patriots who framed our Constitution, and perform contracts, and that when these dethe people who adopted it, must be under- fendants, by intimidation and force, comstood to have employed words in their nat-pelled the colored men named in the indictural sense, and to have intended what they have said." The 13th Amendment reads: "Sec. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. "Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." ment to desist from performing their con- "With these decisions, and many others The meaning of this is as clear as language can make it. The things denounced are slavery and involuntary servitude, and Congress is given power to enforce that denunciation. All understand by these terms a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another. While the inciting cause of the Amendment was the emancipation of the colored race, yet it is not an attempt to commit that race to the care of the nation. It is the denunciation of a con[17]dition, and not a declaration* in favor of a particular people. It reaches every race and every individual, and if in any respect it commits one race to the nation, it commits every race and every individual thereof. Slavery or involuntary servitude of the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon, "Even though such right be a natural or are as much within its compass as slavery inalienable right, the duty of protecting the or involuntary servitude of the African. | citizen in the enjoyment of such right, free Of this Amendment it was said by Mr. from individual interference, rests alone Justice Miller in Slaughter-House Cases, 16 with the state. Wall. 69, 21 L. ed. 406: "Its two short sections seem hardly to admit of construction." And again: "To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government requires an effort, to say the least of it." or interference by individual "Unless, therefore, the additional element, to wit, the infliction of an injury upon one individual citizen by another, solely on account of his color, be sufficient ground to redress such injury, the individual citizen suffering such injury must be left for redress of his grievance to the state laws." The logic of this concession points irresistibly to the contention that the 13th Amendment operates only to protect the African race. This is evident from the fact that nowhere in the record does it ap wronged by the defendants had ever been themselves slaves, or were the descendants of slaves. They took no more from the Amendment than any other citizens of the United States. A reference to the definitions in the dictionaries of words whose meaning is so thoroughly understood by all seems an affectation, yet in Webster slavery is defined as "the state of entire subjection of one per-pear that the parties charged to have been son to the will of another," and a slave is said to be "a person who is held in bondage to another." Even the secondary meaning given recognizes the fact of subjection, as "one who has lost the power of resistance; one who surrenders himself to any power whatever; as a slave to passion, to lust, to strong drink, to ambition," and servitude is by the same authority declared to be "the state of voluntary or compulsory subjection to a master." It is said, however, that one of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its existence, was a lack of power to make or But if, as we have seen, that denounces a condition possible for all races and all individuals, then a like wrong perpetrated by white men upon a Chinese, or by black men upon a white man, or by any men upon any man on account of his race, would come within the jurisdiction of Congress, and that protection of individual rights which, prior to the 13th Amendment, was unquestionably within the jurisdiction solely of the states, would, by virtue of that Amendment, be transferred to the nation, and subject to the legislation of Congress. [19] *But that it was not the intent of the Amendment to denounce every act done to an individual which was wrong if done to a free man, and yet justified in a condition of slavery, and to give authority to Congress to enforce such denunciation, consider the legislation in respect to the Chinese. In slave times in the slave states not infrequently every free negro was required to carry with him a copy of a judicial decree or other evidence of his right to freedom or be subject to arrest. That was one of the incidents or badges of slavery. By the act of May 5, 1892 [27 Stat. at L. 25, chap. 60, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1319], Congress required all Chinese laborers within the limits of the United States to apply for a certificate, and any one who, after one year from the passage of the act, should be found within the jurisdiction of the United States without such certificate, might be arrested and deported. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016, the validity of the Chinese deportation act was presented, elaborately argued, and fully considered by this court. While there was a division of opinion, yet at no time during the progress of the litigation, and by no individual, counsel, or court connected with it, was it suggested that the requiring of such certificate was evidence of a condition of slavery, or prohibited by the 13th Amendment. a One thing more: at the close of the Civil War, when the problem of the emancipated slaves was before the nation, it might have left them in a condition of alienage, or established them as wards of the government, like the Indian tribes, and thus retained for the nation jurisdiction over them. or it might, as it did, give them citizenship. It chose the latter. By the 14th Amendment it made citizens of all born within the limits of the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. By the 15th it prohibited any state from denying the right of suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and by the 13th it forbade