ly and willingly." And a morally bad Action, or an immoral Action, is "to vio"late a Moral Obligation knowingly and

Moral Character and Temper good and bad.

willingly." The propofed Brevity of the Enquiry will not admit of entering into the minuter Diftinctions of Actions. As not an Action, but a Series of Actions conftitute a CHARACTER; as not an Affection, but a Series of Affections conftitute a Temper, and as we denominate things by the grofs, à fortiori, or by the Qualities which chiefly prevail in them, therefore we call that a "mo"rally good Character, in which a Series of morally good Actions prevail; and that a morally good Temper, in which a Series of morally good Affections have the Afcen"dant." A bad Character and bad Tem-. per are the Reverse. But where the above-mentioned Order or Proportion of Paffions is maintained, there a Series of morally good Affections and Actions will prevail. THEREFORE," to maintain that "Order and Proportion, is to have a "morally good Temper and Character.". But a "morally good Temper and Character, "is MORAL RECTITUDE, INTEGRITY, "VIRTUE, or the COMPLETION OF DUTY."

66

How we

If it be asked after all, "How we come by the Idea "of Moral Obligation or Duty?" We may anfwer, that ral Obli

we come by it in the fame way

come by the Idea of Mo

gation.

as by our other original and primary Perceptions. We receive them all from Nature, or the great Author of Nature. For this Idea of Moral Obligation is not a Creature of the Mind, or dependent on any previous Act of Volition, but arifes on certain Occafions, or when certain other Ideas are prefented to the Mind, as neceffarily, inftantaneously, and unavoidably, as Pain does upon too near an Approach to the Fire, or Pleasure from the Fruition of any Good. It does not, for instance, depend on our Choice, whether we shall feel the Obligation to fuccour a diftreffed Parent, or to restore a Depofit entrusted to us, when it is recalled. We cannot call this a COMPOUND Idea made up of one or more fimple Ideas. We may indeed, nay we muft, have fome Ideas antecedent to it, e. g. that of a Parent-in Distressof a Child,—able to relieve,—of the Relation of one to the other,—of a Trust, of Right, &c. But none of these Ideas conftitute the Perception of Obligation.

This

This is an Idea quite diftinct from, and fomething fuperadded to, the Ideas of the Correlatives, or the Relation fubfifting between them. These indeed, by a Law of our Nature, are the Occafion of fuggefting it, but they are as totally different from it, as Colours are from Sounds. By Senfe or Reflection we perceive the Correlatives, our Memory recals the Favours or Deposit we received, the various Cir'cumftances of the Cafe are Matters of Fact or Experience; but fome delicate inward Organ or Power, or call it what we pleafe, does, by a certain inftantaneous Sympathy, antecedent to the cool Deductions of Reason, and independent of previous Inftruction, Art, or Volition, perceive the Moral Harmony, the living, irrefiftible Charms of Moral Obligation, which immediately interefts the correfpondent Paffions, and prompts us to fulfil its awful Dictates.

The Use of
Reafon in

Moral Cafes.

We need not apprehend any Danger from the Quickness of its Decifions, nor be frightened, because it looks like Instinct, and has been called fo. Would we approve one for deliberating long, or reafoning the Matter much at leifure, whether he should

relieve

relieve a diftrefs'd Parent, feed a starving Neighbour, or restore the Trust commited to him? Should we not fufpect the Reafoner of Knavery, or of very weak Affections to Virtue? We employ Reason, and worthily employ it in examining the Condition, Relations, and other Circumftances of the Agent or Patient, or of those with whom either of them are connected, or, in other words, the State of the Cafe And in complicated Cafes, where the Circumftances are many, it - may require no fmall Attention to find the true State of the Cafe; but when the Relations of the Agent or Patient, and the Circumstances of the Action are obvious, or come out fuch after a fair Trial, we should scarce approve him who demurs on the Obligation to that Conduct which the Cafe fuggefts. Thus, suppose one to depofit with us a Sword, which he comes afterwards to reclaim, but in fuch Circumstances, fuppofe of Frenzy or Melancholy, as gives us good ground to fufpect that he will ufe it to the Hurt of others, or of himself. In fuch a Cafe it belongs to Reafon or Prudence, coolly to weigh every Circumstance, the Condition of the Proprietor, the Confequences of

restoring

Infinct confidered.

reftoring the Depofit, and the like; nor fhould we on this Suppofition, condemn the hesitating about the restoring it; but let the Proprietor return to himself, the Obligation to Reftitution being now apparent, we should juftly fufpect the Demurrer of fomething criminal or knavish. As to that Objection against this original Perception of Moral Obligation, taken from its being an Instinct or neceffary Determination of our Nature; are not the Perceptions or Determinations of Reafon equally neceffary? Does not every intuitive Perception or Judgment neceffarily extort our Affent, when the Agreement or Difagreement of the Ideas which are compared is perceived? Inftinct indeed has been confidered, as fomething relative merely to bodily Senfe and Appetite, a mere brutal Senfation or Impulfe, in which the Mind, or our fublimer Powers have no Part; and therefore it is a Term that has been thought obnoxious to great Exceptions in Morals; but is a moral Power of Perception, or a moral Determination the worse for being interwoven with the very Frame, and Conftitution of our Nature, for being inftantaneous, uniform and

fteddy