fions refpecting private Good, towards which we feel higher Degrees of Approbation, as the Love of Knowledge, of Action, of Honour, and the like. We efteem them as Marks of an ingenuous Mind, and cannot help thinking the Character in which they are wanting, remarkably stupid, and in fome degree immoral.

Why the

public.

With regard to the SOCIAL Affections, as Compaffion, natural Affection, Friendship, Benevolence, and the like, we approve, admire, and love them in ourselves, and in all in whom we discover them, with an Efteem and Approbation, if not different in kind, yet furely far fuperior in degree to what we feel towards the other Paffions. These we reckon neceffary, just, and excellently fitted to our Structure and State; and the Creature which wants them we call defective, ill conftituted, a kind of Abortion. But the public Affections we esteem as felf-worthy, originally and eternally amiable. We approve and congratulate ourselves in proportion as we indulge them, and reckon thofe deferving of our Efteem and Friendship who do fo.

But

Distinction between vebement and calm Affections.

But among the facial Affections, we make an obvious and conftant Distinction, viz. between thofe particular-Paffions, which urge us with a fudden Violence, and uneafy kind of Senfation, to pursue the Good of their refpective Objects, as Pity, natural Affection, and the like; and those calm difpaffionate Affections and Defires, which prompt us more fleddily and uniformly, to promote the Happiness of others. The former we generally call Paffions, to distinguish. them from the other Sort, which go more commonly by the Name of Affections, or calm Defires. The first kind we approve indeed and delight in; but we feel still. higher Degrees of Approbation and moral Complacence towards the laft, and towards all Limitations of the particular Instincts, by the Principle of univerfal Benevolence. The more Objects the calm Affections take in, and the worthier these are, their Dignity rifes in proportion, and. with this our Approbation keeps an exact Pace. A Character, on the other hand, which is quite divefted of thefe public Affections, which feels no Love for the

Species,

Species, but inftead of it, entertains Malice, Rancour and Ill-will, we reckon totally immoral and unnatural.

Such then are the Sentiments and Difpofitions we feel, when thefe feveral Orders of Affections pafs before the mental Eye.

Moral Obli

gation.

Therefore," that State in "which we feel ourselves "moved, in the manner a"bove described, towards those Affec"tions and Paffions, as they come under "the Mind's Review, and in which we "are inftantaneously and independently " of our Choice or Volition, prompted "to a correspondent Conduct, we call a "State of MORAL OBLIGATION." Let us suppose, for instance, a Parent, a Friend, a Benefactor, reduced to a Condition of the utmost Indigence and Distress, and that it is in our Power to give them immediate Relief. To' what Conduct are we obliged? What Duty does Nature dictate and require in such a Cafe? Attend to Nature, and Nature will tell, will tell with a Voice irrefiftibly audible and commanding to the human Heart, with an Authority which no Man can filence

without

without being felf-condemned, and which no Man can elude but at his Peril; "That "immediate Relief OUGHT to be given." Again, let a Friend, a Neighbour, or even a Stranger, have lodged a Deposit in our Hands, and after some time reclaim it, no fooner do thefe Ideas of the Confidence reposed in us, and of Property not tranf ferred, but depofited, occur, than we immediately and unavoidably feel, and recognize the OBLIGATION to restore it. In both these Cases, we fhould condemn and even loath ourselves, if we acted otherwife, as having done, or omitted doing what we ought not, as having acted beneath the Dignity of our Nature ;-contrary to our most intimate Senfe of Right and Wrong;-we fhould accufe ourselves as guilty of Ingratitude, Injustice, and Inhumanity;-and be confcious of deferving the Cenfure, and therefore dread the Refentment of all rational Beings.But in complying with the Obligation, we feel Joy and Self-approbation,-are conscious of an inviolable Harmony between our Nature and Duty,-and think ourfelves entitled to the Applaufe of every impartial Spectator of our Conduct.

To

To defcribe therefore what we cannot perhaps define, a State of MORAL OBLIGATION,

Moral Obligation.

is" that State in which a Creature, endued with fuch Senfes, Powers, and Af

fellions as Man, would condemn him"felf, and think he deserved the Con"demnation of all others, should he re"fufe to fulfil it; but would approve "himself, and expect the Approbation of "all others, upon complying with it." And we call him a MORAL

MoralAgent.

AGENT, who is in fuch a State, or is fubject to Moral Obligation. Therefore as Man's Structure and Connections often fubject him to fuch a State of Moral Obligation, we conclude that he is a Mo RAL AGENT. But as Man may fometimes act without knowing what he does, as in Cafes of Frenzy or Disease, or in many natural Functions; or knowing what he does, he may act without Choice or Affection, as in Cafes of Neceffity or Compulfion, therefore to denominate an Action Moral, i. e. approveable, good and or blameable, it must be done knowingly and willingly, or from Affection and Choice. "A morally good Allion then "is to fulfil a Moral Obligation knowing

Moral Action

bad.

ly