slavery or involuntary servitude anywhere within the limits of the land. Whether this was or was not the wiser way to deal with the great problem is not a mat[20]ter for the courts to consider. It is for us to accept the decision, which declined to constitute them wards of the nation or leave them in a condition of alienage where they would be subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, but gave them citizenship, doubt less believing that thereby in the long run their best interests would be subserved, they taking their chances with other citizens in the states where they should make their homes. For these reasons we think that the United States court had no jurisdiction of the wrong charged in the indictment. The judgments are reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the indictment. Mr. Justice Brown concurs in the judgments. Mr. Justice Harlan (with whom concurs Mr. Justice Day), dissenting: The plaintiffs in error were indicted with eleven others in the district court of the United States, eastern district of Arkansas, for the crime of having knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully conspired to oppress, threaten, and intimidate Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton, persons of African descent and citizens of the United States and of Arkansas, in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege-alleged to be secured to them respectively by the Constitution and laws of the United States-of disposing of their labor and services by contract and of performing the terms of such contract without discrimination against them because of their race or color, and without illegal interference or by violent means.+ *The indictment was based primarily upon [21] $ 5508 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3712), which provides: "§ 5508. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen The indictment charged that "the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton, being then and there persons of African descent, and citizens of the United States and of the state of Arkansas, had then and there made and entered into contracts and agreements with James A. Davis and James S. Hodges, persons then and there doing business under the name of Davis & Hodges, as copartners carrying on the business of manufacturers of lumber at White Hall, in said county, the said contracts being for the employment by said firm of the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton, as laborers and workmen in and about their said manufacturing establishment, by which contracts the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton were, on their part, to perform labor and services at said manufactory, and were to receive, on the other hand, for their labor and services, compensation, the same being in the free exercise or enjoyment of any, under color of any statute, ordinance, reguright or privilege secured to him by the Con- lation, custom, or usage of any state or terstitution or laws of the United States, or ritory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, [22] because of his having so exercised, the same; any citizen of the United States or other or if two or more persons go in disguise on person within the jurisdiction thereof to the the highway, or on the premises of another, deprivation of any rights, privileges, or imwith intent to prevent or hinder his free munities secured by the Constitution *and [23] exercise or enjoyment of any right or privi- laws, shall be liable to the party injured in lege so secured, they shall be fined not more an action at law, suit in equity, or other than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned proper proceeding for redress." "§ 5510 (U. not more than ten years, and shall, more- S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3713). Every person over, be thereafter ineligible to any office who, under color of any law, statute, ordior place of honor, profit, or trust created nance, regulation, or custom, subjects, or by the Constitution or laws of the United causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of States." any state or territory to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not more than one year, or by both." Other sections of the statutes relating to civil rights, and referred to in the discussion at the bar, although not, perhaps, vital to the decision of the present case, are as follows: " 1977 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1259). All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, and be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. § 1978. All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. § 1979. Every person who, a right and privilege conferred upon them by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, and being a right similar to that enjoyed in said state by the white citizens thereof; and while the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton were in the enjoyment of said right and privilege the said defendants did knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully conspire as aforesaid to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate them in the free exercise and enjoyment of said right and privilege, and because of their having so exercised the same, and because they were citizens of African descent, enjoying said right, by then and there notifying the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton that they must abandon said contracts and their said work at said mill, and cease to perform any further labor thereat, or receive any further compensation for said labor, and by threatening, in case they did not so abandon said work, to injure them, and by thereafter then and there wilfully and unlawfully marching and moving in a body to and against the places of business of the said firm while the said A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and the defendants having pleaded not guilty, they