his Congress very much in the same relation in which I stood to my Assembly in Jamaica. There is the same absence of effective responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The whole business of legislation in the American Congress, as well as in the State Legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the British Parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance, our Reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session, just as a Railway Bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in Parliament. There was no Government to deal with. The interests of the Union, as a whole and distinct from local and sectional interests, had no organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of canvassing this member of Congress or the other. It is easy to perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the exception but the rule.

Now I feel very strongly, that when a people have been once thoroughly accustomed to the working of such a Parliamentary system as ours, they never will consent to revert to this clumsy irresponsible mechanism. Whether we shall be able to carry on the war here long enough to allow the practice of Constitutional Government and the habits of mind which it engenders to take root in these provinces, may be doubtful. But it may be worth your while to consider whether these views do not throw some light on affairs in Europe. If you part with constitutional monarchies there, you may possibly get something much more democratic; but you cannot, I am confident, get American republicanism. It is the fashion to say, "of course not; we cannot get their federal system;" but this is not the only reason, there are others that lie deeper. Look at France, where they are trying to jumble up the two things, a head of the State responsible to the people who elect him, and a ministry responsible to the Government.

CLXVIII

ELGIN TO EARL GREY

[Trans. T. Walrond, op. cit.]

Toronto, December 17, 1850.

Although, as you observe, it seems to be rather idle in us to correspond on what may be termed speculative questions, when we have so much pressing business on hand, I venture to say a few words in reply to your letter of the 23rd ult., firstly, because I presume to dissent from some of the opinions which you advance in it; and, secondly, because I have a practical object of no small importance in view in calling your attention to the contrasts which present themselves in the working of our institutions and those of our neighbours in the States. My practical object is this: when you concede to the Colonists Constitutional Government in its integrity, you are reproached with leading them to Republicanism and the American Union. The same reproach is hurled with anathemas against your humble servant. Lord Stanley, if I rightly remember, in the debate on Ryland's case last year, stated amid cheers, that if you were in the habit of consulting the ministers of the Crown in the Colony before you placed persons on the colonial pension list, he had no hesitation in saying you had already established a republic in Canada! Now, I believe, on the contrary, that it may be demonstrated that the concession of Constitutional Government has a tendency to draw the Colonists the other way; firsly, because it slakes that thirst for self-government which seizes on all British communities when they approach maturity; and, secondly, because it habituates the Colonists to the working of a political mechanism, which is both intrinsically superior to that of the Americans, and more unlike it than our old Colonial system.

Adopting, however, the views with respect to the superiority of the machanism of our political system to that of our neighbours, which I have ventured to urge, you proceed to argue that the remedy is in their hands; that without abandoning their republicanism they and their confrères in France have nothing to do but to dismiss their Presidents and to substitute our constitution without a King, the body without the head, for their own, to get rid of the inconveniences which they now experience; and you quote with approbation, as an embodiment of this idea, the project submitted by M. Grévy and the Red Republicans to the French Constituent Assembly.

Now here I confess I cannot go along with you, and the difference between us is a very material one; for if the monarch be not an indispensable element in our constitutional mechanism, and if we can secure all the advantages of that mechanism without him, I have drawn the wrong moral from the facts. You say that the system the Red Republicans would have established in France would have been the nearest possible approach to our own. It is possible, I think, that we may be tending towards the like issues. It is possible, perhaps probably, that as the House of Commons becomes more democratic in its composition, and consequently more arrogant in its bearing, it may cast off the shackles which the other powers of the State impose on its self-will, and even utterly abolish them; but I venture to believe that those who last till that day comes, will find that they are living under a very different constitution from that which we now enjoy; that they have traversed the interval which separates a temperate and cautious administration of public affairs resting on the balance of powers and interests, from a reckless and overbearing tyranny based on the caprices and passions of an absolute and irresponsible body. You talk somewhat lightly of the check of the Crown, although you acknowledge its utility. But is it indeed so light a matter, even as our constitution now works? Is it a light matter that the Crown should have the power of dissolving Parliament; in other words, of deposing the tyrant at will? Is it a light matter that for several months in each year the House of Commons should be in abeyance, during which period the nation looks on Ministers not as slaves of Parliament, but servants of the Crown? Is it a light matter that there should still be such respect for the monarchical principle, that the servants of that visible entity yclept the Crown are enabled to carry on much of the details of internal and foreign administration without consulting Parliament, and even without its cognisance? Or do you suppose that the Red Republicans, when they advocated the nomination of a Ministry of the House of Assembly with a revocable mandat, intended to create a Frankenstein endowed with powers in some cases paramount to, and in others running parallel with, the authority of the omnipotent body to which it owed its existence? My own impression is, that they meant a set of delegates to be appointed, who should exercise certain functions of legislative initiation and executive patronage so long as they reflected clearly, in the former the passions, and in the latter the interests of the majority for the time being, and no longer.

