by the objects of our perceptions: and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact would appear to every person, were it not, that, from our earliest years, the attention is engrossed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with which is absolutely necessary for the preservation of our animal existence. Hence it is, that these phenomena occupy our thoughts more than those of mind; that we are perpetually tempted to explain the latter [the phenomena of mind] by the analogy of the former [the phenomena of matter], and even to endeavor to refer them to the same general laws; and that we acquire habits of inattention to the subjects of our consciousness, too strong to be afterwards surmounted, without the most persevering industry.

If the foregoing observations be well founded, they establish the distinction between mind and matter, without any long process of metaphysical reasoning:* for if our notions of both are

Hamilton, and others, justly object to this doctrine. Having a sensation, and being conscious of that sensation, are not two things; the thing is one, the names only are two. If I say I feel a sensation, the expression is tautological, for the feeling and the sensation are the same thing; the sensation is the feeling. And to say I am conscious of a feeling, is merely to say that I feel it; to have a feeling is to be conscious, and to be conscious is to have a feeling. A single perception is simple and indivisible; it cannot be analyzed into a fact and the consciousness of that fact, for the event itself being an act of knowing, it does not exist, if it be not known to exist. See Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, 2d. ed. p. 47. James Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, I. p. 170. Bowen's Essays, p. 131. Dr. T. Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, I. pp. 244–261.]

*In stating the relative notions which we have of mind and of body, I have avoided the use of the word substance, as I am unwilling to furnish the slightest occasion for controversy; and have contented myself with defining mind to be that which feels, thinks, wills, hopes, fears, desires, etc. That my consciousness of these and other operations is necessarily accompanied with a conviction of my own existence, and with a conviction that all of them belong to one and the same being, is not an hypothesis, but a fact; of which it is no more possible for me to doubt, than of the reality of my own sensations or volitions.

[Substance is the unknown something which underlies and supports all the qualities by which any thing is made known to us. We can define any particular body only by saying, that it is something which is extended, colored,

merely relative; if we know the one only by such sensible qualities as extension, figure, and solidity; and the other, by such operations as sensation, thought, and volition; we are certainly entitled to say, that matter and mind, considered as objects of human study, are essentially different; the science of the former resting ultimately on the phenomena exhibited to our senses; that of the latter, on the phenomena of which we are conscious. Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of materialism, that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate to say, that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on a misapprehension of the proper object of science; the difficulty which it professes to remove being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of that principle which feels and thinks and wills, by saying that it is a material substance, or that it is the result of material organization, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting, that matter as well as mind is known to us by its qualities and attributes alone, and that we are totally ignorant of the essence of either.*

The Philosophy of Mind susceptible of cultivation and progress. It would probably contribute much to accelerate the progress of the philosophy of mind, if, (1.) a distinct explanation were given of its nature and object; and if, (2.) some gen

hard or soft, hot or cold, etc.; that is, by enumerating those properties or attributes, by means of which it manifests itself to our senses. So we can define mind only by saying, that it is something which feels, thinks, remembers, conceives, etc.; that is, we enumerate the qualities or faculties through which it manifests itself in consciousness. In both cases, this unknown something is called substance, which word, in plain English, means that which stands under, or upholds, its various qualities.]

* Some metaphysicians, who appear to admit the truth of the foregoing reasoning, have further urged, that for any thing we can prove to the contrary, it is possible, that the unknown substance which has the qualities of extension, figure, and color, may be the same with the unknown substance which has the attributes of feeling, thinking, and willing. But besides that this is only an hypothesis, which amounts to nothing more than a mere possibility, even if it were true, it would no more be proper to say of mind, that it is material, than to say of body, that it is spiritual.

eral rules were laid down, with respect to the proper method of conducting the study of it.

Upon a slight attention to the operations of our minds, they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws.*

* [What are general laws, or laws of nature, as they are generally termed ? Few phrases are more frequently and glibly used than these, yet, in the minds of most persons, they have but a vague and uncertain signification. It is worth while, then, to attempt to gain some clear and precise notions respecting them.

A law of nature is nothing more than a general fact, or rather, a general statement comprehending under it many similar individual facts. A law is the result of a classification, and individual things are classed together on account of some similarity or uniformity that has been discovered between them.