were tried before a jury, and some of them-the present plaintiffs in error-were convicted of the crime charged, were each fined $100, and ordered to be imprisoned for one year and a day. A motion for new trial having been denied, they have brought the case to this court. In our consideration of the questions now raised it must be taken, upon this record, Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton were engaged thereat, and while they were in the performance of said contracts thereon, the said defendants being then and there armed with deadly weapons, threatening and intimidating the said workmen there employed, with the purpose of compelling them, by violence and threats and otherwise, to remove from said place of business, to stop said work, and to cease the enjoyment of said right and privilege, and by then and there wilfully, deliberately, and unlawfully compelling said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton to quit said work and abandon said place and cease the free enjoyment of all advantages under said contracts, the same being so done by said defendants and each of them for the purpose of driving the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg. Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton from said place of business and from their labor because they were colored men and citizens of African descent, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States." as conclusively established by the verdict Chief Justice Waite, said: Rights and imand judgment, That certain persons-the said Berry Winn and others above named with himcitizens of the United States, and of Arkansas, and of African descent, entered into a contract whereby they agreed to perform, for compensation, service and labor in and about the manufacturing business in that state of a private individual; That those persons, in execution of their contract, entered upon and were actually engaged in performing the work they agreed to do, when the defendants-the present plaintiffs in error-knowingly and wilfully conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate such laborers, solely because of their having made that contract, and because of their race and color, in the free exercise of their right to dispose of their labor, [24]and *prevent them from carrying out their contract to render such service and labor; That, in the prosecution of such conspiracy, the defendants, by violent means, compelled those laborers, simply, "because they were colored men and citizens of African descent," to quit their work and abandon the place at which they were performing labor in execution of their contract; and That, in consequence of those acts of the defendant conspirators, the laborers referred to were hindered and prevented, solely be cause of their race and color, from enjoying the right by contract to dispose of their labor upon such terms and to such persons as to them seemed best. Was the right or privilege of these laborers thus to dispose of their labor secured to them "by the Constitution or laws of the United States?" If so, then this case is within the very letter of § 5508 of the Revised Statutes, and the judgment should be affirmed if that section be not unconstitutional. But I need not stop to discuss the constitutionality of § 5508. It is no longer open to question, in this court, that Congress may, by appropriate legislation, protect any right or privilege arising from, crcated or secured by, or dependent upon, the Constitution or laws of the United States. That is what that section does. It purports to do nothing more. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152, it was distinctly adjudged that § 5508 was a valid exercise of power by Congress. In Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 286, 293, 36 L. ed. 429, 437, 439, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, 623, 626, this court stated that the validity of § 5508 had been sustained in the Yar brough Case, and, speaking by Mr. Justice Gray, said: "In United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217, 23 L. ed. 563, 564, decided at October term, 1875, this court, speaking by munities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form and the manner of the protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion, shall provide. These may be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right to be *protected.'" After[25] referring to prior adjudications the court in the Logan Case also unanimously declared: "The whole scope and effect of this series of decisions is that, while certain fundamental rights, recognized and declared, but not granted or created, in some of the amendments to the Constitution, are thereby guaranteed only against violation or abridgment by the United States or by the states as the case may be, and cannot therefore be affirmatively enforced by Congress against unlawful acts of individuals, yet that every right created by, arising under, or dependent upon, the Constitution of the United States, may be protected and enforced by Congress, by such means and in such manrelative duty of protection, or of the legisner as Congress, in the exercise of the corstitution, may, in its discretion, deem most lative powers conferred upon it by the Coneligible and best adapted to attain the object." In Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 44 L. ed. 1150, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993, the language of the court was: "We have seen that by § 5508 of the Revised Statutes it is made an offense against the United States for two or more persons to conspire to incitizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of jure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the punishment prescribed being a fine of not more than $5,000, imprisonment not more than ten years, and ineligibility to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust creUnited States. And by § 5509 (U. S. Comp. ated