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two bows-one for firing from horseback, and the other, for greater precision, when on foot. They had three quivers, each with a different calibre of arrows for the various ranges. class could penetrate armour, and the other was suitable against unprotected troops. In addition, their light artillery consisted of various missilethrowing machines, mangonels, and catapults. These were taken to pieces, and formed a pack - artillery. They could fire rapidly and accurately, could go anywhere, and were adequate for open fighting.

Every trooper carried a complete set of tools, individual camp-kettle, and iron ration, for his own maintenance and subsistence in the field. He

had also a water-tight bag in which he carried a change of clothes, and which could be inflated for crossing rivers.

The tactics of the Mongol Army were rigid in conception, without the possibility of wide variation, but flexible in execution. They do not afford much encouragement to lovers of laissez faire tactics and the uncontrolled licence of subordinates, to whom the suggestion of a "normal method " is anathema. They were indeed built up on a definite framework of tactical moves, so that they resembled an applied battle drill. The analogy is further heightened by the fact that the different manœuvres were directed by signals, so that the delays and upsets caused by orders and messages were obvi

ated. The result of these battle drill tactics was seen in an amazing perfection and rapidity of execution. The Mongol force was a machine which worked like clockwork, and this very mobility made it irresistible to troops far more strongly armed and numerous.

The battle formation was comprised of five ranks, the squadrons being separated by wide intervals. The troops in the two front ranks wore complete armour, with sword and lance, and their horses also were armoured. The three rear ranks wore no armour, and their weapons were the bow and the javelin. From these latter were thrown out mounted skirmishers or light troops, who harassed the enemy as he advanced. Later, as the two forces drew near each other, the rear ranks advanced through the intervals in the front ranks, and poured a deadly hail of arrows and javelins on the enemy. Then, when they had disorganised the enemy ranks, they retired into the intervals, and the front ranks charged to deliver the decisive blow. It was a perfect combination of fire and shock tactics, the missile-weapon troops firing and disorganising the enemy ready for the shock troops to complete his overthrow. In addition to these individual missileweapons, which were sometimes fired by troops dismounted, the Mongols developed extensively the heavier ordnance; they were, indeed, the inventors of "artillery preparation."

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Like all the Mongol campaigns, the invasion of Turkestan was prepared for by the employment of an extensive spy system, combining propaganda among the enemy peoples with a wonderful service of information to the Mongol command. The Mongols, indeed, were the pioneers in that "attack on the rear" which the 1914-1918 campaign developed. Meanwhile the Shah devoted his energies to surrounding Samarkand with immense fortifications, which were never

finished.

him concentrating his main forces on the Irtish to the east of Lake Balkash. This was by the Dzungarian Gates, the northern route into Turkestan. His first step is security to his plan. He covers his concentration, ensures its secrecy, and avoids the danger of a Persian offensive by sending his son, Juji, with a force towards the lower reaches of the Syr Daria river (the Jaxartes of ancient history). This force, in accordance with his instructions, lays waste the whole trough country between the desert of Ak-kum to the north and the Ala-tau range to the south. By the time the Shah's son, the valiant Jelaladdin, arrived on the scene to meet the sup

Let us now watch the extraordinary skill, foresight, and grasp of the principles of war with which Jenghiz Khan gradually unfolded his plan. We see

of

posed invasion, the Mongols also at Samarkand.
have accomplished their mis-
sion, have sent back all the
horses and forage they required,
and burnt the towns and fields.
After a doubtful rearguard
battle, the Mongols set fire to
the dry grass on the plain, and
disappeared behind the barrier
of flame. This was in the
summer of 1219.

For several months there was no further move, and the Shah prepared his plan of defence. He mobilised all his vassal states, so that he had nearly 200,000 men available. But like Napoleon's opponents he adopted the fatal cordon system. By stringing out his forces in packets all along the line of the Syr Daria, he violated the principle of concentration, and with it those of security and the offensive, for by such a disposition he restricted himself to a purely defensive rôle.

Then early in 1220, Jenghiz Khan struck his opening blow, a shrewdly conceived diversion. Chépé, with two toumans (20,000 men), had passed by the southern route from Kashgar into Fergana, and was advancing on Khojent, which covered the southern end of the Syr Daria line. Thus Chépé directly threatened the Shah's right flank, as well as Samarkand and Bokhara, which lay beyond-the two centres of his power. It was a dagger pointing at the heart of the enemy. The Shah reinforced the Syr Daria line, and concentrated some 40,000 at Bokhara, and

Against

this Karismian total of 200,000 the Mongols had about 150,000 in the invading armies. Jenghiz Khan had distributed his main striking force into three armies, two of three toumans each under his sons Juji and Jagatai, and the third of three toumans and the Guard under his direct control, with Subutai as his adviser or chief of staff. Chépé's southern detachment comprised two toumans, while there were 30,000 auxiliaries distributed between the four armies.

