acknowledge, that our emotions have an influence even upon our eye-fight. This experiment leads to a general obfervation; That whatever is found more ftrange or beautiful than was expected, is judged to be more strange or beautiful than it is in reality. Hence it is a common artifice, to depretiate

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pretiate beforehand what we wish to make a figure in the opinion of others.

The comparisons employ'd by poets and orators, are of the fame nature with that last mentioned; for it is always a known object that is to be aggrandized or leffened. The former is effectuated by likening it to fome grand object, or by contrasting it with one of an oppofite character. To effectuate the latter, the method must be reversed the object must be contrasted with fomething fuperior to itself, or likened to fomething inferior. The whole effect is produced upon the principal object, which by this means is elevated above its rank, or depreffed below it.

In accounting for the effect that any unusual refemblance or diffimilitude hath upon the mind, no cause has been mentioned but furprise; and to prevent confufion and obfcurity, it was proper to difcufs that caufe firft. But furprise is not the only cause of the effect defcribed another concurs, which operates perhaps not lefs powerfully than furprise. This caufe is a principle in human nature that lies still in obfcurity, not having been unfolded by any writer, though its effects are extenfive; and as it is not diftinguifhed by a proper name, the reader must be fatisfied with the following defcription. No man who studies himself or others, but must be fenfible of a tendency or propensity in the mind, to complete every work that is begun, and to carry things to their full perfection. This propenfity has little

opportunity

opportunity to display itself upon natural operations, which are feldom left imperfect but in the operations of art, it hath great fcope; and difplays itself remarkably, by making us perfevere in our own work, and by making us with for the completion of what is done by another: we feel a fenfible pleasure when the work is brought to perfection; and our pain is not lefs fenfible when we are disappointed. Hence our uncafinefs, when an interesting story is broke off in the middle, when a piece of mufic ends without a clofe, or when a building or garden is left unfinished. The fame propensity operates in making collections, fuch as the whole works good and bad of any author. A certain perfon attempted to collect prints of all the capital paintings, and fucceeded except as to a few: La Bruyere remarks, that an anxious fearch was made for thefe; not for their value, but to complete the fet *

The

*The examples above given, are of fubjects that can be brought to an end or conclufion. But the fame uneafinefs is perceptible with refpect to fubjects that admit not any conclufion; witnefs a feries that has no end, commonly called an infinite feries. The mind running along fuch a feries, begins foon to feel an uncafinefs, which becomes more and more fenfible, in continuing its progress without hope of coming to an end.

An unbounded profpect doth not long continue agreeable: we foon feel a flight uncafinefs, which increases with the time we bestow upon the profpect. An avenue without a terminating object, is one inftance of an unbounded profpect; and we might hope to find the cause of its difagreeableness, if it refembled an infinite feries.

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The final caufe of this propenfity is an additional proof of its exiftence: human works are of no fignificancy till they be completed; and

ferics. The eye indeed promifes no refemblance; for the quick eft eye commands but a certain length of space, and there it is bounded, however obfcurely. But the mind perceives things as they exift; and the line is carried on in idea without end; in which refpect an unbounded prospect is fimilar to an infinite feries. In fact, the uncafinefs of an unbounded profpect, differs very little in its feeling from that of an infinite feries; and therefore we may reasonably conclude, that both proceed from the fame caufe.

We next confider a profpect unbounded every way, as, for example, a great plain, or the ocean, viewed from an eminence. We feel here an uneafinefs occafioned by the want of an end or termination, precifely as in the other cafes. A profpect unbounded every way, is indeed fo far fingular, as at first to be more pleasant than a profpect that is unbounded in one direction only, and afterward to be more painful. But thefe circumstances are eatly explained, without breaking in upon the general theory: the pleasure we feel at firft, is a vivid emotion of grandeur, arifing from the immenfe extenfion of the object: and to increase the pain we feel afterward for the want of a termination, there concurs a pain of a different kind, occafioned by ftretching the eye to comprehend fo great a profpect; a pain that gradually increases with the repeated efforts we make to grafp the whole.

It is the fame principle, if I mistake not, which operates imperceptibly with refpect to quantity and number. Another's property indented into my field, gives me uneafinefs; and I am ea ger to make the purchase; not for profit, but in order to square my field. Xerxes and his army, in their paffage to Greece, were fumptuously entertained by Pythius the Lydian: Xerxes getting a particular account of his riches, recompenfed him with 70c0 Da rics, which he wanted to complete the fum of four millions.

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