was

to establish its system of government upon any portion of the American hemisphere; although it may at any time be compelled to take the further step of demanding that the Latin-American Republics should be treated in the same manner and with the same degree of consideration which ought to be extended to all other independent Governments in the family of nations. What line of conduct such a demand would indicate is perfectly clear, and does not impose the slightest hardship upon any European Power. It would simply require that in the first instance they should endeavour, without irritation or such domineering spirit as this record discloses, to reach an amicable arrangement by diplomatic methods as to the matters in controversy. If that effort fail, then as the law of nations has been enlarged by the Peace Conference, a persistent effort should be made to secure either mediation or arbitration, or both; and if any Government of Latin-America so foolish as finally to decline all such overtures, the complaining nation could be at perfect liberty to appoint a judicial tribunal of her own1 to pass upon the question of the merits of the claims presented and of the financial ability to provide for their payment. Thereafter she would be at liberty to enforce them, and no doubt with the cordial approval of the Government of the United States, by such methods as were likely to produce the best practical results with the least use of armed force; and provided always that no permanent occupancy of any territory was contemplated. This would seem to be the method which common sense and a decent regard for the rights of others, now that the Peace Conference has authoritatively spoken on the general subject of international relations, would dictate; but there is one additional grave consideration which, it is submitted with confidence, ought always to be kept in view, and that is, that any effort to collect by armed force the indebtedness of independent nations to holders of their bonds or holders of concessions, will always be fraught with danger.

1 This would be following the example of the United States Government in the l'enezuela Boundary difficulty.

The modus operandi thus sketched out would leave it to circumstances to guide the United States in determining when permanent occupancy seemed to become a possibility. The President's Message of December 5, 1905, seems, however, to foreshadow some arrangement under which occupation by any European Power would become unnecessary.

The subject bristles with difficulties, and it is probably safer to leave each case to be dealt with in accordance with its particular requirements, than to try to organise any definite system in which the United States would have to be the medium of obtaining redress for the grievances of complaining European States, except as hitherto, i.e., acting as the common friend of the contending parties, and with due reiteration as usual of the Monroe Doctrine.

increase for a fixed period the present effectives of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary examination of the means by which even a reduction might be effected in future in the forces and budgets above mentioned."

At the Conference the Russian Government, further developing the proposal, submitted the following details:

"1. Establishment of an international understanding for a term of five years, stipulating non-increase of the present figures of the peace effective of the troops kept up for home use.

"2. Fixation, in case of this understanding being arrived at, and, if possible, of the figures of the peace effective of all the Powers, excepting colonial troops.

"3. Maintenance for a like term of five years of the amount of the military budgets at present in force."

When the subject came on for discussion in the Commission appointed to deal with it, the German military delegate stated his view that "the question of effectives could not be discussed by itself, as there were many others to which it was in some measure subordinated, such, for instance, as the length of service, the number of cadres, whether existing in peace or made ready for war, the amount of training received by reserves, the situation of the country itself, its railway system, and the number and position of its fortresses. In a modern army all these questions went together, and national defence included them all.” In Germany, moreover, the military system "did not provide for fixed numbers annually, but increased the numbers each year." After many expressions of regret at finding no method of giving effect to the proposal, the Commission recorded its opinion that "a further examination of the question by the Powers would prove a great benefit to humanity."

The Conference, however, were unanimous in the adoption of the following resolution :

"The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military budgets, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind";

and passed also the following vơu :—

"That Governments, taking into account the proposals made at the Conference, should examine the possibility of an understanding concerning the limitation of military and naval armaments, and of war budgets."1

1 Lord Goschen, when First Lord of the Admiralty, issued a public invitation on behalf of the Government to other countries to respond to British feeling in favour of a reduction of naval armaments.--Sir E. Grey, House of Commons, May 9, 1906.

