thus appropriated, and, if a general appropriation applicable to the same purpose, together with other purposes of the like class would otherwise be available to meet the same expenditure, the specific appropriation operates pro tanto as a repeal or supersession of the general, and renders its use for the specific purpose illegal. If, therefore, the laws providing for the naval-hospital fund can be likened to a general appropriation bill, the use of such fund to supplement specific appropriations by the Congress for particular purposes covered by the laws in question would be illegal. I do not think, however, that the analogy between these statutes and a general appropriation bill is sufficiently close to justify the application of this rule of construction. The law requires the use of this fund by the Secretary of the Navy for certain designated purposes, under conditions which are in themselves no less specific than the provisions of an appropriation bill furnishing money to effect one or the other of the same ends.

As the successor of the commissioners of naval hospitals, the Secretary of the Navy is authorized and required to purchase supplies, construct buildings, and cause the latter to be erected, so far as may be conveniently practicable according to "such plans as with most convenience and least cost will admit of subsequent additions when the funds permit and circumstances require." This passage indicates, in my opinion, an intention on the part of the Congress that the fund in question should be used to supplement appropriations and not as a substitute for such appropriations, and, in view of the scope and general spirit of the legislation, I think that, ordinarily, appropriations for particular purposes included within the powers of the former commissioners of naval hospitals would constitute legislation in pari materia with the laws defining those powers and transferring them to the Secretary of the Navy, and, according to the well-known rule that, if possible, all laws in pari materia shall be construed together, so as, if possible, to give effect to each one of them, I think, in the absence of words expressing a contrary intention, an appropriation by the Congress for the construction of a hospital or its equipment would not prohibit the expenditure

of money from the naval hospital fund for the enlargement of the said hospital or providing it with improved appliances. In the two cases, however, to which you call my attention, the Congress has used language which, in my opinion, shows the contrary intention. By the act approved June 29, 1906, there is appropriated for the naval hospital at Norfolk, Va., $100,000 for the renovation of the present hospital buildings and the erection of new wards, to cost not to exceed $200,000;" and precisely the same words are found. in the act approved May 13, 1908, the Congress having distinctly stated that the cost of these improvements shall not exceed $200,000, and having, by two bills, appropriated the full amount required to meet this expense, it seems to me clear that the National Legislature could not have intended any additional expenditure to be incurred in connection therewith, and that the use of the naval hospital fund to supplement these appropriations to the extent, as stated in your letter, of about $29,000, would be illegal, the result of such use being that the cost would amount to $229,000. In placing this construction on the acts, I have understood the limit of cost to apply to the entire work and not merely to the erection of the new wards. The strict grammatical interpretation of the language would justify, perhaps, the restriction of this limit to the last mentioned part of the work; but, as you say that the contract was entered into for the entire work authorized by the appropriation, at a cost of $186,500, I infer that the appropriation was made upon the basis of information. leading to the reasonable belief that $200,000 would suffice for the renovation as well as the wards.

This opinion is in entire harmony as to its conclusion with the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury regarding the hospital at the Naval Academy, of which you furnished me a copy, since, in that case as in this, the appropriation was made with the provision that the hospital in question was "to cost not more than $100,000." In so far, however, as the Comptroller bases this conclusion upon the application of the rule of construction respecting general and specific appropriations, I have been unable, for the

reasons hereinbefore set forth, to take the same view of the subject-matter.

Moreover, I do not think the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy by section 4810, above quoted, is limited, as tentatively suggested in the said decision, "to the establishment of hospitals at places where none exist." This would be, in my opinion, to place too narrow a construction on the powers thus conferred. When the work for which the Congress has made a specific appropriation, and the cost whereof has been limited to the amount of such appropriation, has been completed in accordance with the intention of the Congress, the expenditure of this fund for what is, in good faith, a clearly different purpose from that mentioned in the specific appropriation, although made in the same locality, would be, in my opinion, justified by the broad terms of the law.

