Puslapio vaizdai
PDF
„ePub“

&c.; all united in one complex object, and ftriking the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality fo remarkable in vifible objects, lends its name to exprefs every thing that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of fpeech, we fay a beautiful found, a beautiful thought or expreffion, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful difcovery in art or fcience. But as figurative expreffion is the fubject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper fignification.

It is natural to fuppofe, that a perception fo various as that of beauty, comprehending fometimes many particulars, fometimes few, fhould occafion emotions equally various and yet all the various emotions of beauty, maintain one common character of fweetnefs and gaiety.

Confidering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds. The first may be termed intrinfic beauty, because it is difcovered in a fingle object viewed apart without relation to any other: the examples above given, are of that kind, The other may be termed relative beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The propofed diftribution would lead me to handle these beauties feparately; but they are frequently fo intimately connected, that, for the fake of connection, I am forc'd in this inftance to vary from the plan, and to bring them both into the fame chapter. Intrinfic beauty is a perception of fenfe merely; for to perceive the beauty

of

of a spreading oak or of a flowing river, no more is required but fingly an act of vifion. Relative beauty is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection; for of a fine inftrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, until we be made acquainted with its ufe and deftination. In a word, intrinfic beauty is ultimate: relative beauty is that of means relating to fome good end or purpose. These different beauties agree in one capital circumftance, that both are equally perceived as belonging to the object; which will readily be admitted with refpect to intrinfic beauty, but is not fo obvious with respect to the other: the utility of the plough, for example, may make it an object of admiration or of defire; but why should utility make it appear beautiful? A natural propenfity mentioned above*, will explain this doubt: the beauty of the effect, by an eafy transition of ideas, is transferred to the caufe, and is perceived as one of the qualities of the cause thus a fubject void of intrinfic beauty, appears beautiful from its utility; an old Gothic tower, that has no beauty in itself, appears beautiful, confidered as proper to defend against an enemy; a dwelling-house void of all regularity, is however beautiful in the view of convenience; and the want of form or fymmetry in a tree, will not prevent its appearing beautiful, if it be known to produce good fruit.

Chap. 2 part 1. fect. 4.

When

When these two beauties concur in any object, it appears delightful: every member of the human body poffeffes both in a high degree: the fine proportions and flender make of a horse destined for running, please every eye; partly from fymmetry, and partly from utility.

The beauty of utility, being proportioned accurately to the degree of utility, requires no illuftration; but intrinfic beauty, fo complex as I have faid, cannot be handled diftinctly without being analyzed into its constituent parts. If a tree be beautiful by means of its colour, its figure, its fize, its motion, it is in reality poffeffed of so many different beauties, which ought to be examined separately, in order to have a clear notion of the whole. The beauty of colour is too familiar to need explanation. The beauty of figure, arifing from various circumftances and different views, is more complex: for example, viewing any body as a whole, the beauty of its figure arifes from regularity and fimplicity; viewing the parts with relation to each other, uniformity, proportion, and order, contribute to its beauty. The beauty of motion deferves a chapter by itfelf; and another chapter is destined for grandeur, being diftinguishable from beauty in its proper fenfe. For a defcription of regularity, uniformity, proportion, and order, if thought neceffary, I remit my reader to the appendix at the end of the book. Upon fimplicity I muft

make

make a few curfory obfervations, fuch as may be of ufe in examining the beauty of single objects.

A multitude of objects crowding into the mind at once, disturb the attention, and pafs without making any impreffion, or any lasting impreffion: in a group, no fingle object makes the figure it would do apart, when it occupies the whole attention *. For the fame reafon, even a fingle object, when it divides the attention by the multiplicity of its parts, equals not, in strength of impreffion, a more fimple object comprehended in a fingle view: parts extremely complex must be confidered in portions fucceffively; and a number of impreffions in fucceffion, which cannot unite becaufe not fimultaneous, never touch the mind like one entire impreffion made as it were at one stroke. This juftifies fimplicity in works of art, as oppofed to complicated circumstances and crowded ornaments. There is an additional reason for fimplicity, in works of dignity or elevation; which is, that the mind attached to beauties of a high rank, cannot defcend to inferior beauties. The best artists accordingly have in all ages been governed by a taste for fimplicity. How comes it then that we find profufe decoration prevailing in works of art? The plain reafon is, that authors and architects who cannot reach the higher beauties, endeavour to fupply

* See the appendix, containing definitions, and explanation of terms, $33.

want

want of genius by dealing in thofe that are inferior.

These things premifed, I proceed to examine the beauty of figure as arifing from the abovementioned particulars, viz. regularity, uniformity, proportion, order, and fimplicity. To exhaust this fubject, would require a volume; and I have not room but for a few curfory remarks. To inquire why an object, by means of the particulars mentioned, appears beautiful, would, I am afraid, be a vain attempt: it seems the most probable opinion, that the nature of man was originally framed with a relish for them, in order to answer wife and good purposes. To explain thefe purpofes or final caufes, though a fubject of great importance, has fcarce been attempted by any able writer. One thing is evident, that our relifh for the particulars mentioned adds much beauty to the objects that furround us, which of course tends to our happiness: and the Author of our nature has given many fignal proofs, that this final caufe is not below his care. We may be confirmed in this thought upon reflecting, that our tafte for thefe particulars is not accidental, but uniform and univerfal, making a branch of our nature. At the fame time it ought not to be overlooked, that regularity, uniformity, order, and fimplicity, contribute each of them to readinefs of apprehenfion; and enable us to form more diftinct images of objects, than can be done with the utmost attention where thefe particulars are not found. In fome

inftances

« AnkstesnisTęsti »