Lord Goschen's statement on the subject in the House of Lords was as follows: "An International Conference is to be assembled. Will the deliberations of that Conferencewill the actions of other nations resulting from that Conference-make it possible for us to diminish or modify our programme for new construction, while, of course, maintaining our standard and not altering our relative position? We have been compelled to increase our expenditure as other nations have increased theirs, not taking the lead, not pressing on more than they. As they have increased, so we have increased. I have now to state on be. half of Her Majesty's Government that similarly, if the other great Naval Powers should be prepared to diminish their programme of shipbuilding, we should be prepared on our side to meet such a procedure by modifying ours. The difficulties of adjustment are no doubt immense, but our desire that the Conference should succeed in lightening the tremendous burdens which now weigh down all European nations is sincere. But if Europe comes to no agreement, and if the hopes entertained by the Tzar should not be realised, the Programme which I have submitted to the House must stand."-March 9, 1899.

The growth of armaments, since the Conference, has continued

at a still greater speed than ever, and, if their limitation was desirable in 1899, it is far more so now. It has also become a more complicated question through the recent rise of a great military Power in the Far East, which has brought British colonies within the scope of the considerations excessive armaments suggest.

Speaking in the House of Commons on 17th March 1903, Mr. Arnold-Forster, the Secretary for War, observed, as regards colonial feeling, that

"there was an impression that naval warfare could be conducted on the principle of limited liability, and that a colony, in the event of war, would only need a force capable of meeting the belligerent squadron that might happen to be in its neighbourhood at the outbreak of hostilities. But if Australia, for example, were menaced by France, or Japan, or Germany, the Australians would at once find out that this idea of limited liability in naval warfare was a fallacy, and that they would have to contend, not merely against the German, or French, or Japanese squadron in Australian waters, but against the whole maritime power of the hostile nation. . . . If Australia were to establish a navy on the most economical lines, its cost would not be less than £1,000,000 a year."

Latterly the general public, more particularly in Great Britain and France, has shown an interest in the rapid growth of armaments as a possible cause of grave economic troubles. A high state of military preparedness of any one State obliges all the others to endeavour to be prepared on the same level. This process of emulation, very appropriately called by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman "a policy of huge armaments," unfortunately is a policy from which it is impossible for any country to extricate itself without the co-operation, direct or indirect, of other nations.2

In the course of a debate on the reduction of armaments in the House of Lords on May 25, 1906, a number of interesting remarks were made on a suggestion of Lord Avebury, that "If our overtures were rejected, we should have held out the olive branch, and it would be an honourable, even glorious failure. But he did not entertain such a fear; he had too much confidence in the common sense and conscience of Europe";

Lord Sanderson observed that: "Armaments were not so much

1 Prime Minister's Speech at the Albert Hall, December 21, 1905.

2 On May 10, 1906, the following resolution on the subject of armaments was moved by Mr. Vivian and "agreed to by the House of Commons :-" That this House is of opinion that the growth of expenditure on armaments is excessive, and ought to be reduced; such expenditure lessens national and commercial credit, intensifies the unemployed problem, reduces the resources available for social reform, and presses with exceptional severity on the industrial classes; and it, therefore, calls upon the Government to take drastic steps to reduce the drain on national income, and to this end to press for the inclusion of the question of the reduction of armaments by international agreement in the agenda of the forthcoming Hague Conference." The Foreign Secretary (Sir Edward Grey), speaking upon it observed: When The Hague Conference meets, what will be its object? To promote peace, to diminish the horrors of war. No greater service could it do than to make the conditions of peace less expensive than they are at the present time. To all the horrors of war which are commonly known, there are, no doubt, certain off-sets on the other side. You may set triumph against physical suffering, the fine qualities of courage and self. sacrifice against wounds and loss of life in war; but against the expenditure which war entails you have no off-set of that kind. That remains after all the excitement and passion of war is over, as a heavy deadweight pressing on the national life, lowering the standard of vitality in the country. Nowadays the expenditure in Europe on armies and navies is so great that in a sense every year we suffer that depression of national life which, though we are at peace, is in itself one of the worst conditions of war. Now, there is no more profitable task to which any such thing as The Hague Conference might aspire than to produce some practical result of agreement amongst nations as would lead to reduction of this un productive expenditure. It is true there are difficulties about coming to any settlement. It was the original object of the first Hague Conference to do something to reduce expendi. ture, or, at any rate, to stop the increase of expenditure. The reason for doing that is not less urgent now than it was then. On the contrary, it is more urgent. It is said we are waiting upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expenditure. As a matter of fact we are all waiting upon each other. Some day or other somebody must take the first step."Times report, May 11, 1906.