CHAPTER I

genesis of laissez

views on

WHERE tendencies, not events, are being considered, divisions The by time must, in the nature of things, be somewhat rough and arbitrary. No one can say the exact hour when the aller Zeitgeist is found pointing in a particular direction. More- Colonial over, it must be confessed that during the time we have been Policy. considering there was already much of the spirit abroad which we have called laissez-aller. Note the language of Sir F. Rogers1 in 1854. Speaking of a "Legislative declaration of Independence on the part of the Australian Colonies," he goes on, "The successive Secretaries of State have been bidding for popularity with them by offering to let them have their own way. . . . What remains to complete colonial independence except command of the land and sea forces I don't quite see. I shall be interested to see what comes of it. It is a great pity that, give as much as you will, you can't please the colonists with anything short of absolute independence, so that it is not easy to say how you are to accomplish what we are, I suppose, all looking to, the eventual parting company on good terms." The view, which regards the granting of complete self-government to the Colonies, as part of a general policy of cutting them adrift, has been already noted. In 1872 Mr Disraeli asserted that "there had been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen, as the attempt of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the British Empire." "Those subtle views," he alleged, "were adopted by the country under the plausible plea of granting self-government." The attempt has been already made to vindicate the memory of 1 Afterwards Lord Blachford. 2 Letters, p. 175, ed. by G. Marindin.

3 Speeches, ed. by T. E. Kebbel, Vol. II. p. 530.

Question of military defence.

Lord John Russell on this question, and we have seen how complete was, in fact, the continuity of policy amongst statesmen of both the great parties. Nor was Mr Disraeli very clear in his suggestions as to what British policy should have been. Self-government . . . ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an Imperial tariff, by securities for the people of England for the enjoyment of unappropriated lands . . . and by a military code, which should have precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the Colonies should be defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the Colonies themselves." Now, with regard to an Imperial tariff, if what was meant was an Imperial zollverein, of course much might have been said for such a policy. It was not, however, through indifference to the Colonies, but because, rightly or wrongly, English public opinion was in favour of simple free trade, that such a policy was not adopted. But if it be meant that the Mother country should have dictated to the Colonies their fiscal policy, then there is little doubt but that such a course would have wrecked the Empire. In fact, it was strenuously advocated by the Whig doctrinaire, Lord Grey, and its inexpediency was clearly shown by one who had himself been a Tory Under Secretary for the Colonies. With regard to the Land question, we have already seen that all English statesmen started with the firm intention to retain the control of the Crown lands in the hands of the Mother country, but the practical difficulties in the way proved insurmountable, and, in fact, it was a Tory Secretary of State who first yielded on this point to the colonial demands.

1

The subject of military defence opens out a wide question. It has been maintained that the policy of gradually reducing the number of troops quartered in the Colonies was part of a

1 See controversy in Nineteenth Cent. in 1877, between Lord Grey and Sir C. Adderley.

2 On this, note that in the Western Aust. Act of 1890 it was found impossible to retain to the Mother country the control of the public lands, and sec. iii. provides that "the entire management and control of the waste lands ... shall be vested in the Legislature."

general scheme of disintegration; but, in fact, that policy may well be defended on better grounds. It is not necessary to agree with the historical theory again and again put forward by Lord Grey and the statesmen and officials of the day. This theory held that the American Colonies had, in the old time, defended themselves unaided against aggression, and had even taken part in expeditions outside their own limits. While this state of things had lasted all had gone well, it was supposed, with the Empire. The theory took, perhaps, its most extravagant form in the language of Mr Godley, a recognised authority on colonial matters, who gravely informed1 a Parliamentary Committee that the sending of English troops to America under Braddock was indirectly the cause of the future separation. Assuredly, as things were tending, without the presence of British troops in America, such separation would not have happened, because in a very short time there would have been no British America to separate. The theory appears based on a hasty generalisation from the single case of the New England Colonies. As a matter of fact, after there was a regular standing army at home, troops were furnished to some at least of the Colonies, as a matter of course. Thus, in 1679, we find an annual expenditure of over £3000 in each of the Colonies of Virginia, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands upon English soldiers, and £1000 was at the same time devoted to the maintenance of forts in New York. If, as in the case of the troops afterwards quartered in New York, such companies in a short time only existed upon paper, the fault lay with the dry rot of corruption, and was not due to any elaborate theory. Moreover, as we have already seen, the despatch of troops from the Mother country, to assist the Colonies in special expeditions, had been proposed and made on many occasions before the time of Braddock.

Apart, however, from history, and merely upon its merits, there would appear much to be said for the almost unanimous conclusion of the Committee, which carefully considered the whole question in 1861, that the main object 1 Parl. Pap., 1861. 2 Fortescue, Cal., 1677-1680.

should be to encourage local efforts and local organisation; that therefore "the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve upon themselves." And this "not merely with a view to diminish Imperial expenditure, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in colonial communities." It was not necessary to agree with Mr Lowe, who, having boxed the political compass in New South Wales, lost no opportunity in England of traducing the community where he had passed his political apprenticeship, that a Government of the kind of New South Wales was not "fit to be entrusted with the disposition of Her Majesty's troops for any purpose whatever," to recognise the extreme difficulty of reconciling complete local independence with Imperial control of the military forces. Everyone must agree with Sir W. Denison that "Usefulness must attend upon that unity of action which can only result from unity of administration . . . there must be no shuffling of responsibilities." But, under these necessary conditions, there was a grave risk of friction between the local and Imperial authorities. In this connection we may note the circumstances under which the last detachment of Imperial troops was removed from Victoria. The British Government were willing to leave, and the Colonial Government desired to have the services of a small body of men "to assist in fortifying and to aid in organising local volunteers." The Colonial Government was willing to pay the cost, but insisted on a guarantee that under no circumstances should the troops move from the Colony. This guarantee the Imperial authorities were unable to give, 1870. and so the troops were removed.

Apart, however, from the complications introduced by the existence of responsible governments, the subject bristled with difficulties. It was easy enough to maintain in theory that Great Britain should protect her Colonies from attack by European powers, but that the resources of the Colony should be sufficient for small frontier wars; the difficulty Parl. Fap., 1861.

2 Rusden, Hist. of Aust., Vol. III. p. 400.