This provision is the great antiseptic of the English constitution. It absolutely precludes log-rolling, and in so doing dries up the most copious source of legislative graft. It establishes the representative assembly in its proper function as an organ of control. This explains the great jealousy with which the Commons cherish their exclusive prerogative of budget-making. When they themselves are so fixed that they cannot indulge motives of private favor and privilege, they take good care that such opportunity does not exist elsewhere. Thus in any conflict between the chambers the members stand together, and the collective might of the House is pitted against the prerogative of the Lords.

The principle of executive responsibility in budgetmaking is not peculiar to the English system. It is the foundation of responsible government wherever it exists. When English example is cited in our Congress, it is the fashion to reply that such procedure is an incident of monarchical rule and cannot be applied to our system. But we find the same system in Switzerland, still more drastically applied. Switzerland is a federal republic like our own. It is a union of sovereign states. The Swiss constitution explicitly declares that "the cantons are sovereign." The Federal Assembly, corresponding to our Congress, is declared by the constitution to be "the supreme authority." All legislative authority is concentrated in it, and among its powers is expressly mentioned "the determination of the budget." But in actual practice the executive department prepares the budget and proposes all measures of taxation, including long and elaborate

tariffs. More than that, so intense is the determination of the Swiss Congress to keep itself in a position to control and supervise, that it will not consider any bill unless it has first been referred to the executive department for examination and report.1

Wherever the preparation of the budget is not an executive duty, signs of constitutional derangement appear. While nowhere else in the world is found any parallel to the powers which our Senate exercises in levying taxes and making appropriations, there are countries in which log-rolling practices prevail, notably in France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal,—and in them we find that the procedure subjects the budget to the manipulation of particular interests. The budget is submitted by the government, but is exposed to committee manipulation, and opportunities exist for action in behalf of private interests at the expense of public interests. Representative institutions do not necessarily secure responsible government. The natural tendency, exhibited everywhere and always, so far as circumstances permit, is for those in the representative position to use their opportunities for themselves. Unless efficient means of counteracting this tendency are provided, representative institutions are converted into agencies of class advantage and private profit. Signs of constitutional decay from this cause visible in countries that have adopted parliamentary institutions without the English budget safeguards.

are

I have been asked how the cost of our government

1 "The Swiss Confederation," by Adams and Cunningham, p. 47. The work is authoritative. It was prepared with the aid of Swiss publicists.

compares with that of other countries. After much consideration, I am convinced that it is impossible to answer that question. It is easy to compare disbursements, and comparisons of this sort are frequently made for electioneering use. The annual volumes of the Statistical Abstract, issued by the Bureau of Statistics at Washington, contain tables showing expenditures per capita. It appears that in 1907 the per capita expenditure of the federal government was only $6.73, while in some other countries it was far greater. A per capita calculation, including the principal nations, is given in the Statesman's Year Book for 1909. In this also the per capita expenditure of the United States appears much less than that of most other nations, although far in excess of Turkey and China. If small per capita expenditure be the mark of good government, the palm must be given to China, for according to this tabulation its per capita expenditure is put at 8 pence as against 17. 12s. 6d. for the United States, and 31. 8s. 2d. for the United Kingdom. But while giving these figures, the Statesman's Year Book is careful to say that they have no comparative value, for reasons thus stated: "Revenue and expenditure, which in some states are raised and expended by local authorities, are in others included in the national accounts; debt in some countries is incurred merely for the sake of profitable investment, while in others it is unproductive and burdensome; in some states the creditors are citizens, while in others they are foreigners; debt charges generally include more or less amortization, but sometimes only the interest is stated."

But even if statistical analysis could be extended to

all these factors, a comparative statement of the cost of government in different countries would be still impossible, for while outlay might be computed, the returns could not be. It may happen that, while public expenditure is increased, the aggregate may be far less than the private expenditure abolished. For instance, the claim is made by New Zealand authorities that passenger and freight rates on the state railroads are the lowest in the world. While on a visit to this country, Sir Joseph G. Ward, the New Zealand premier, said that "when our railroads produce 3 or 31⁄2 per cent, we make large concessions on passenger and freight rates." The effect of this policy is a great reduction of shipping costs, of which the people get the benefit. In New Zealand the disbursements of the government in 1908 were over $40,000,000 for a population of less than a million citizens, the per capita being over $40. It is clear in this case that high per capita is an evidence of high function, while such low per capita as appears in the case of Turkey and China is evidence of low function.

The truth of the matter appears to be that everywhere the democratizing of governmental function is accompanied by a process of transfer of social costs from private to public account. Whether or not results will be salutary or pernicious depends upon the degree of administrative efficiency. Just as in the case of private business, it is not the amount of the investment that determines the result, but the skill with which it is applied and managed. Enterprises which in one country may be profitable may in another be burdensome. The strong tendencies everywhere mani

fest to augment the administrative tasks of government introduce conditions which will try the souls of nations. The state, like every organism, must have power to adjust its activities to the conditions of its being, or else it is doomed. The strains to which modern nations are now subjected will have consequences that will doubtless produce new groupings of empire. Probably by the end even of the present century the map of the world will look very different from what it does now.