It appears to me, I must confess, that if you have a republican form of government in a great country, with complicated internal and external relations, you must either separate the executive and legislative departments, as in the United States, or submit to a tyranny of the majority, not the more tolerable because it is capricious and wielded by a tyrant with many heads. Of the two evils I prefer the former.

Consider, for a moment, how much more violent the proceedings of majorities in the American Legislatures would be, how much more reckless the appeals to popular passion, how much more frequently the permanent interests of the nation and the rights of individuals and classes would be sacrificed to the object of raising political capital for present uses, if debates or discussions affected the tenure of office. I have no idea that the executive and legislative departments of the State can be made to work together with a sufficient degree of harmony to give the maximum of strength and of mutual independence to secure freedom and the rights of minorities, except under the presidency of Monarchy, the moral influence

of which, so long as a nation is monarchical in its sentiments, cannot, of course, be measured merely by its recognized power.

CLXIX

ELGIN TO MR. CUMMING BRUCE

[Trans. T. Walrond, op. cit.]

September, 1852.

As respects the matter of the report', I am disposed to believe that, viewing the question with reference to personal interests exclusively, my removal from hence would not be any disadvantage to me. But, as to my work here, there is the rub. Is it to be all undone? On this point I must speak frankly. I have been possessed (I use the word advisedly, for I fear that most persons in England still consider it a case of possession) with the idea that it is possible to maintain on this soil of North America, and in the face of Republican America, British connection and British institutions, if you give the latter freely and trustingly. Faith, when it is sincere, is always catching; and I have imparted this faith, more or less thoroughly to all Canadian statesmen with whom I have been in official relationship since 1848, and to all intelligent Englishmen with whom I have come in contact since 1850-as witness Lord Wharncliffe, Waldegrave Tremenheere, etc., etc. Now if the Governor ceases to posses this faith, or to have the faculty of imparting it, I confess I fear that, ere long, it will become extinct in other breasts likewise. I believe that it is equally an error to imagine with one old-fashioned party, that you can govern such dependencies as this on the antiquated bureaucratic principle, by means of rescripts from Downing Street, in defiance of the popular legislatures, and on the hypothesis that one local faction monopolises all the loyalty of the Colony; and to suppose with the Radicals that all is done when you have simply told the colonists "To go to the devil their own way." I believe, on the contrary, that there is more room for the exercise of influence on the part of the Governor under my system than under any that ever was before devised; an influence, however, wholly moral-an influence of suasion, sympathy, and moderation, which softens the temper while it elevates the aims of local politics.

It is true that on certain questions of public policy, especially with regard to Church matters, views are propounded by my ministers which do not exactly square with my pre-conceived opinions, and which I acquiesce in, so long as they do not contravene the fundamental principles of morality, from a conviction that they are in accordance with the general sentiments of the community.

It is true that I do not seek the commendation bestowed on Sir F. Head for bringing men into his councils from the Liberal party, and telling them that they should enjoy only a partial confidence; thereby allowing them to retain their position as tribunes of the people in conjunction with the prestige of advisers of the Crown by enabling them to shirk responsibility for any acts of government which are unpopular. It is true that I have always said to my advisers, "while you continue my advisers you shall enjoy my unreserved confidence; and en revanche you shall be responsible for all acts of government."

But it is no less certain that there is not one of them who does not know that no inducement on earth would prevail with me to bring me to acquiesce in any measure which seemed to me repugnant to public morals, or Imperial interests; and I must say that, far from finding in my advisers a desire to entrap me into proceedings of which I might disapprove, I find a tendency constantly increasing to attach the utmost value to my opinion on all questions, local or general, that arise.

1i.e. Lord Elgin's rumoured recall by the new ministry under Lord Derby.

