ly mean a blind, arbitrary Principle of Action, but such a Principle as is directed by Reason, and governed by Wisdom, or a Regard to certain Ends in Preference to others. Unless we suppose some Principle in the Deity analogous to our Sense of the Obligation, fome antecedent Affection, or Determination of his Nature, to prefer fome Ends before others, we cannot affign any fufficient, or indeed any poffible Reason, why he fhould will one thing more than another, or have any Election at all. Whatever therefore is the Ground of his Choice, or Will, muft be the Ground of Obligation, and not the Choice, or Will itfelf. That this is fo, appears plainly from the common Distinction which Divines and Philofophers make between Moral and Pofitive Commands and Duties. The former they think obligatory, antecedent to Will, or at least to any Declaration of it; the latter obligatory only in confequence of a pofitive Appointment of the Divine Will. But what Foundation can there be for this Diftinction, if all Duty and all Obligation. be equally the Refult of mere Will?

A more

Scheme of
Truth, of the
Natures and
Reajons of
Things.

A more refined Tribe of Philofophers have attempted to lay the Foundation of Morals much deeper, and on a

more large and firm Bottom, viz. the Natures and Reasons, the Truth and Fitneffes of Things. Senfes and Affections, they tell us, are vague and precarious; and though they are not, yet irrational Principles of Action, and confequently very improper Foundations, on which to reft the eternal and immutable Obligations of Morality. Therefore they talk much of the abftract Natures and Reasons of Things, of eternal Differences, unalterable Relations, Fitnesses and Unfitneffes refulting from thofe Relations; and from thefe eternal Reasons, Differences, Relations, and their confe quent Fitneffes, they fuppofe Moral Obligation to arife. A Conduct agreeable to them, or, in other words, "A Confor"mity to Truth they call Virtue, and the "Reverse they call Vice." *

We perceive the Nature of Things by different Organs, or Senfes, and our Reafon acts upon them when. fo perceived,

and

See Dr. Clarke, Woolafton, and other eminent Writers.

and investigates thofe Relations which fubfift between them, or traces what is true, what is false, what may be affirmed, and what denied concerning them. Thus by Senfe or Experience we perceive the Nature or Character of a Benefactor, and of a Beneficiary (if one may fo express it) and upon comparing them together, a third Idea is fuggefted to us, which we call the Relation between the Benefactor and Beneficiary; we likewife perceive the Foundation of that Relation, fome Benefit received. But are any of thefe Ideas that which we understand by the Moral Duty or Obligation, the Idea of Gratitude due to the Benefactor from the Beneficiary? This is evidently a diftinct Perception, obvious to fome Senfe, Organ, or Power of Perception, but not the Refult of Reasoning. Suppofe farther, the Benefactor in Prifon for a finall Debt, and the Beneficiary in Affluence, Reafon may suggest to the latter, that a little Share of his Wealth bestowed on the former, will make a confiderable Change in his State to the better; but will Reason, mere Reason, without fome degree of Affection, prompt him. to fuch a well-placed Charity? Or will the Perception of his Relation to his Bene

factor

factor and of the Benefit received, lead him to approve fuch a Conduct, unless we fuppofe a Sense or Feeling quite different from that Perception of the intervening Relation, and of the Ground of that Relation? We might, therefore, perceive all the poffible Reasons, Relations, and Differences of Things, and yet be totally indifferent to this or that Conduct, unless we were endued with fome Senfe or Affection, by which we approved and loved one, or difapproved and difliked the other Conduct. Reafon may perceive a Fitness, or Aptitude to a certain End, but without fome Sense or Affection we cannot propose, or indeed have any Idea of an End, and without an End we cannot conceive any Inducement to Action.-Therefore before we can understand the Natures, Reafons, and Fitneffes of Things, which are faid to be the Foundation of Morals, we must know what Natures are meant, to what Ends they are fitted, and from what Principles or Affections they are prompted to act, otherwise we cannot judge of the Duty required, or of the Conduct becoming that Being whom we fuppofe under Moral Obligation. But let the Natures be once given, and the Relations which fub

fift among them be ascertained, we can then determine what Conduct will be obligatory to fuch Natures, and adapted to their Condition and Oeconomy. And to the fame Natures placed in the fame Relations, the fame Conduct will be eternally, and invariably proper and obligatory.

To call Morality a Conformity to Truth, gives no Idea, no Characteristic of it, but what feems equally applicable to Vice. For whatever Propofitions are predicable of Virtue, as, that it flows from good Affection, or is agreeable to the Order of our Nature,―tends to produce Happiness, -is beheld with Approbation, and the like, the contrary Propofitions are equally true, and may be equally predicated of Vice. What is Truth, but the Conformity of Propofitions to the Nature or Existence and Reality of Things? And has not Vice its Nature, its Exiftence, its Adjuncts and Confequences, as much as Virtue? And are not Propofitions conformable to them true Propofitions? And therefore is not a Conduct fuited to, or fignificative of fuch true Propofitions, a true Conduct, or a Conduct conformable to

Truth?