Truth? Could we understand a Watchmaker, a Painter, or a Statuary, talking of their respective Arts, fhould they tell us, that a Watch, a Picture, or Statue, were good when they were true, or done according to Truth, and that their Art lay in adjusting them to Truth? Would they not speak more intelligibly, and more to the Purpose, if they should explain to us their End or Ufe, and in order to that, fhew us their Parts both together and feparately, the Bearings and Proportions of thofe Parts, and their Reference to that End? Is not fuch a Detail likewife neceffary to understand Human Nature, its Duty, and End? Will the Truth, the abftract Natures and Reafons, the eternal Relations and Fitneffes of Things, form fuch a Detail? But fuppofe it could, yet what Degrees of Virtue, or Vice, does Truth admit? Truth is a fimple, uniform, invariable Thing, incapable of Intenfion or Remiffion. But Virtue and Vice admit of almost infinite Degrees and Variations, and therefore cannot confift of, or be founded upon, a Thing which admits of none. For fuch as is the Foundation, fuch must the Superstructure be. But Objection But it is faid, that, to deduce Moral Obligation from the Conftitution of our Nature, and an Inward Senfe, is to render it exceedingly precarious and mutable, because Man might have been differently conftituted, fo as to approve of Treachery, Malice, Cruelty, and then another, or a quite contrary Train of Duties would have been required, or obligatory. That Human Nature might The Anfwer. have been otherwife conftitut ed than it is, is perhaps true, but that it could have been better conftituted, confidering its prefent State and Circum ftances, may be justly questioned under his Government, who does every thing in Number, Weight, and Measure, and who has poured Wisdom and Beauty over all his Works. The little Sketch that hath been given of our Nature, fhews that it is admirably adapted to our prefent Condition, and the various Connections we fuftain. We could not have fubfifted, or at least not have fubfifted fo well, in fuch a Concition, nor maintained fuch Connections, without that fucceffive Train of Powers and Paffions with which we are en endued. Without them, or with a contrary Set, we must have been miferable. And he who ordained the Condition and fettled the Connections, must likewise have ordained that Conduct of Powers, and that Balance of Paffions which is exactly proportioned to that Condition and to those Connections. Such an Order of Creatures being fuppofed, and fuch a Condition with fuch Connections being given, fuch a Conduct as has been traced out, must be eternally and invariably obligatory to fuch Creature fo placed and fo connected. Had Man been a different Creature, and placed in different Circumftances, a Spider for inftance, or an Hound, a different Set of Duties would have then become him; the Web, the Vigilance, the rapacious Conduct of the former; the Sagacity, the Love of Game, and Swiftnefs of the latter, and the Satisfaction of Appetite, the Propagation and Love of Offfpring common to both, would have fulfilled the Destinations of his Nature, and been his proper Bufinefs and Oeconomy. But as Man is not only a Senfible, an Active, and a Social, but a Rational, a Political, and a Religious Creature, he has a nobler Part to act, and more numerous and more important portant Obligations to fulfil. And if afterwards, in any future Period of his Duration, he fhall be advanced to a superior Station, and take in wider Connections, the Sphere of his Duty, and the Number and Weight of his Obligations, must increase in proportion. Had a Creature, therefore, fituated and connected as Man, been formed with Difpofitions to approve of Treachery, Malice, or Cruelty, fuch a Temper or Conftitution would have been evidently destructive of his Happinefs. Now if we imagine the Deity prefers fome Ends to others, fuppose the Happiness of his Creatures to their Mifery, he must likewife prefer the Means most adapted to thofe Ends. Therefore, fuppofing the Deity neceffarily Wife and Good, he could not have implanted in us fuch Difpofitions, or, in other words, could not have annexed Feelings of Approbation to a Conduct fo incongruous to our State, and fo fubverfive of our Happinefs. Confequently amidft the infinite Variety of poffible Conftitutions, Vice could never have been approveable, and of course, not obligatory. — THEREFORE, "The Scheme of Human Nature above "propofed, refts on the faine Founda❝tion "tion as the Divine Wisdom and Good66 nefs, and the Scheme of Moral Obli gation erected upon it, must be equally "immutable and immortal." And that the Deity is wife and good, fupremely and univerfally fo, Nature cries aloud through all her Works. Another Objection. The Anfwer. But it is farther objected against this Scheme, that Mankind differ ftrangely in their Moral Sentiments, fome approving Treachery, Revenge, and Cruelty, nay whole Nations Theft, the Expofition of Infants, and many other Crimes of as black a Dye: therefore the Moral Senfe,recommended as the Judge of Morals, is either not univerfal, or a very uncertain and fallacious Rule. As to that Diversity of Opinion, or rather of Practice, concerning Moral Obligation, we can no more conclude from thence, that the internal Perception, or Moral Senfe of Right and Wrong, is not an Univerfal, or Certain Standard or Rule of judging in Morals, than we can infer from the different Opinions concerning the Merit of the fame Performances, that there is no Standard in Painting, no certain and uncontroverted Principle of the Art. In the last, Men appeal |