Puslapio vaizdai
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number that is recollected. This doctrine fhall

be illuftrated by examples. After finishing a journey through a populous country, the fre quency of agreeable objects diftinctly recollected by the traveller, makes the time spent in the journey appear to him longer than it was in reality; which is chiefly remarkable in the first journey, when every object is new, and makes a ftrong impreffion. On the other hand, after finishing a journey through a barren country thinly peopled, the time appears fhort, being meafured by the number of objects, which were few, and far from interefting. Here in both inftances a computation is made, directly oppofite to that made during the journey. And this, by the way, ferves to account for what may appear fingular, that in a barren country, a computed mile is always longer, than near the capital where the country is rich and populous: the traveller has' no natural measure of the miles he has travelled, other than the time beftow'd upon the journey; nor any natural measure of the time, other than the number of his perceptions: now thefe, being few from the paucity of objects in a wafte country, lead him to compute that the time has been fhort, and confequently that the miles have been few: by the fame method of computation, the great number of perceptions from the quantity of objects in a populous country, make the traveller conjecture that the time has been long, and the miles many. The laft : VOL. I. L

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ftep of the computation is obvious: in eftimating the distance of one place from another, if the miles be reckoned few in number, each mile muft of course be long; if many in number, each must be short.

Again, the travelling with an agreeable compa nion, produceth a fhort computation both of the road and of time; especially if there be few objects that demand attention, or if the objects be familiar: and the cafe is the fame of young people at a ball, or of a joyous company over a bottle: the ideas with which they have been entertained, being tranfitory, escape the memory; after the journey and the entertainment are over, they reflect that they have been much diverted, but fcarce can fay about what.

When one is totally occupied with any agrecable work that admits not many objects, time runs on without obfervation: and upon a fubfequent recollection, muft appear fhort, in proportion to the paucity of objects. This is ftill more remarkable in clofe contemplation and in deep thinking, where the train, compofed wholly of ideas, proceeds with an extreme flow pace: not only are the ideas few in number, but are apt to efcape an afterreckoning. The like falfe reckoning of time, may proceed from an oppofite state of mind: in a reverie, where ideas float at random without making any impreffion, time goes on unheeded, and the reckoning is loft. A reverie may be fo profound as to prevent the recollection of any one i

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dea that the mind was busied in a train of thinking, may in general be remembered; but what was the fubject, has quite efcaped the memory. In such a cafe, we are altogether at a loss about. the time, having no data for making a computation. No caufe produceth fo falfe a reckoning of time, as immoderate grief: the mind, in this state, is violently attached to a fingle object, and admits not a different thought: any other object breaking in, is inftantly banished, so as fcarce to give an appearance of fucceffion. In a reverie, we are uncertain of the time that is paft; but in the example now given, there is an appearance of certainty, that the time must have been short, when the perceptions are so few in number.

The natural measure of space, appears more obfcure than that of time. I venture however to mention it, leaving it to be further profecuted, if it be thought of any importance.

The space marked out for a house, appears confiderably larger after it is divided into its proper parts. A piece of ground appears larger after it is furrounded with a fence; and still larger when it is made a garden and divided into different compartments.

On the contrary, a large plain looks lefs after

it is divided into parts. The fea must be excepted, which looks less from that very circumstance of not being divided into parts.

A room of a moderate size appears larger when properly furnished. But when a very large room

is furnished, I doubt whether it be not leffened in appearance.

A room of a moderate fize, looks lefs by having a ceiling lower than in proportion. The fame low ceiling makes a very large room look larger than it is in reality.

Thefe experiments are by far too fmall a stock for a general theory: but they are all that occur at préfent; and without attempting any regular fyftem, I must be fatisfy'd with a few conjec

tures.

The largest angle of vifion feems to be the natural measure of fpace; the eye is the only judge; and in examining with it the fize of any plain, or the length of any line, the most accurate method that can be taken is, to run over the object in parts the largest part that can be feen with one ftedfaft look, determines the largest angle of vifion; and when that angle is given, one may inftitute a calculation by trying with the eye how many of these parts are in the whole.

Whether this angle be the fame in all men, I know not; the fmalleft angle of vision is afcertained; and to ascertain the largest angle, would not be lefs curious.

But fuppofing it known, it would be a very imperfect measure; perhaps more fo than the natural measure of time: for it requires great fteadinefs of eye to measure a line with any accuracy, by applying to it the largest angle of distinct vifion. And fuppofe this steadiness to be acquired

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by practice, the measure will be imperfect from other circumstances. The space comprehended under this angle, will be different according to the distance, and alfo according to the fituation of the object of a perpendicular this angle will comprehend the finalleft fpace: the space will be larger in looking upon an inclined plain; and will be larger or lefs in proportion to the degree of inclination.

This measure of space, like the measure of time, is liable to feveral errors from certain operations of the mind, which will account for fome of the erroneous judgements above mentioned. The space marked out for a dwelling-houfe, where the eye is at any reasonable diftance, is feldom greater than can be feen at once without moving the head: divide this fpace into two or three equal parts, and none of these parts will appear much less than what can be comprehended at one diftinét look; confequently each of them will appear equal, or nearly equal, to what the whole did before the divifion. If, on the other hand, the whole be very finall, fo as fcarce to fill the eye at one look, its divifions into parts will, I conjecture, make it appear ftill lefs the minutenefs of the parts is, by an eafy tranfition of ideas, transferred to the whole; each part hath a diminutive appearance, and by the intimate connection of thefe parts with the whole, we pafs the fame judgement upon the latter that we do upon the former.

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