V. Effects of committing to Writing our acquired Knowledge 304 VII. Importance of making a proper Selection among the Ob- jects of our Knowledge, in order to derive Advantage II. Imagination considered in its Relation to the Fine Arts III. Relation of Imagination and of Taste to Genius IV. Influence of Imagination on Character and Happiness V. Inconveniences resulting from an ill-regulated Imagination 357 INTRODUCTION. PART I. OF THE NATURE AND OBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. Why the Philosophy of the Human Mind has hitherto made little progress. The prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions; and if such discussions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded as no inconsiderable evidence of the progress which true philosophy has made in the present age. Among the various subjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphysics,* there are some, which are essentially * [The term Physics comprehends the various branches of Physical or Natural Philosophy, such as Chemistry, Mechanics, Astronomy, Botany, etc. It properly denotes the science of things actually existing, whether those distinguished from the rest, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts; and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit into which the other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; —a science so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been classed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable disquisitions of the schoolmen. In order to obviate these misapprehensions with respect to the subject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the nature of the truths which I propose to investigate; and, secondly, to point out some of the more important applications of which they are susceptible. things are material or immaterial; but it is usually confined to things material, and thus signifies the science of the external world. After Aristotle had written books upon various branches of Physics, he composed certain other treatises, to which he gave the name of Metaphysics, or things coming after Physics. In its widest signification, therefore, the term Metaphysics comprehends every study or science which does not belong to Physics. It is the science of pure ideas, or of abstract and universal truths; the objects of this science lie beyond the range of the senses, and are not attainable by experience. That every event must have a cause that qualities or attributes presuppose a substance in which they inhere that the human will is free, etc., are propositions which belong to Metaphysics. By many writers, however, the word Metaphysics is loosely applied to denote the Philosophy of Mind. Such a Philosophy treats of the Association of Ideas, Memory, Attention, and other phenomena of mind; and as it consists only in collecting facts and making inductions, it is properly an experimental science, and ought to be ranked under the head of Physics rather than of Metaphysics. Psychology is the latest term in use to denote the science of mental phenomena, while Physics, in its narrower signification, comprehends only material phenomena; the one is the philosophy of mind, the other is the philosophy of matter.] Our notions both of Matter and Mind are merely relative.The notion we annex to the words, matter and mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid, (in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man,) are merely relative. If I am asked, what I mean by `matter? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, colored, movable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold; — that is, I can define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses; but only extension, figure, color, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to SOMETHING, which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations, which imply the existence of SOMETHING which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being; to that being, which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of its organs. Proof of the separate existence of Mind. From these considerations, it appears, that we have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body; nay, it there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of our own consciousness,* and the other merely * [Consciousness is usually defined to be the notice which the mind takes of its own operations. If I think or remember, I know, or am conscious, that I think or remember; if I am pained or pleased, I know that I am so pained or pleased. Thus, Consciousness is the witness or reporter of all mental phenomena, just as the senses witness and report the phenomena of the external universe. Consciousness reports the present phenomena of mind, as memory reports its past phenomena. By most writers, Consciousness is spoken of as if it were a separate faculty of mind, whose special office it is to take cognizance of whatever is passing within us. But Dr. Thomas Brown, Mr. James Mill, Sir W. |