liberty"; therefore, "not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn." In this way Madison is able to substitute for Montesquieu's wrong account of the English constitution a true account, and thus, by correcting the premises of the argument, he reaches a different conclusion. Madison showed that no separation of powers exists in the English constitution, and that "the executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority." Hence he argues that no more practical significance should be imputed to Montesquieu's doctrine than that all the powers should not be united in the same hands. In this way he emptied the doctrine of the significance which Montesquieu himself ascribed to it, and was thus able to avoid an objection which was, in fact, well founded. The Constitution of the United States does not conform to Montesquieu's doctrine, and consideration of the debates of the constitutional convention show that it was not meant to do so. It aimed at a reproduction of the English constitution so far as was possible in the circumstances, and the English constitution then as now is founded on the connection of the powers.1

But though the powers were not separated, neither were they adjusted, which likewise was the case with the Constitution of England at the time the American version of it was made. That was beyond the thought

1 A lucid exposition of the English system, displaying this connection, is contained in a pamphlet on the Constitution by James Iredell of North Carolina, published in 1788. See P. L. Ford's "Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States," p. 347.

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of the age. The particular adjustment eventually reached in English politics was facilitated by the practice of choosing secretaries of state from the membership of Parliament, but this practice was long antagonized by reformers, and an express prohibition of it was introduced by Tory influence in the Act of June 12, 1701, to regulate the succession to the Crown. Before any succession took place, and hence before the stipulation became operative, the prohibition was repealed by the Act of 1705, settling the matter by excluding from Parliament specified classes of office-holders, and by providing that a member who should accept office under the Crown must be reëlected by a constituency in order to retain his seat in the House of Commons. This established the English practice, which has remained substantially unchanged since then. The complete prohibition persistently sought for by eighteenthcentury reformers, but frustrated in England, was however adopted in the Constitution of the United States. This precludes such an adjustment as was reached in English politics namely, the formation of the administration in the representative assembly itself. The way is, however, open to effect a connection of the powers by arrangements for the junction of the separately constituted executive and legislative departments. The practical expediency of this method is

1 It is contained in Section 6 of Article 1, as follows: "No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office." The corresponding article in the Act of Settlement of 1701 provides that "no person who has an office or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the Crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons."

illustrated by the experience of Switzerland. In fundamental characteristics the American Constitution conforms to the Swiss type and is unconformable to the English type. Under the English system the Crown is a branch of the legislature; both in the American and in the Swiss system all legislative authority is vested in Congress. Under the English system executive authority is vested in a committee of the legislature; both in the American and in the Swiss system executive authority is vested in a distinct department of the government. The chief difference between the American system and the Swiss system is that the latter provides for systematic connection between the executive and legislative powers, while the former still lacks such connection.

From the first, American politics have been engaged in experimentation in this field. That there would be a connection was expected as a matter of practice and convenience, but as there is no express provision for it, the relations of the executive and legislative branches are exposed to disturbance from party violence and private interest. In this field the doctrine of the separation of the powers is still influential. It colors political ideas, supplies pretexts for discord, and obscures recognition of constitutional propriety. Our political history exhibits a series of precarious adjustments, but settled and obvious connection is yet to be accomplished, and it does not yet appear in what way it shall be. Still, we are able to note with certainty phases in the evolution of the American system, although we are not able to descry the form to which this evolution is tending. Political practice began

with English procedure.1 Congress relied upon the administration to prepare business for its consideration. So long as the connection of the powers of government lasted, the House of Representatives was the chief seat of dignity and power. On January 4, 1859, on the occasion of the removal of the Senate from the chamber it had occupied since 1819 to the chamber it now occupies, Vice-President Breckinridge delivered an elaborate historical address, in which he said:

"It would be interesting to note the gradual changes which have occurred in the practical working of the government since the adoption of the Constitution, and it may be appropriate to this occasion to remark one of the most striking of them: At the origin of the government, the Senate seemed to be regarded chiefly as an executive council. The President often visited the Chamber and conferred personally with this body; most of the business was transacted with closed doors, and it took comparatively little part in the legislative debates. The rising and vigorous intellects of the country sought the arena of the House of Representatives as the appropriate theater for the display of their powers. Mr. Madison observed, on one occasion, that being a young man, and desiring to increase his reputation, he could not afford to enter the Senate.

Similar testimony as to the original importance of the House is given by other experienced statesmen. Calhoun remarks that the House was originally "a much more influential body than the Senate." " Ben

1 When Jefferson was elected Vice-President in 1796, he prepared a manual of parliamentary law for his use as presiding officer of the Senate. It is a compilation of English parliamentary rules and precedents, and the preface mentions English procedure as "the model."

2 Calhoun's Works, Vol. I, p. 341.

ton says, "For the first thirty years it was the controlling branch of the government, and the one on whose action the public eye was fixed." 1

The cause of the decline of the House stands out plainly in our political history. The efficiency of the House is strictly proportioned to the connection between its legislative power and the executive power. The decline began as soon as the House began to reject executive aid and turned to committees of its own for the formulation of measures for its consideration. In 1797, Fisher Ames, a member of the House, in a letter to Alexander Hamilton, said: "Committees are already the ministers; and while the House indulges a jealousy of encroachment in its functions, which are properly deliberative, it does not perceive that these are impaired and nullified by the monopoly as well as the perversion of information by the committees." 2 The decline was arrested when the election of Jefferson brought the House and the administration into accord, and under him and his party successors the House attained its highest dignity and power. The change which settled the relations of the two houses to the advantage of the Senate took place during the administration of John Quincy Adams. The House and the administration were again antagonistic, and the connection of the powers was ruptured. Senator Benton, who was himself a congressional leader, observed this effect. He remarks: "The appointment of the majority of members in all committees, and their chairmen, in both houses, adverse to the administration, 1"Thirty Years' View," Vol. I, p. 208. 2 Hamilton's Works, Vol. VI, p. 201.