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which, though seemingly contradictory, are perfectly concordant. His actions are influenced by the principle of benevolence as well as by that of felfilhness : and in order to answer the foregoing question, I must introduce a third principle, not less remarkable in its influence than either of those mentioned; it is that principle common to all, which prompts us to punish those who do wrong An envious, a malicious, or a cruel action, is disagreeable to me even where I have no connection with the sufferer, and raiseth in me the painful emotion of resentment. When by the production of desire this emotion becomes a passion, its gratification is directed by the principle now unfolded : being prompted by my nature to punish guilt as well as to reward virtue, my resentinent is not gratified but by inflicting punishment: I mult chastise the wretch by indignation at least and hatred, if not more severely, Here the final cause is self-evident.
An injury done to myself, touching me more than when done to others, raises my resentment to a higher degree. The desire accordingly included in this passion, is not satisfied with so fight a punithment as indignation or hatred : it is not fully gratified without retaliation; and the author must by my hand suffer mischief, as great at least as he has done to me. . Neither can we be at any loss about the final cause of this higher degree of resentment: the whole vigour of this
passion is required to secure individuals from the injustice and oppression of others *.
A wicked or disgraceful action, is disagreeable not only to others, but even to the delinquent himself; and raises in both a painful emotion including a desire of punishment. The painful emotion felt by the delinquent, is distinguished by the name of remorse; and in this case, the desire he has to punish is directed to himself. There cannot be imagined a better contrivance to deter us from vice; for remorfe itself is a severe punishment. This passion, and the desire of self-punislıment derived from it, aré touched delicately by Terence :
Menedemus. Ubi comperi ex iis, qui ei fuere conscii, Domum revortor mæftus, atque animo fere Perturbato, atque incerto præ ægritudine : Adfido, adcurrunt fervi, foccos detrahunt: Video alios festinare, lectos fternere, Cænam adparare : pro se quisque sedulo Faciebat, quo illam mihi lenirent miferiam. Ubi video hæc, copi cogitare: Hem! tot mea Solius solliciti fint caufa, ut me unum expleant ? Ancillæ tót me vestiant ? fumptus domi Tantos ego folus faciam ? fed gnatum unicum, Quem pariter uti his decuit, aut etiam amplius, Quod illa ætas magis ad hæc utenda idonea 'st, Eum ego hinc ejeci miserum injustitia mea. Malo quidem me dignum quovis deputem, Si id faciam, nam usque dum ille vitam illam colet
* See Historical law-tracts, tract 1.
Inopem, carens patria ob meas injurias,
Heautontimorumenos, act i.fc. 1.
Otway reaches the same fentiment:
Monimia. Let mischiefs multiply ! let ev'ry hour
Orphan, act 4.
The cases mentioned are, where benevolence alone, or where desire of punishment alone, governs without a rival; and it was necessary to handle these cases separately, in order to elucidate a subject which by writers is left in great obscurity. But neither of these principles operates always without rivalship: cases may be figured, and cafes actually exist, where the same person is an object both of sympathy, and of desire to punish. Thus the light of a profligate in the venereal disease, over-run with botches and fores, puts both principles in motion : while his distress fixes my attention, sympathy prevails; but fo soon as I think of his profligacy, hatred prevails, accompanied sometimes with a desire to punish. This in general is the case of distress, occafioned by immoral actions that are not highly criminal : and if the distress and the immoral action, make impressions equal or nearly so, fympathy and hatred counterbalancing each other, will not suffer me either to afford relief or to infliet punishment What then will be the result? The principle of self-love solves the question : abhorring an object fo loathsome, I naturally avert my eye, and walk off as fast as I can, in or
ways defire : deed
I der to be relieved from the pain.
The present subject gives birth to several other observations, for which I could not find room above, without relaxing more froin the strictness of order and connection, than with safety could be indulged in discoursing upon an intricate subject. These observations I shall throw out loosely as they occur.
No action, right nor wrong, is indifferent even to a mere spectator : if right, it inspires esteem; and disgust, if wrong. But it is remarkable, that these emotions seldom are accompanied with
desire: the abilities of man are limited, and he
If the good qualities of others raise my esteem, the same qualities in myself, must produce a fimilar effect in a fuperior degree, upon account of the natural partiality every man hath for himself: and this increases self-love. If these qualities be of a high rank, they produce a conviction of fuperiority, which excites me to assume some fort of government over others. Mean qualities, on the other hand, produce in me a conviction of inferiority, which makes me submit to others. These convictions, distributed among individuals by measure and proportion, may justly be esteemed the folid basis of government; because upon them depend the natural fubmiffion of the
many to the few, without which even the mildest government would be in a violent flate, and have a constant tendency to diffolution.
No other branch of the human constitution fhows more visibly our destination for society, nor tends more to our improvement, than appetite for fame or esteem: for as the whole conveniencies of life, are derived from mutual aid and support in society; it ought to be a capital aim, to secure these conveniencies by gaining the esteem and affection of others. Reason in