sions in such a manner as to preserve its selfrespect, and to calm the clamor of the people.

Now under these circumstances it would surely have been wise and just in the United States to have exercised toward that republie a spirit of kindness and generosity, to have borne with her pride, and to have taken some pains to soothe her irritation and to dispel her jealousy. The existing boundary question afforded an opportunity for that conciliating course which justice required from us, and which would gratify the feelings of Mexico.

Had that been adjusted by a commissioner, had a comparatively small sum been paid to Mexico for that undetermined extent of territory which she might be supposed to surrender and had she been treated with the forbearance due from a great nation toward a feebler one on which it was encroaching, how easily might the causes of difficulty have been dissipated, and all resentments brushed away.

Our government indeed could hardly have adopted a course better calculated than the one which it did adopt, to deepen in the minds of the Mexican people its sense of injury, and its feeling of hostility. Mexico was first charged

ces.

with having violated her word, and she was next informed that the alternative was before her, immediately to abandon her position and renew her diplomatic intercourse with the United States, or to suffer the consequenNow consenting to the demand of Mexico would have been so perfectly in accordance with the usages of nations, it was so peculiarly proper for us to adopt a conciliatory course toward her at that time, and the unhappy consequences of this haughty and imperious conduct were so apparent, that we are driven to the conclusion that a sincere desire for peace and a renewal of friendship, and an anxiety to show to Mexico that we intended her no injury, were not in the mind of our government; but that it was impelled rather by that pride of power which generally accompanies wrong, and which can tolerate nothing but submission.

In a few days after the refusal to receive our minister, the administration of Herrera, who only a year before had been elected with unequalled unanimity, yielded to the opposition which had been excited against it, and by the act of the army the supreme power passed

without bloodshed or tumult into the hands of Paredes.

In the latter part of January Mr. Slidell was directed to apply to the new government for reception. As it might have been expected, Paredes declined receiving him on the same ground on which his predecessor had based his refusal.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the administration of Herrera, and probably that of Paredes also, would have received a commissioner to settle the dispute relating to Texas. Had a commissioner been sent and received, it is probable that peace and harmony would have been established. Now we submit, that if it appears probable that the war would have been prevented by any just and proper act on the part of the United States which that government refused to perform, it must share at least the responsibility of the war, by whichever party it might actually have been commenced.

We shall not examine the question, whether the administration of Paredes, the attempt at negotiation having been thus broken off, would have proceeded to acts of hostility against the

United States on account of the annexation of Texas. This at best would be only an examination of probabilities, which could not lead to a satisfactory conclusion, nor be of any practical consequence. Our own opinion is, that it would not. We entertain but little doubt that, as the popular commotion was taken advantage of by Paredes for his own personal elevation, so he would have been glad to avoid a collision with the United States, which would endanger its security. Many hold a contrary opinion. As Mexico was allowed no opportu nity to solve this doubt, the question must remain as uncertain as it is immaterial.

CHAPTER V.

THE advance of our Army to the Rio Grande. This movement a violation of the rights of Mexico, which had been recognized by our Government itself.

WE have now established the fact, that war was not the necessary consequence of annexation. We have seen that beyond a reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the braggadocio and haughty language of Mexico, all matters of dispute and difficulty between that country and our own might have been settled by negotiation, had the United States really desired to preserve harmony and peace.

We now pass to the consideration of an event on which, and on which alone, the responsibil ity of the Mexican war must forever rest. By refusing to negotiate in the manner that Mexico desired, we had estopped ourselves from ever asserting that such a negotiation would have been unsuccessful. We could not con