CHAPTER VI.

ON THE CONSCIENCE BEFORE FOUR YEARS OLD.

NOTHING perhaps at first sight appears more inconsistent, or more changeable, than the moral feeling of children of three years old. Yet this feeling exists; and will display itself even at that age, if the passions be not excited. Children have a distinct idea of right and wrong, though they are unable to express this idea in general terms. They acknowledge a law common to all;—a tacit agreement which all are required to respect. If their attention have been drawn to the circumstances, any violation of truth, any trenching on the right of property, or on the enjoyment of others, distresses their feelings, though they may not themselves be sufferers from it. But it is difficult to determine the point at which they become interested, without their passions being excited; nor is it always easy to obtain a just decision from them, on account of the difficulty of fixing their attention, and their tendency to partiality.

In fact, the natural inclinations of children seldom allow them to judge coolly. Continually

led away and excited by some temporary emotion, prepossessed in favour of themselves, or of those whom they love; at one time thinking only of their own interest, and at another devoting themselves entirely to that of others, they are not very likely to be impartial in their judgment. The evil inclinations of their hearts may indeed be overcome by their good feelings; but we see distinctly marked in their conduct the fickle and uncertain nature of our two most dazzling and amiable qualities, imagination, and sympathy.

The emotion of pity, so interesting in itself, is often capricious in children. Sometimes they are moved by it to tears, to distress, and even to the sacrifice of their greatest pleasures; while at others they seem entirely inaccessible to the feeling. Every thing displeasing to them. tends to harden their hearts. If a beautiful animal be hurt, they will sympathize warmly in its pain; but, if the suffering creature be ugly, they turn away with disgust. Their compassion vanishes as soon as any defect (such as deformity of person), or any feeling of ridicule, makes them indisposed to associate themselves with the sufferer. Such, even at a more advanced age, is the instability of sympathy as a foundation for the firm structure of morality!

From the nature of this feeling it follows that every action, not directly producing pain to an

individual, will appear innocent to children. Hence it is that they do not hesitate to commit petty thefts, when they suppose that the things stolen will not be missed. Yet there is one duty which they fully acknowledge, when the idea of it has once been conceived by them, — that of obedience towards the person on whom they depend.

I have before said, that there is always some one to whom an affectionate child believes him

self particularly to belong. Feeling more closely connected with this individual than with any other, he also feels responsible to him for his conduct. From any other less certain authority, he frees himself as he best can; but the reproaches of one, whom he acknowledges as his true master, are deeply felt by him. This master it is who stands to him in the place of conscience; whose judgment, already foreseen, must condemn or absolve him; and whom he sees in imagination when the moment of temptation arrives. Often, indeed, he so completely brings him before his mind's eye, that, by the natural effect of a strong illusion, he believes that he is observed by him. He is not astonished when this acknowledged and lawful governor is aware of actions committed by him when out of his sight; for at this age there is nothing repugnant to his understanding in the idea of an invisible witness. And if, from for

getfulness or wickedness, the child has yielded to temptation, he is touched with remorse at the sight of this representative of his conscience. He would have met without emotion the owner of the flowers or fruit he may have taken, but his face is covered with blushes when he encounters one whom he considers as his moral ruler; to him he avows his fault, with touching and affecting explanations, and towards him he feels the desire, so natural to a guilty conscience, of making some expiation for his crime; and will even sometimes voluntarily inflict on himself a punishment.

I have said that sympathy alone is not a sufficiently solid foundation for morality;— but it is certainly one of its strong supports during the period of infancy. The love and respect felt by a child for his parents by degrees become associated in his mind with the laws which they impose; their judgment assumes an independent authority, and he begins to form a more definite idea of duty. And when he sees that his parents are themselves governed by the same laws; that these laws are obeyed by all around him; and, above all, when he feels that they are in harmony with the intimations which he begins to receive from his conscience, his conduct becomes more and more within the pale of morality.

One obstacle to the progress of children

consists in their having no idea of time; the non-existence to them either of the past or the future excludes all regrets and all fears; and, whilst the knowledge of the consequences of an action forms a powerful auxiliary to our conscience, children, on the contrary, not perceiving how one event influences another, attach no importance to their determinations. Their volatile impressions are at the mercy of every wind which blows; their recollections, to which they seldom refer, soon fade away: and, if past events occasionally remain in their methe motives which led to them are for ever forgotten. Hardly conceiving themselves the same beings, they do not consider themselves responsible to-day for the actions committed yesterday.

mory,

Hence it follows that the sooner children can be made to understand the necessary connection between the past and the present, the sooner will their moral and rational existence be established. I say the connection between the past and present, because it is with these that we must begin. The influence of preceding events on those which follow is obvious and easily shown; while the future, at all times uncertain, appears particularly so to children. They soon become weary of our warning predictions; but if we show them clearly that the events of each day depend on those of the preceding one, they