if the defire be, to do a wrong action in order to produce an ill effect, the paffion is, and must be difagreeable. In this light, paffions as well as actions are governed by the moral sense. These rules by the wisdom of providence coincide: a paffion that is conformable to our common nature, must tend to good; and a paffion that deviates from our common nature, must so far tend to ill. This deduction may be carried a great way farther; but to avoid intricacy and obscurity, I make but one other step. A paffion, which, as aforesaid, becomes an object of thought to a spectator, may have the effect to produce a pafsion or emotion in him; for it is natural, that a focial being should be affected with the paffions of others. Paffions or emotions thus generated, submit, in common with others, to the general law above mentioned, viz. that an agreeable object produces a pleasant emotion, and a disagreeable object a painful emotion. Thus the paffion of gratitude, being to a spectator an agreeable object, produceth in him the pleasant paffion of love to the grateful person: and malice, being to a spectator a disgreeable object, produceth in him the painful paffion of hatred to the malicious perfon. We are now prepared for examples of pleasant paffions that are difagreeable, and of painful paffions that are agreeable. Self-love, so long as confined within just bounds, is a passion both pleasant G 3 pleasant and agreeable: in excess it is disagreeable, though it continues to be still pleasant. Our appetites are precisely in the fame condition. Resentment, on the other hand, is, in every stage of the paffion, painful; but is not disagreeable unless in excess. Pity is always painful, yet always agreeable. Vanity, on the contrary, is always pleasant, yet always disagreeable. But however distinct these qualities are, they coincide, I acknowledge, in one class of paffions: all vicious paffions tending to the hurt of others, are equally painful and difagreeable. The foregoing qualities of pleasant and painful, may be sufficient for ordinary subjects: but with respect to the science of criticism, it is further neceffary, that we be made acquainted with the several modifications of these qualities, with the modifications at least that make the greatest figure. Even at first view one is sensible, that the pleasure or pain of one paffion differs from that of another: how distant the pleasure of revenge gratified, from that of love? so distant, as that *we cannot without reluctance admit them to be any way related. That the fame quality of pleafure should be so differently modified in different paffions, will not be surprising, when we reflect on the boundless variety of agreeable sounds, taftes, and smells, daily perceived. Our difcernment reaches differences still more nice, in objects even of the same sense: we have no difficulty to distinguish different sweets, different fours, and and different bitters; honey is sweet, so is fugar, and yet they never pass the one for the other: our sense of smelling is sufficiently acute, to diftinguish varieties in fweet-fmelling flowers without end. With respect to paffions and emotions, their differences as to pleasant and painful have no limits; though we want acuteness of feeling for the more delicate modifications. In this matter, however, there is an analogy between our internal and external senses: the latter generally are sufficiently acute for all the useful purposes of life, and so are the former. Some persons indeed, Nature's favourites, have a wonderful acuteness of sense, which to them unfolds many a delightful scene totally hid from vulgar eyes. But if fuch refined pleasure be with-held from the bulk of mankind, it is however wisely ordered that they are not sensible of the defect; and it detracts not from their happiness that others fecretly are more happy. With relation to the fine arts only, this qualification seems essential; and there it is termed delica y of taste. Should an author of such a taste attempt to describe all those varieties in pleasant and painful emotions which he himself feels, he would foon meet an invincible obstacle in the poverty of language: a people must be thoroughly refined, before they find words for expreffing the more delicate feelings; and for that reason, no known tongue hitherto has reached that perfection. We muft G4 must therefore rest satisfied with an explanation of the more obvious modifications. In forming a comparison between pleasant paffions of different kinds, we conceive some of them to be grofs, fome refined. Those pleasures of external sense that are felt as at the organ of sense, are conceived to be corporeal, or gross *: the pleasures of the eye and ear are felt to be internal; and for that reason are conceived to be more pure and refined. The focial affections are conceived by all to be more refined than the selfish. Sympathy and humanity are universally esteemed the finest temper of mind; and for that reason, the prevalence of the focial affections in the progress of society, is held to be a refinement in our nature. A favage knows little of social affection, and therefore is not qualified to compare selfish and social pleasure; but a man, after acquiring a high relish of the latter, loses not thereby a taste for the former: this man is qualified to judge, and he will give preference to social pleasures as more fweet and refined. In fact they maintain that character, not only in the direct feeling, but also when we make them the subject of reflection; the social paffions are by far more agreeable than the selfsh, and rise much higher in our esteem. There are differences not less remarkable among the painful paffions. Some are voluntary, * See the Introduction. fome some involuntary: the pain of the gout is an ex ample of the latter; grief, of the former, which in some cafes is so voluntary as to reject all. confo lation. One pain foftens the temper, pity is an in stance: one tends to render us savage and cruel, which is the case of revenge. I value myself upon sympathy: I hate and despise myself for envy. Social affections have an advantage over the selfish, not only with respect to pleasure as abovė explained, but also with respect to pain. The pain of an affront, the pain of want, the pain of disappointment, and a thousand other selfish pains, are cruciating and tormenting, and tend to a habit of peevishness and discontent. Social pains have a very different tendency. The pain of sympathy, for example, is not only voluntary, but does me good, by softening my temper, and raising me in my own esteem. Refined manners, and polite behaviour, must not be deemed altogether artificial: men who, inured to the sweets of society, cultivate humanity, find an elegant pleasure in preferring others, and making them happy, of which the proud or delfish scarce have a conception. Ridicule, which chiefly arifes from pride, a selfish paffion, is at best but a grofs pleasure: a people, it is true, must have emerged out of barbarity before they can have a taste for ridicule; but it is too rough an entertainment for those who are highly polished and refined. Ci cero |