During infancy, every new object is probably the occafion of wonder, in fome degree; becaufe, during infancy, every object at first fight is strange as well as new: but as objects are rendered familiar by cuftom, we ceafe by degrees to wonder at new appearances, if they have any refemblance to what we are acquainted with; for a thing must be fingular as well as new, to raise our wonder. To fave multiplying words, I would be understood to comprehend both circumstances when I hereafter talk of novelty. In an ordinary train of perceptions where one thing introduces another, not a fingle object makes its appearance unexpectedly *: the mind thus prepared for the reception of its objects, admits them one after another without perturbation. But when a thing breaks in unexpectedly, and without the preparation of any connection, it raises a fingular emotion, known by the name of Surprife. This emotion may be produced by the moft familiar object, as when one accidentally meets a friend, who was reported to be dead; or a man in high life, lately a beggar. On the other hand, a new object, however ftrange, will not produce this emotion if the fpectator be prepared for the fight: an elephant in India will not furprise a traveller who goes to fee one; and yet its novelty will raife his wonder: an Indian in Britain would be much furprised to stumble upon See chap. I. an an elephant feeding at large in the open fields; but the creature itself, to which he was accuftomed, would not raife his wonder. : Surprise thus in feveral refpects differs from wonder: unexpectedness is the caufe of the former emotion; novelty is the caufe of the latter. Nor differ they lefs in their nature and circumftances, as will be explained by and by. With relation to one circumftance they perfectly agree; which is, the fhortness of their duration the inftantaneous production of thefe emotions in perfection, may contribute to this effect, in conformity to a general law, That things foon decay which foon come to perfection: the violence of the emotions may also contribute; for an ardent emotion, which is not fufceptible of increase, cannot have a long courfe. But their fhort duration is occasioned chiefly by that of their causes: we are foon reconciled to an object, however unexpected; and novelty foon degenerates into familiarity. Whether these emotions be pleafant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ftrange, that our own feelings, and their capital qualities, fhould afford any matter for a doubt: but when we are ingroffed by any emotion, there is no place for fpeculation; and when fufficiently calm for fpeculation, it is not eafy to recal the emotion with accuracy. New objects are fometimes terrible, fometimes delightful: the terror which a tyger infpires is greatest at firft, and wears off gradually Q 4 gradually by familiarity: on the other hand, even women will acknowledge, that it is novelty which pleases the most in a new fashion. At this rate, it fhould be thought, that wonder is not in itself pleasant nor painful, but that it affumes either quality according to circumftances. This doctrine, however plaufible, muft not pafs without examination: A new object, it is true, that hath a threatening appearance, adds to our terror by its novelty: but from this experiment it doth not follow, that novelty is in itself disagreeable; for it is perfectly confiftent, that we be delighted with an object in one view, and terrified with it in another: a river in flood fwelling over its banks, is a grand and delightful object; and yet it may produce no fmall degree of fear when we attempt to crofs it: courage and magnanimity are agreeable; and yet, when we view thefe qualities in an enemy, they ferve to increase our terror. In the fame manner, novelty may produce two effects clearly diftinguishable from each other it may, directly and in itself, be agreeable; and it may, at the fame time, have an oppofite effect indirectly, which is, to infpire terror; for when a new object appears in any degree dangerous, our ignorance of its powers and qualities, affords ample scope for the imagination to drefs it in the moft frightful colours*. The first fight of a lion, for example, may at the fame * Effays on the principles of morality and natural religion, part 2. eff. 6. inftant inftant produce two oppofite feelings, the pleafant emotion of wonder, and the painful paffion of terror: the novelty of the object, produces the former directly, and contributes to the latter indirectly. Thus, when the subject is analyzed, we find, that the power which novelty hath indirectly to inflame terror, is perfectly confiftent with its being in every cafe agreeable. The matter may be put in the cleareft light, by adding the following circumftances. If a lion be firft feen from a place of fafety, the fpectacle is altogether agreeable without the leaft mixture of terror. If again the first fight put us within reach of this dangerous animal, our terror may be fo great as quite to exclude any fenfe of novelty. But this fact proves not that wonder is painful: it proves only, that wonder may be excluded by a more powerful paffion. Every man may be made certain by his own experience, that wonder raised by a new object that is inoffenfive, is always pleasant; and with respect to offenfive objects, it appears from the foregoing deduction, that the fame must hold fo long as the fpectator can attend to the novelty. Whether furprife be in itfelf pleasant or painful, is a queftion not lefs intricate than the former. It is certain, that furprise inflames our joy, when unexpectedly we meet with an old friend; and not lefs our terror, when we ftumble upon any thing noxious. To clear this matter, we must trace it step by step. And the first thing to be remarked is, that in some instances an unexpected object overpowers the mind, fo as to produce a momentary stupefaction: where the object is dangerous, or appears fo, the fudden alarm it gives, without preparation, is apt totally to unhinge the mind, and for a moment to fufpend all the faculties, even thought itself*; in which state a man is quite helplefs; and if he move at all, is as like to run upon the danger as from it. Surprise carried to this height, cannot be either pleasant or painful; because the mind, during fuch momentary ftupefaction, is in a good measure, if not totally, infenfible. And If we then inquire for the character of this emotion, it must be where the unexpected object or event produceth lefs violent effects. while the mind remains fenfible of pleasure and pain, is it not natural to fuppofe, that furprise, like wonder, fhould have an invariable character? I am inclined however to think, that furprise has no invariable character, but affumes that of the object which raises it. Wonder being an emotion invariably raised by novelty, and being diftinguishable from all other emotions, ought naturally to poffefs one conftant character. The unexpected appearance of an object, feems not equally intitled to produce an emotion distinguishable from the emotion, pleafant or painful, that is produced by the object in its ordinary appear * Hence the Latin names for furprise, torpor, animi ftupor. ance: |
