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&c.; all united in one complex object, and striking the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality so remarkable in visible objects, lends its name to express every thing that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of speech, we say a beautiful sound, a beautiful thought or expression, a beautiful theorem,' a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or science. But as figurative expression is the subject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper signification.

It is natural to suppose, that a perception fo various as that of beauty, comprehending fometimes many particulars, sometimes few, should occasion emotions equally various : and yet

all the various emotions of beauty, maintain one common character of sweetness and gaiety.

Considering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds. The first may be termed intrinsic beauty, because it is discovered in a single object viewed apart without relation to any other : the examples above given, are of that kind, The other may be termed relative beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The proposed distribution would lead me to handle these beauties separately; but they are frequently so intimately connected, that, for the fake of connection, I ain forc'd in this instance to vary from the plan, and to bring them both into the same chapter. Intrinsic beauty is a percepțion of sense merely; for to perceive the beauty


of a spreading oak or of a flowing river, no more is required but singly an act of vision. Relative beauty is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection; for of a fine instrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, until we be made acquainted with its use and destination. In a word, intrinsic beauty is ultimate : relative beauty is that of means relating to some good end or purpose. These different beauties

agree in one capital circumstance, that both are equally perceived as belonging to the object; which will readily be admitted with respect to intrinsic beauty, but is not fo obvious with respect to the other: the utility of the plough, for example, may make it an object of admiration or of desire; but why should utility make it appear beautiful ? A natural propensity mentioned above *, will explain this doubt: the beauty of the effect, by an eafy transition of ideas, is transferred to the cause, and is perceived as one of the qualities of the cause: thus a subject void of intrinsic beauty, appears beautiful from its utility; an old Gothic tower, that has no beauty in itself, appears beautiful, considered as proper to defend against an enemy; a dwelling-house void of all regularity, is however beautiful in the view of convenience; and the want of form or symmetry in a tree, will not prevent its appearing bcautiful, if it be known to produce good fruit.

Chap. 2 part 1. fect. 4.


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When these two beauties concur in any object, it appears delightful : every member of the human body possesses both in a high degree: the fine proportions and slender make of a horse destined for running, please every eye ; partly from fymmetry, and partly from utility.

The beauty of utility, being proportioned accurately to the degree of utility, requires no illustration ; 'but intrinsic beauty, fo complex as I have said, cannot be handled distinctly without being analyzed into its constituent parts. If a tree be beautiful by means of its colour, its figure, its size, its motion, it is in reality possessed of fo many different beauties, which ought to be examined separately, in order to have a clear notion of the whole. The beauty of colour is too familiar to need explanation. The beauty of figure, arising from various circumstances and different views, is more complex : for example, viewing any body as a whole, the beauty of its figure arises from regularity and simplicity; viewing the parts with relation to each other, uniformity, proportion, and order, contribute to its beauty, The beauty of motion deserves a chapter by itfelf; and another chapter is destined for grandeur, being distinguishable from beauty in its proper sense. For a description of regularity, uniformity, proportion, and order, if thought necessary, I remit my reader to the appendix at the end of the book. Upon fimplicity I must


make a few cursory obfervations, such as may be of use in examining the beauty of single objects.

A multitude of objects crowding into the mind at once, disturb the attention, and pass without making any impreffon, or any lasting impression: in a group, no fingle object makes the figure it would do apart, when it occupies the whole attention *. For the same reason, even a single object, when it divides the attention by the multiplicity of its parts, equals not, in strength of impression, a more simple object comprehended in a single view : parts extremely complex must be considered in portions fuccessively; and a number of impressions in succession, which cannot unite because not simultaneous, never touch the mind like one entire impression made as it were at one stroke. This justifies simplicity in works of art, as opposed to complicated circumstances and crowded ornaments. There is an additional reason for simplicity, in works of dignity or elevation; which is, that the mind attached to beauties of a high rank, cannot descend to inferior beauties. The best artists accordingly have in all ages been governed by a taste for simplicity. How comes it then that we find profufe decoration prevailing in works of art? The plain reason is, that authors and architects who cannot reach the higher beautics, endeavour to supply want of genius by dealing in those that are inferior.

* See the appendix, containing definitions, and explanation of terms, 5 33.


These things premised, I proceed to examine the beauty of figure as arising from the abovementioned particulars, viz. regularity, uniformity, proportion, order, and fimplicity. To exhauft this subject, would require a volume; and I have not room but for a few cursory remarks. To inquire why an object, by means of the particulars mentioned, appears beautiful, would, I am afraid, be a vain attempt : it seems the most probable opinion, that the nature of man was originally framed with a relih for them, in order to answer wise and good purposes. To explain these purposes or final causes, though a subject of great importance, has scarce been attempted by any able writer. One thing is evident, that our relish for the particulars mentioned adds much beauty to the objects that surround us, which of course tends to our happiness: and the Author of our nature has given many signal proofs, that this final cause is not below his care. We may be confirmed in this thought upon reflecting, that our taste for these particulars is not accidental, but uniform and universal, making a branch of our nature. At the same time it ought not to be overlooked, that regularity, uniformity, order, and simplicity, contribute each of them to readiness of apprehension; and enable us to form more diftinct images of objects, than can be done with the utmost attention where these particulars are not found. In some


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