by the Constitution or laws of the Stat. 1901, p. 3712), it is provided that if, in committing the above offense, any other felony or misdemeanor be committed, the offender shall suffer such punishment as is attached to such felony or misdemeanor by the laws of the state in which the offense is committed. No question has been madeindeed, none could successfully be madeas to the constitutionality of these statutory provisions. Ex parte Yarbrough, supra; United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 28 L. ed. 673, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. Referring to those provisions and to the clause of the Constitution giving Congress authority to pass all laws *necessary and proper for car-[26] rying into execution the powers specifically granted to it, and all other powers vested in the government of the United States, this court has said: 'In the exercise of this general power of legislation, Congress may use any means appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.' Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 283, 36 L. ed. 429, 435, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, 622.” In view of these decisions it is unnecessary to examine the grounds upon which the constitutionality of § 5508 rests; and I may assume that the power of the national government, by appropriate legislation, to protect a right created by, derived from, or dependent in any degree upon, the Constitution of the United States, cannot be disputed. I come now to the main question, whether a conspiracy or combination to forcibly prevent citizens of African descent, solely because of their race and color, from disposing of their labor by contract upon such terms as they deem proper, and from carrying out such contract, infringes or violates a right or privilege created by, derived from, or dependent upon, the Constitution of the United States. Before the 13th Amendment was adopted the existence of freedom or slavery within any state depended wholly upon the Consti 2d section, invested Congress with power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions. To that end, by direct, primary legislation, Congress may not only prevent the re-establishing of the institution of slavery, pure and simple, but may make it impossible that any of its incidents or badges should exist or be enforced in any state or territory of the United States. It therefore became competent for Congress, under the 13th Amendment, to make the establishing of slavery, as well as all attempts, whether in the form of a conspiracy or otherwise, to subject anyone to the badges or incidents of slavery, offenses against the United States, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. And legislation of that character would certainly be appropriate for the protection of whatever rights were given or created by the Amendment. So, legislation making it an offense against the United States to conspire to injure or intimidate a citizen in the free exercise of any right secured by the Constitution is broad enough to embrace a conspiracy of the kind charged in the present indictment. "A right or immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by it, may be protected by Congress." This court so adjudged in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310, 25 L. ed. 664, 666, as it had previously adjudged in Prigg tution and laws of such state. However v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 10 L. ed. 1060, abhorrent to many was the thought that and in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, human beings of African descent were held 23 L. ed. 563. The colored laborers against as slaves and chattels, no remedy for that whom the conspiracy in question was distate of things as it existed in some of the rected owe their freedom as well as their [28] states could be given by the United States exemption from the incidents and badges of in virtue of any power it possessed prior slavery alone to the Constitution of the to the adoption of the 13th Amendment. United States. Yet it is said that their That condition, however, underwent a rad-right to enjoy freedom and to be protected ical change when that Amendment became a part of the supreme law of the land, and, as such, binding upon all the states and all the people, as well as upon every branch of government, Federal and state. By the Amendment it was ordained that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as [27]a punishment for *crime where of the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction;" and "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Although in words and form prohibitive, yet, in law, by its own force, that Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and established freedom. It also conferred upon every person within the jurisdiction of the United States (except those legally imprisoned for crime) the right, without discrimination against them on account of their race, to enjoy all the privileges that inhere in freedom. It went further, however, and by its 1 against the badges and incidents of slavery is not secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It may be also observed that the freedom created and established by the 13th Amendment was further protected against assault when the 14th Amendment became a part of the supreme law of the land; for that Amendment provided that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. To deprive any person of a privilege inhering in the freedom ordained and established by the 13th Amendment is to deprive him of a privilege inhering in the liberty recognized by the 14th Amendment. It is true that the present case is not one of the deprivation, by the Constitution or laws of the state, of the privilege of disposing of one's labor as he deems proper. But it is one of a combination and conspiracy by individuals acting in hostility to rights conferred by the Amendment that ordained and estab |