proper bearings by bringing the House to its proper bearings; and it is just in this way, and in no other way, that in self-governing commonwealths throughout the world upper houses have been incapacitated from using their powers for class advantage and have been confined to an advisory function in behalf of the public welfare.

It has already been shown by citations that the deviation of our political practice from our constitutional theory is recognized and deplored in the House. It is not reasonable to suppose that leaders of the House would endure a subserviency that galls them so sorely that they complain of it bitterly, if they could help themselves. This implies that the defect is established in conditions that have grown up in the House from the circumstances in which it does business. These conditions govern and confine the activities of members. It is not fair, therefore, to attribute the failure of the House to casual defect in the personal quality of its membership. It is not the failure of any one House, or of any particular body of men who happen to form its membership. It is a continuing failure, extending back to an early period of our history. Clearly, then, the defect is not personal; it is systematic.

Such being the case, in criticizing our politics we should bear in mind a law of political phenomena laid down by Edmund Burke. In his "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents," published in 1770, he remarked:

"Where there is a regular scheme of operations carried on, it is the system and not any individual person who acts in it that is truly dangerous."

It is a mark of Burke's singular mental elevation and moral discernment that he was able to propound such a principle in a period when the disposition to indulge in personal accusation, that now goes by the name of muck-raking, was, perhaps, even more violent than in our own time. The muck-raking literature of that period has dropped into oblivion, but enough of it has been preserved to show that it presents a strong family likeness to that of our own time in the United States. There is a work known to students of eighteenth-century political literature, entitled "Political Disquisitions," by James Burgh. It was published in 1774, and must have had considerable circulation in the American colonies, judging from the references made to it in the writings of the Fathers. This book abounds with accusations against the statesmen of the period, including the elder Pitt, much in the style now current. There was plenty to sustain such charges, for corruption was indeed rampant. Lecky's "History of the Eighteenth Century" gives a critical account of the same conditions; and when we compare his calm and measured statements with Burgh's heated and inexact statements, we see that Burgh did not err as to the fact that corruption was prevalent, but that he mistook results for causes, and addressed his treatment to the symptoms and not to the disease. Burke drew down upon himself sharp censure because he refused to join in the popular cry of his times to turn the rascals out; but events have since shown that he was right in his diagnosis of the disease, and that its underlying cause was the existence of opportunity for the exercise of public power without public responsibility. As a

matter of fact, the cleansing of English politics was brought about by change in conditions, and not by sweeping change in the personnel of the legislative body. This has been clearly pointed out by Walter Bagehot in his classic treatise on the "English Constitution." He remarks that "the statesmen who worked the system that was put up had themselves been educated under the system that was put down."

I have thought it necessary to enter into these explanations, as the system that now exists in our government cannot be explained without some reference to the situation in its personal aspects. But when I mention names, I do so simply for the purpose of illustration, and not to make any imputation upon character. Our public men are blamed for conditions that they did not create and of which they are the victims. The congresses of to-day are not inferior to the congresses of the past in the personal ability or integrity of members. Matters are not worse than they have been in the past, but the results of bad conditions are now more manifest, and the public consciousness of them is more acute and sensitive. If any one imagines there has been a golden age in our politics, if he will look for it he will not find it.

I shall now cite the case of a member of the House who in his time deservedly commanded the esteem of his constituents, and became favorably known to the nation at large because of his vigilant activity. He was widely known as the "watch-dog of the Treasury." I refer to the late Judge Holman of Indiana. Under the title "Something of Men I have Known," the Hon. Adlai E. Stevenson, Vice-President of the United

States during President Cleveland's second term, has published a book of reminiscences. It contains the following anecdote of Judge Holman :

"It has been said that even great men have at times their weaknesses. An incident to be related will possibly show that Judge Holman was no exception to that rule. The consideration of sundry bills for the erection of post-office buildings in a number of districts, having 'gone over' by reason of his objection, the members having the bills in charge joined forces and jumped the several measures into an 'omnibus bill' which was duly presented. The members especially interested in its passage, to make assurance doubly sure, had quietly inserted a provision for the erection of a Government building in one of the cities of Holman's district.

"When the bill was read, Judge Holman, as he sat busily writing at his desk, was, without solicitation on his part, the closely observed of every member. Apparently oblivious, however, to all that was occurring, he continued to write. No objection being made, the bill was in the very act of passing, when a member from Wisconsin rushed to the front and exclaimed:

"Mr. Speaker, I desire to call the attention of the gentleman of the Fourth district of Indiana to the fact that the Treasury is being robbed!' Unmoved by the appeal, the Judge continued to write, and, as one of his colleagues afterward remarked, 'was chewing his tobacco very fine.' After a moment of suspense, and amid applause, in which even the galleries took part, the member from Wisconsin in tragic tones exclaimed:

"Ah, Mr. Speaker, our watch-dog of the Treasury, like all other good watch-dogs, never barks when his friends are around!'"

Here we have an instance of the dilemma in which every member of Congress continually finds himself. What should Holman have done? He might have affronted interests on whose help he depended for his seat. He might have sacrificed himself, and Congress would have lost the advantage of his laborious and useful activity. But what he might have been unwill

ing to do, other candidates in his district would have been eager to undertake. As Edmund Burke wisely said, "Whatever is the road to power, that is the road which will be trod."

But this is not all. Had he scorned the sop offered to shut his mouth, he would not only have rejected a district favor, but he would have antagonized the interests of other districts, and thus have diminished his ability to serve his constituents in other respects, or indeed to exert any positive influence upon legislation. The conditions are such that members are practically dependent upon the aid and good-will of their fellowmembers for the chance of obtaining any consideration whatever for a legislative proposal, however meritorious. During the sessions of Congress bills pour in at an average rate of more than 150 a day. This torrent swells with every legislative session, and in the 59th 1 A report from the Superintendent of the House document room (House Document No. 704, 60th Congress, 1st Session) gives the following statistics of congressional documents, omitting resolutions and treaties :

Redlich, in his "Procedure of the House of Commons" (Vol. III, p. 282), gives statistics as to legislation from 1890 to 1903. The public bills introduced in the House of Commons ranged from 384 in 1890 to 311 in 1903. The private bills ranged from 125 in 1898 to 116 in 1903. The public bills sent down by the House of Lords ranged from 8 to 21 in the course of a session; private bills, from 82 to 113.