I remain, sir,

Yours, very respectfully,

CHARLES J. BONAPARTE.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

NATIONAL BANKS IN OKLAHOMA-STATE GUARANTY

FUND.

It is illegal for the officers of any national bank in Oklahoma to enter into an agreement to contribute to the guaranty fund provided for by the Oklahoma State banking act, and persistent action on the part of any such bank in accepting or conforming to the provisions of section 4 of that act would be just cause for the forfeiture of its charter.

The Attorney-General is not authorized to render an opinion to the head of an Executive Department upon a question which has not arisen in the administration of that department and requiring action thereon.

The Attorney-General advised the Secretary of the Treasury as to the legality of a course of action contemplated by him, in order that immediate notification might be given to the parties to be affected thereby, in the hope that such notification might result in a change of existing practices which would render the contemplated action unnecessary; but he expressed a doubt as to his authority to render such an opinion,

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 28, 1908.

SIR: I received from you on March 4, 1908, a letter in which, at the instance of the Comptroller of the Currency, you requested my opinion "as to the legal right of national banks in the State of Oklahoma to contribute toward the guaranty fund or to avail themselves of the other privileges. of the State banking act," in that State. On March 9 I called your attention to the fact that this question did not appear to me, as then advised, one arising in connection with a matter requiring action on your part, and, therefore, would not be one as to which the Attorney-General was required by law, or permitted by established practice, to give an opinion.

On May 14 following, you informed me that the matter was one which, in your judgment, would require action. by the Comptroller of the Currency, who could perform such duty only under the general direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance with section 324, Revised Statutes of the United States. You further informed me that if, in my opinion, the acceptance of the provisions of the Oklahoma statute was not within the powers of a national bank, you proposed to direct the Comptroller to bring suit to forfeit the charter of a certain national bank in Oklahoma, in case it should persist in accepting the provisions of the statute in question after being notified not to do so by the Comptroller, and that the immediate official action contemplated by your inquiry was a notification by the Comptroller to the said bank to the effect that its action would, or would not, be regarded as appropriate ground for such proceeding.

I have explained these circumstances, because I feel bound, as a matter of precedent, to say that I still entertain some doubt as to whether the case above stated constitutes one of a character prescribed by the statute as justifying and requiring the expression of an opinion by the AttorneyGeneral; but, holding that, as a matter of public policy as well as of courtesy, any doubt on a question of this nature should be determined in favor of the propriety of such advice, I proceed to answer the question above set forth.

National banks are instruments of the Government of the United States. The Congress creates them by virtue of its general powers to provide for such instruments, and no State can, by any law, interfere with their management or operation, in so far as these are determined expressly or by reasonable implication in the laws of the United States. (Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220; Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 283.) It seems to me quite immaterial whether the officers or stockholders of the bank are, or are not, voluntary parties to the State action thus affecting its operations. The legality of such State action, whether it takes the form of a law to be enforced in invitum against the bank, or of a contract to be entered into by the bank with State officers authorized by law to make such contract, must depend upon whether it is in accordance with the Federal statutes regulating the organization, government and operation of the banks, or with the policies embodied and the public purposes sought to be attained by such laws.

The statute of Oklahoma to which you call my attention creates a State banking board, composed of certain designated State officers, and requires the said board to “levy against the capital stock an assessment of one per cent of the bank's daily average deposits," with certain deductions, "upon each and every bank organized and existing under the laws of this State." This assessment is to constitute what is designated as a "depositor's guaranty fund,” and additional assessments are to be levied against the capital stock of the banks, proportionately to the amount of their deposits, so as to always maintain the fund at the designated amount. This fund is to be used in paying the depositors of any bank included within the terms of the statute any deficiency statute any deficiency there may be in the amount to be received by them from the assets of such bank in the event of its failure. By section 4 it is provided that any national bank in the said State, with the approval of the bank commissioner thereto "may voluntarily avail its depositors of the protection of the depositor's guaranty fund, by application to the State banking board, in writing;" it being further provided that the appli