1. Objects that exist are classed together on account of their resemblance to each other. Such classification may consist of several successive steps, and is the proper work of Natural History. Thus, all objects whatsoever are divided into three great kingdoms, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral. The Animal kingdom is subdivided into four classes, Vertebrates, Molluscs, Articulates, and Radiates or Zoöphites. Again, Vertebrates are divided into Mammifers, Birds, Reptiles, and Fishes. All the animals ranked under any one of these classes agree with each other in certain respects; all Vertebrates, for instance, have a vertebral column inclosing a spinal cord; all Birds have an apparatus, or the rudiments of an apparatus, for flying. The General Fact, that all the animals so classed possess the given organ or property, is called a Law of Nature. It is a Law of Nature, for instance, that all Vertebrates have a spinal cord and a skull inclosing a brain; it is also a Law, that all Mammifers and Birds have warm red blood, and a heart composed of four compartments. Another Law of Nature is, that every animal is produced from an egg. These Laws are not necessary and immutable truths, but are mere inductions founded on experience; they hold good only until an instance is discovered to the contrary. Whales were once classed with Fishes; they are now properly ranked with Mammifers, because unlike Fishes, they suckle their young. It was once supposed to be a Law of Nature, that all swans are white; black swans have since been discovered.

2. Events that take place, also, arc classed together on account of their uniformity. Thus, it is a General Fact, or Law of Nature, that pressure on a fluid is propagated equally in all directions, and that a heavy body, if unsupported, falls to the earth. Many of these General Facts are so familiar, that we never think of formally enunciating them; no science,"

In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first,

says J. S. Mill, was needed to teach men that food nourishes, that water drowns, or quenches thirst, that the sun gives light and heat, that bodies fall to the ground." These laws, also, are not necessary truths, but are founded on mere induction,- often on a not very extensive one. A newly discovered metal, being found, by a single experiment, to be fusible at a certain temperature, it is at once declared to be a Law of Nature, that it does melt, always has melted, and always will melt, at the ascertained degree of heat. It is certainly possible, though not probable, that another piece of the metal should be discovered which will not melt at this temperature; such an instance would be only a parallel to the case of the black swans. A particular event, comprehended under the statement of a Law, is not properly said to be caused by the Law, but only to be a case, or instance, happening under the Law. A cow does not suckle its calf because it is a Mammifer, but it is called a Mammifer because it suckles its calf. So, it is not a law of Hydrostatics which causes water to remain at the same level in the two arms of a bent tube; but the fact, that the water stands at this level, is ranked among many other facts, which are comprehended under the general statement, called a Law, of Hydrostatics. Gravitation does not make the stone fall, but the particular fact, that this stone fell, is comprehended under the General Fact, or Law, of Gravitation. In like manner, Gravitation does not make the earth revolve in an elliptical orbit round the sun; but the fact, that the earth revolves in this manner, is ranked with the falling of a stone, and with many other facts of a similar character, under the general statement, or Law, of Gravitation.

Hence it is abundantly evident, to adopt Mr. Mill's language, that "the expression, Laws of Nature, means nothing but the uniformities which exist among natural phenomena, when reduced to their simplest expression." The Laws of Nature do not account for, or explain, the phenomena of nature; they only describe them. Description and classification are the sole employments of Physical science.

To account for, or explain, the operations of nature, we must have recourse to Metaphysics · to something after, or above, nature. We must ascend to the notion of Cause. The maxim, "every event must have a cause,” is not, like the so-called Laws of Nature, a mere induction, founded on experience, and holding good only until an instance is discovered to the contrary; it is a necessary and immutable truth. It is not derived from observation of natural phenomena, but is superimposed upon such observation by a necessity of the human intellect. It is not made known through the senses; and its falsity, under any circumstances, is not possible is not even conceivable. The Cause, to which it points us, is not to be found in

to be too various for our comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and uncompounded principles of action. These faculties and principles are the general laws of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind, that the general laws we investigate in physics, hold in that branch of science. In both cases, the laws which nature has established are to be investigated only by an examination of facts; and in both cases, a knowledge of these laws leads to an explanation of an infinite number of phenomena.

In the investigation of physical laws, it is well known that our inquiries must always terminate in some general fact, of which no account can be given, but that such is the constitution of nature. After we have established, for example, from the astronomical phenomena, the universality of the law of gravitation, it may still be asked, whether this law implies the constant agency of mind; and (upon the supposition that it does) whether it be probable that the Deity always operates immediately, or by means of subordinate instruments? But these questions, however curious, do not fall under the province of the natural philosopher. It is sufficient for his purpose, if the universality of the fact be admitted.

The case is exactly the same in the philosophy of mind. When we have once ascertained a general fact; such as, the various laws which regulate the Association of Ideas, or the dependence of Memory on that effort of the mind which we call Attention; it is all we ought to aim at, in this branch of science. If we proceed no further than facts for which we have the evidence of our own consciousness, our conclusions will be no less certain, than those in physics; but if our curiosity leads us to attempt an explanation of the Association of Ideas, by certain

nature. The mere Physicist, after vainly searching, ever since the world began, for a single instance of it, has at length abandoned the attempt as hopeless, and now confines himself to the mere description of natural pheThe true cause of these phenomena must be sought for in the realm, not of matter, but of mind.]

nomena.