was a regular consequence of the inflamed state of parties, although the proper conducting of the public business would demand for the administration the chairmen of several important committees as enabling it to place its measures fairly before the House." 1

The breakdown of the Jeffersonian system of connection, through executive control of committee appointments, was the last of the adjustments aiming at direct connection between the administration and the House of Representatives. Thereafter adjustment of the powers of government was sought through extra-constitutional agencies of government - particularly in the development of the convention system, which first took definite shape in 1831. In theory the convention system proposes a system of representation combined with control of executive policy, and hence the great importance once attached to "platforms.' In practice that system has displayed signal incompetency for the discharge of such functions, and it is now showing marked signs of decay. Conventions have no power to contract binding engagements. Their declarations are merely expressions of sentiment made for electioneering use, and those raised to office may decide for themselves to what extent and in what way they will recognize party obligations. Indeed explicit party pledges may be flatly repudiated. In 1896 the Republican party made an explicit pledge that if returned to power it would promote reciprocity agreements with foreign countries. The Dingley Tariff bill, passed by the Republican majority returned by the election of 1896, made special provision for the "Thirty Years' View," Vol. I, p. 92.

negotiation of reciprocity agreements, and the fact has been divulged that in making up the bill the committee fixed what it deemed to be an adequate rate for the protection of home industry, and then clapped on an additional rate for use as a concession in making reciprocity negotiations. But after a number of countries had responded to the invitation of the President extended in pursuance of the Dingley Act, and had entered into reciprocity agreements with this country, the Republican majority in the Senate refused to do so much as consider them. They expired in committee rooms, and the net result of the movement was simply an increase of the rates of duty above the scale actually intended in the passage of the act.

Quite as direct a repudiation of party pledges was made by Democratic members of Congress during the consideration of the Payne Tariff bill in 1909. The Democratic national platform of 1908 demanded "the immediate repeal of the tariff on wood-pulp, print paper, lumber, timber and logs, and that these articles be placed upon the free list." When the bill was under discussion in the House, over thirty Democrats voted against an amendment to make lumber free, and one of them was the chairman of the national convention which declared for free lumber. Later on seventeen Democratic senators voted in the same way, under the lead of Senator Bailey, who, when confronted by his party pledge, repudiated it, saying, "I refuse to allow a set of delegates, selected by the people absolutely without reference to a question of that kind, but selected almost solely with a view to the candidacies of men, to assemble in a convention and assume

the function of legislators." 1 The criticism is well founded. The only pledges as regards public policy that are worth anything are such as are given by those who will have charge of public policy if elected, and are thus subjected to the steadying pressure of responsibility. Instructions from such irresponsible gatherings as nominating conventions are not entitled to binding force. But with the decay of the convention system, and the collapse of authority in its declarations of public policy, what connection is now left between elections and public policy? Really, none at all, save as the President is able to influence congressional action by diplomatic methods. He has no direct connection with Congress, but he must negotiate with members individually. He has not to deal with a legislature, but with numerous legislative segments. There are 72 committees of the Senate and 62 committees of the House. In the ordinary transaction of business nothing can be taken up for consideration except by permission of the committee to which the matter has been referred. Interests controlling committees are in a position to subordinate public policy to private interests.

The late Speaker Reed once summed up the situation as follows:

"It is true we have at present irresponsible government, so divided that nobody can tell who is to blame. Government

by committees and of two houses entirely independent of each other produces some fearful and wonderful results. The growth of the British system was out of circumstances at least as bad as ours, and we shall find some way to responsible government, though it does not seem to me it will be the English way."

1 Congressional Record, Vol. 44, Part 3, May 24, 1909, p. 2333. 2 Article published in Illustrated American, July 31, 1897, quoted in Bradford's "Lesson of Popular Government," Vol. II, p. 362 et seq.

The breakdown of representative government in the United States and the substitution of methods which give the custody of political power to particular interests, are the direct and natural consequence of the application of the doctrine of the separation of the powers. Viewing the situation from the standpoint of political pathology, it may be concisely described as a case of constitutional disease from specific infection. The case is a perfectly typical one, for which many parallels are to be found in history, the only marked difference being the remarkable vitality and endurance of the patient. In all other national constitutions which have experienced that infection, the breakdown was so rapid that all semblance of constitutional government rapidly disappeared. In France the outcome was a succession of constitutions, and there was no return of stability until the poison was expelled from the constitutional system.1 The extrication of the states of Spanish America from a state of chronic revolution is attended by the substitution of connection for separation in the organization of public authority. History affords no instance of economical and efficient government constituted on the principle of the separation of the powers. On the other hand, it appears that where the rule of the people is most vigorous

1 Compare the constitution of 1791 and the present one, adopted in 1875. The text will be found in Anderson's "Constitutions and Documents of France, 1789-1907." The constitution of 1791 denied the executive all legislative initiative. He "can only invite the legislative body to take the matter under consideration" (p. 77). The constitution of 1875 declares, "The President of the Republic has the initiative of the laws, concurrently with the members of the two Chambers" (p. 635).

there the connection is closest. The maximum of intimacy is presented in Switzerland, where the executive department frames all the laws and is in the habit of publishing for public information drafts of enactments in advance of their submission to the legislature for examination and action. The custody of the measures remains in the hands of the executive department during legislative consideration, and it drafts whatever changes are required as the result of discussion and criticism. The extraordinary economy of administration attained in Switzerland is striking evidence of the efficiency of the representative system when confined to its proper function as an organ of control in behalf of the people.

It has been noted that this doctrine of the separation of the powers, although it has profoundly affected procedure, was not adopted in the formation of the Constitution of the United States. It has produced its characteristic maladies by contaminating procedure under the Constitution and not by inoculating the Constitution itself. It is exhausting its influence in hindering adjustments necessary for administrative efficiency, but it is not destroying the powers of constitutional government; so means of control have been preserved which may be utilized as the stress of exigency compels improvement in the mechanism of gov

ernment.