fociable as ever, as much Barbarians and Wolves as before their Union. But if there is a distinct and previous Obligation to Fidelity, Honour, and a Regard to one's Engagements, then Right and Wrong, Juftice and Injuftice, are antecedent to Compact.-Perhaps he will tell us that the Neceffity of the Cafe, or a Regard to our own Safety, which is included in that of the Public, obliges us to adhere to our Engagements. We may be compelled or punifhed for Breach of Faith by thofe, to whom we transfer our Rights. Force, or fuperior Strength of the Majority to controul or punish the Refractory, is, no doubt, the true Origin of the Obligation, if he will fpeak out, and Self-love is its only Judge and Meafure. And if this be all, then what Obligation is a Man under to Gratitude, Charity, Friendship, and all those Duties of Humanity, which fall not under the Cognizance or Controul of Law? What Obligations to private Veracity, Honesty and Fidelity, when a Man may be a Knave with Safety? That Scheme, therefore, which fets us loofe from fuch Obligations, and involves us in fuch Abfurdities, muft be itself both abfurd and wicked. That State

State of Nature which it fuppofes as its Foundation, is a mere Chimera, a Vision of his own Brain, which, from the Condition and Nature of the Creature, the Growth of a Family, the Rife of a Tribe or Clan, we have no Reafon to believe ever fubfifted; therefore the Superstructure which he has raised on that Foundation, is fictitious and chimerical. Hobbes took it for granted, that all Men were Knaves or Fools, and wanted to drefs up a Syftem of Government, agreeable to the corrupt Taste of the reigning Powers, and to the Genius of a moft diffolute Court, a Government contrived to make a small Part of Mankind Tyrants, and all the rest Slaves. He measured Virtue by mere Utility, and while he pretends to be the first that discovered this Connection, and gave the only true Reafon for the Practice of Honesty, he seems to have mifunderstood, or wilfully overlooked its true Nature, and its infeparable Connection with the Perfection and Happiness of the Individual.

Another Set of Moralifts establish Morals upon the Will or pofitive Appointment of the Deity, and call Virtue a Conformity to that Will, or C 4

Scheme of Conformity to the Di

vine Will.

Appoint

ment.

ment.

All Obligation, they fay, fuppofes one who obliges, or who has a Right to prefcribe, and can reward the Obedient, and punish the Difobedient. This can be none but our Creator. His Will therefore is our Law, which we are bound to obey. And this they tell us is only fufficient to bind, or oblige fuch imperfect and corrupt Creatures as we are, who are but feebly moved with a Senfe of the Beauty and Excellency of Virtue, and ftrongly fwayed by Paffion, or Views of Intereft.

That Virtue, or fuch a Conduct of the Paffions as hath been above described, is agreeable to the Will of God, is evident beyond. Difpute, as that Conduct, or Scheme of Duty, is pointed out to us by our Inward Structure, and as that Inward Structure is the Effect of the Will or Appointment of the Deity. Whatever therefore is agreeable, or correspondent to our Inward Structure, muft likewife be agreeable, or correfpond to the Will of God. So that all the Indications, or Sanctions of cur Duty, which are declared, or enforced by our Structure, are, and may be, confidered as Indications, or Sanctions of the Will of our Creator.

If

these

thefe Indications, through Inattention to, or Abuse of the Structure, prove infufficient to declare; or if thefe Sanctions, through the Weakness or Wickedness of Men, prove infufficient to enforce Obedience to the Divine Will, and the Deity is pleased to fuperadd new Indications, or new Sanctions; these additional Indications and Sanctions cannot, and are not fuppofed by the Affertors of this Scheme, to add any new Duty, or any new Moral Obligation; but only a new and clearer Promulgation of our Duty, or a new and ftronger Sanction or Motive from Intereft, to perform that Duty, and to fulfil that Obligation to which we were bound before. It makes no Difference, as to the Matter of Obligation, after what mannar the Will of our Creator is enforced, or declared to us, whether by Word or Writ, or by certain inward Notices and Determinations of our own Minds, arifing according to a neceffary Law of our Na

ture.

By whichever of these Ways we fuppofe the Divine Will intimated to us, the first Queftion that naturally occurs to us is, "Why we are obliged to obey the Divine Will?" If it be an

fwered, that he is our Superior, and can reward, or punish us, as we are obedient or refractory; this is refting Obligation upon the foot of Intereft. If we say that he is our Creator, and Benefactor, and we ought to obey our Creator and be grateful to our Benefactor, this refers the Obligation to an inward Senfe, or Perception, that Obedience is due to one's Creator, Gratitude to one's Benefactor. Upon what other Principle but this, can we connect those Relations, and that Obedience and Gratitude, unless we recur to the Principle of Self-intereft just now mentioned? If the Scheme of Duty and Moral Obligation be thought to rest on too flight a Foundation, when built on Moral Perception, and the Affections of our Nature, because these are found infufficient to bind, or rather compel Men to their Duty, we fear the fame Objection will militate against this Scheme, fince all the Declarations and Sanctions of the Divine Will have not hitherto had their due Effect in producing a thorough and univerfal Reformation.

When some speak of the Will of God, as the Rule of Duty, they do not certain

ly