While Chépé was striking his first blows in Fergana, the three armies which formed the main force traversed the devastated route in the north, and in February suddenly debouched on the left flank of the Syr Daria line. The speed of this move was the more remarkable when we remember that it was made by a mounted force of more than 100,000, without counting the packanimals of the train, and across a country that had been turned into a desert.

The two armies of Juji and Jagatai turned south from Otrar, clearing the line of the Syr Daria, capturing the fortresses, and working towards Chépé's detachment, which, after taking Khojent, was seeking to join hands with them. During the whole of February these operations on the Syr Daria continued, destroying in detail the Shah's forces and drawing in his reserves. Then, like a thunder-clap, as the

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him concentrating his main forces on the Irtish to the east of Lake Balkash. This was by the Dzungarian Gates, the northern route into Turkestan. His first step is security to his plan. He covers his concentration, ensures its secrecy, and avoids the danger of a Persian offensive by sending his son, Juji, with a force towards the lower reaches of the Syr Daria river (the Jaxartes of ancient history). This force, in accordance with his instructions, lays waste the whole trough of country between the desert of Ak-kum to the north and the Ala-tau range to the south. By the time the Shah's son, the valiant Jelaladdin, arrived on the scene to meet the sup

Like all the Mongol campaigns, the invasion of Turkestan was prepared for by the employment of an extensive spy system, combining propaganda among the enemy peoples with a wonderful service of information to the Mongol command. The Mongols, indeed, were the pioneers in that "attack on the rear which the 1914-1918 campaign developed. Meanwhile the Shah devoted his energies to surrounding Samarkand with immense fortifications, which were never finished.

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Let us now watch the extraordinary skill, foresight, and grasp of the principles of war with which Jenghiz Khan gradually unfolded his plan. We see

posed invasion, the Mongols also at Samarkand. Against have accomplished their mission, have sent back all the horses and forage they required, and burnt the towns and fields. After a doubtful rearguard battle, the Mongols set fire to the dry grass on the plain, and disappeared behind the barrier of flame. This was in the summer of 1219.

For several months there was no further move, and the Shah prepared his plan of defence. He mobilised all his vassal states, so that he had nearly 200,000 men available. But like Napoleon's opponents he adopted the fatal cordon system. By stringing out his forces in packets all along the line of the Syr Daria, he violated the principle of concentration, and with it those of security and the offensive, for by such a disposition he restricted himself to a purely defensive rôle.

Then early in 1220, Jenghiz Khan struck his opening blow, a shrewdly conceived diversion. Chépé, with two toumans (20,000 men), had passed by the southern route from Kashgar into Fergana, and was advancing on Khojent, which covered the southern end of the Syr Daria line. Thus Chépé directly threatened the Shah's right flank, as well as Samarkand and Bokhara, which lay beyond the two centres of his power. It was a dagger pointing at the heart of the enemy. The Shah reinforced the Syr Daria line, and concentrated some 40,000 at Bokhara, and

this Karismian total of 200,000 the Mongols had about 150,000 in the invading armies. Jenghiz Khan had distributed his main striking force into three armies, two of three toumans each under his sons Juji and Jagatai, and the third of three toumans and the Guard under his direct control, with Subutai as his adviser or chief of staff. Chépé's southern detachment comprised two toumans, while there were 30,000 auxiliaries distributed between the four armies.

While Chépé was striking his first blows in Fergana, the three armies which formed the main force traversed the devastated route in the north, and in February suddenly debouched on the left flank of the Syr Daria line. The speed of this move was the more remarkable when we remember that it was made by a mounted force of more than 100,000, without counting the packanimals of the train, and across a country that had been turned into a desert.

The two armies of Juji and Jagatai turned south from Otrar, clearing the line of the Syr Daria, capturing the fortresses, and working towards Chépé's detachment, which, after taking Khojent, was seeking to join hands with them. During the whole of February these operations on the Syr Daria continued, destroying in detail the Shah's forces and drawing in his reserves. Then, like a thunder-clap, as the

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