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"of Man muft lie in the aforefaid SuPREMACY of CONSCIENCE and REASON, and in the SUBORDINATION of "the Paffions to their AUTHORITY and "DIRECTION. And his VIRTUE OF "GOODNESS must consist in acting agree"ably to that ORDER OF OECONOMY.'

That fuch an Oeconomy of How conformable to the Mind, and fuch a ConReafon. duct of its Powers and Paffions will stand the Teft of Reason, cannot admit of any Difpute. For, upon a fair Examination into the Confequences of Things, or the Relations and Aptitudes of Means to Ends, Reafon evidently demonftrates, and Experience confirms it, that" To have our defenfive Paffions duly "proportioned to our Dangers, is the "fureft way to avoid or get clear of them, "and obtain the Security we feek after."

"To proportion our private Paffions "to our Wants, is the beft Means to fupply them; and, to adapt our public

Affections to our focial Relations, and the "Good of others, is the most effectual "Method of fulfilling one, and procuring "the other." In this Senfe therefore, Virtue may be faid to be a "Conduct con"formable to Reason," as Reafon discovers

an

an apparent Aptitude in fuch an Order and Oeconomy of Powers and Paffions, to anfwer the End for which they are naturally formed.

Connection between Affections and

Ends, not the Idea of Moral Obli gation.

If the Idea of Moral Obligation is to be deduced merely from this Aptitude or Connection between certain Paffions, or a certain Order and Balance of Paffions, and certain Ends obtained, or to be obtained by them, then is Reafon or Reflection, which perceives that Aptitude or Connection, the proper Judge of Moral Obligation; and on this Suppofition it may be defined, as hath been done by fome, the Connection between the Action and the Motive; for the End is the Motive, or the final Cause, and the Affection is the Action, or its immediate, natural Cause. A Man, from mere Self-love, may be induced to fulfil that Obligation, which is founded on the Connection between the defenfive Paffions and their Ends, or the private Paffions and their Ends; because in that Cafe his own Intereft will prompt him to indulge them in the due Proportion required. But if he has no Affections which point beyond himfelf, no Principle but Self-love, or fome

fubtle

fubtle Modification of it, what fhall intereft him in the Happiness of others, where there is no Connection between it and his own; or what Sense can he have of Moral Obligation to promote it? Upon this Scheme therefore, without public of focial Affection there could be no Motive, and confequently no Moral Obligation to a beneficent, difinterested Conduct.

But if the mere Connection between certain Paffions, or a certain Order of Paffions, and certain Ends, are what conftitutes, or gives us the Idea of Moral Obligation, then why may not the Appofitenefs of any Temper or Conduct, nay, of any Piece of Machinery to obtain its End, form an equally ftrict Moral Obligation? For the Connection and Aptitude are as ftrong and invariable in the latter Inftances as in the former. But as this is confounding the most obvious Differences of things, we must trace the Idea of Moral Obligation to another and a more natural Source. Let us appeal therefore to our inmoft Senfe and Experience, "How we ftand af"fected to thofe different Sets of Paf"fions, in the just Measure and Balance "of which we found a right Temper to "confift.".

Idea of it from Experience.

"confift." For this is entirely a Matten of Experience, in which we must examine; as in any other natural Enquiry, "What

66.

are the genuine Feelings and Operations "of Nature, and what Affections or Symptoms of them appear in the given "Inftance."

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Why the defenfive Paffons ap

prov'd.

The DEFENSIVE Paffions, as Anger and Fear, give us rather Pain than Pleasure, yet we cannot help feeling them when provoked by Injury, or expofed to Harm.. We account the Creature imperfect that wants them, because they are neceffary to, his Defence. Nay we fhould in some measure condemn ourfelves, did we want the neceffary Degree of Refentment and Caution. But if our Refentment exceeds. the Wrong received, or our Caution the Evil dreaded, we then blame ourselves for having over-acted our Part. Therefore, while we are in Danger, to be totally destitute of them we reckon a blameable Defet, and to feel them in a juft, i. e. neceffary Measure, we approve, as suited to the Nature and Condition of fuch a Creature as Man. But our Security obtained, to continue to indulge them, we not only

disapprove

1

difapprove as hurtful, but condemn as unmanly, unbecoming, and mean-spirited: Nor will fuch a Conduct afford any felf-approving Joy, when we coolly reflect up

on it.

Why the private.

With regard to the PRIVATE Paffions, fuch as Love of Life, Pleafure, Eafe, and the like, as these aim at private Good, and are neceffary to the Perfection and Happiness of the Individual, we should reckon any Creature defective, and even blameable, that was deftitute of them. Thus, we condemn the Man who imprudently ruins his Fortune, impairs his Health, or expofes his Life; we not only pity him as an unfortunate Creature, but feel a kind of Moral Indignation and Contempt of him, for having made himself fuch. On the other hand, though a difcreet Self-regard does not attract our Efteem and Veneration, yet we approve of it in fome Degree, in an higher and different Degree from what we would regard a well-contrived Machine, as neceffary to form a finifh'd Creature, nay to complete the virtuous Character, and as exactly fuited to our prefent indigent State. There are fome Paf

fions