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The subject of economical reform is now engaging the attention of Congress. The action taken affords another illustration of the futility of the committee system of control. The Senate, among its 72 standing committees, has eight charged with the examination of departmental expenditures. But when the piling up of Treasury deficits in 1909 excited alarm, the Senate deemed it necessary to create still another committee on the general subject of public expenditures. It is the largest of the committees, having twenty members, including the chairmen of the committees on Appropriations, Finance, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Post-Offices, Agriculture, and Indian Affairs. So it brings together the heads of the principal spending committees with a view of coördinating their action, a purpose not logically reconcilable with the individual license of action possessed by senators. This committee was appointed on March 22, 1909. After some months it made a report, reiterating what had often been said before, and is perfectly well known; namely, that "the application to the business of the government of improvements in system and method similar to those which have produced the high degree of business efficiency in the great business corporations of the country will result in the saving of many millions of dollars annually and in a much higher degree of efficiency in the conduct of the government business." The committee recommended a business methods commission composed of three senators, three representatives, and three members selected by the President. On February 5, 1910, Senator Aldrich introduced a bill for the creation of such a commission. In advo

cating the bill Senator Aldrich made some very frank admissions. He declared that a saving of over $100,000,000 a year could be readily effected, and later on he declared: "If I were a business man and could be permitted to do it, I would undertake to run this government for $300,000,000 a year less than it is now run for." 1

Congressional jealousy of the executive department promptly manifested itself. Mr. Money, the opposition party leader, protested against any association of the executive and legislative branches of the government. His remarks struck a responsive chord. Senator Aldrich held that "as it is an investigation into the executive management, the executive departments should take part in it"; but a little later in the same day he proposed to strike out the provision in regard to appointees by the President "in deference to the expressed opinion of senators." On February 28, 1910, Senator Newlands proposed a substitute providing for a commission of nine to be appointed by the President, supporting it by a speech much sounder in constitutional doctrine than is usually heard in the Senate. But his efforts were fruitless. The substitute was rejected without a call for the ayes and nays. The bill as passed by the Senate merely provides for a joint commission of five members of the Senate and five members of the House. Try to fancy such a situation. arising in the affairs of any private business corporation: the executive management denied any part in the ordering of its affairs!

1 Congressional Record, February 21, 1910, Vol. 45, No. 50, pp. 2202-2203.

All that the movement amounts to is the creation of a new committee subject to the same conditions of action as the old committees, and there can be no sensible expectation of much better results. It should be observed that all the improvements in system that have been accomplished have been favored by the propensity of Congress to keep departmental officers in a state of dependence upon the congressional committees. It is quite another matter when reforms strike at congressional patronage. President Taft has himself pointed out in his public addresses that as soon as any change concerning the pay and quantity of offices is proposed those affected will appeal to their friends in Congress for help, which these friends in Congress are apt to extend.1 The long-urged and continually defeated consolidation of pension agencies, to which I referred in a previous lecture, is a typical

instance.

The truth of the matter is that Congress lacks power of self-amendment. It is the servant of particular interests, and its energies are consumed by that service. Such invariably is the case unless the organization of public authority sets up effective barriers against local demands and class importunity. Edmund Burke long ago laid down a principle of universal application when he said of the British Parliament, “If we do not permit our members to act upon a very

1 In a speech at Newark, New Jersey, on February 23, 1910, President Taft said:

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"They will find opposition in Congress to every change recommended, because there is no branch or bureau so humble that it cannot secure its adherents and defenders within the legislative halls."

enlarged view of things, we shall infallibly degrade our national representation into a confused and scuffling bustle of local agency." That is the matter with our Congress. The cause was indicated by Mr. Burton of Ohio, in the speech in the House on March 15, 1904, to which I have already referred. He said :

"The most characteristic feature can be expressed in one word - the word 'severance.' First, the severance of the executive department from the legislative; next, the severance of the committees or branches of the legislature which provide the revenue from those which determine expenditures; and third, the severance of the committees which consider estimates and present appropriation bills."

All these sorts of severance are parts of a series, the first of which, and the cause of all the rest, is the severance of the executive and legislative departments. Constitutional government, with its prime characteristic, budget control, -is impossible without a connection of the powers.

Constitutional history often illustrates the truth of a remark made by the philosopher Schopenhauer to the effect that we fancy that important events will make their entrance on the stage of affairs with the noise of drums and trumpets, whereas they slip in unobtrusively and almost unnoticed. I well remember the surprise I felt when in the course of my reading I discovered that what our text-books now designate as the fall of the Roman Empire was unobserved by the people of that age. The epochal character of the event as set forth in history is apt to give one the notion of an appalling smash; but it appears that when the Roman Empire fell nobody heard it fall. The signifi

cance of the event was not appreciated until centuries afterwards. And in the same way the germs of all great institutional developments have emerged without manifesting their importance. The whole framework of modern government is traceable to usages of barbarians adopted from considerations of convenience and without any perception of constitutional values. It seems to me that Congress, by sheer stress of circumstances, has been forced to take a step towards connection of the powers and has thus unwittingly started a movement of profound constitutional importance. The real hope of establishing budget control, and with it a genuine constitutional system, lies in the flow of political force in the channel thus opened. I refer to section 7 of the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of March 4, 1909, making it the duty of the President to coördinate income and expenditure.1

Most assuredly this law was not enacted with the view of enhancing presidential authority. Its author inserted in the same act a clause stripping the President of any authority to employ experts to institute reforms in departmental organization, such as President Roosevelt had endeavored to accomplish through the labors of the Keep Commission. Section 7 probably derives its origin from the same animus, for as has been mentioned previously it is a pet theory of the congressional leaders that the rapid increase of expenditure is largely due to popular demands incited by President Roosevelt's influence. But whatever be the motive, the action taken is the salvation of representative government in the United States.

1 See Appendix B for the text of the provision.

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