CLXX

ELGIN TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE

[Trans. T. Walrond, op. cit.]

Quebec, February 18, 1853.

Now that the bonds formed by commercial protection and the disposal of local offices are severed, it is very desirable that the prerogative of the Crown, as the fountain of honour, should be employed, in so far as this can properly be done, as a means of attaching the outlying parts of the empire to the throne. Of the soundness of this proposition as a general principle no doubt can, I presume, be entertained. It is not, indeed, always easy to apply it in these communities, where fortunes are precarious, the social system so much based on equality, and public services so generally mixed up with party conflicts. But it should never, in my opinion, be lost sight of, and advantage should be taken of all favourable opportunities to act upon it.

There are two principles which ought, I think, as a general rule to be attended to in the distribution of Imperial honours among colonists. Firstly, they should appear to emanate directly from the Crown, on the advice, if you will, of the Governors and Imperial Ministers, but not on the recommendation of the local executives. And, secondly, they should be conferred, as much as possible, on the eminent persons who are no longer actively engaged in political life. If these principles be neglected, such distinctions will, I fear, soon lose their value.

CLXXI

ELGIN TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

[Trans. T. Walrond, op. cit.]

March 26, 1853.

It is argued that, by the severance of the connection, British statesmen would be relieved of an onerous responsibility for colonial acts of which they cannot otherwise rid themselves. Is there not, however, some fallacy in this? If by conceding absolute independence the British Parliament can acquit itself of the obligation to impose its will upon the Colonists, in the matter, for instance, of a Church Establishment, can it not attain the same end by declaring that, as respects such local questions, the Colonists are free to judge for themselves? How can it be justifiable to adopt the former of these expedients, and sacriligious to act upon the latter?

The true policy, in my humble judgment, is to throw the whole weight of responsibility on those who exercise the real power, for, after all, the sense of responsibility is the best security against the abuse of power; and, as respects the connection, to act and speak on this hypothesis that there is nothing in it to check the development of healthy national life, in these young communities. I believe that this policy will be found to be not only the safest, but also (an important consideration in these days) the most economical.

C

CLXXII

ELGIN TO THE COLONIAL SECRETARY, SIR GEORGE GREY [Trans. T. Walrond, op. cit.]

Quebec, December 18, 1854.

I readily admit that the maintenance of the position and due influence of the Governor is one of the most critical problems that have to be solved in the adaptation of Parliamentary Government to the Colonial system: and that it is difficult to over-estimate the importance which attaches to its satisfactory solution. As the Imperial Government and Parliament gradually withdraw from legislative interference, and from the exercise of patronage in Colonial affairs, the office of Governor tends to become, in the most emphatic sense of the term, the link which connects the Mother Country and the Colony, and his influence the means by which harmony of action between the local and Imperial authorities is to be preserved. It is not, however, in my humble judgment, by evincing an axious desire to stretch to the utmost constitutional principles in his favour, but, on the contrary, by the frank acceptance of the conditions of the Parliamentry system, that this influence can be most surely extended and confirmed. Placed by his position above the strife of parties-holding office by a tenure less precarious than the ministers who surround him-having no political interests to serve but that of the community whose affairs he is appointed to administer-his opinion cannot fail, when all cause for suspicion and jealousy is removed, to have great weight in the Colonial Councils, while he is set at liberty to constitute himself in an especial manner the patron of those larger and higher interests-such interests, for example, as those of education, and of moral and material progress in all its branches-which, unlike the contests of party, unite instead of dividing the members of the body politic. The mention of such influences as an appreciable force in the administration of public affairs may provoke a sneer on the part of persons who have no faith in any appeal which is not addressed to the lowest motives of human conduct; but those who have juster views of our common nature, and who have seen influences that are purely moral wielded with judgment, will not be disposed to deny to them a high degree of efficacy.

CLXXIII

THE UNION ACT AMENDMENT ACT, 1848

(11 & 12 Victoria, c. 56.)

An Act to repeal so much of an Act of the Third and Fourth Years of Her present Majesty, to re-unite the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, as relates to the use of the English Language in Instruments relating to the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada.

14th August, 1848. Whereas by an Act' past in the session of Parliament held in the 3 and 4 Vict., third and fourth years of Her Present Majesty, intituled "An Act to re- c. 35. unite the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, and for the Government of Canada," it is amongst other things enacted that from and after the said reunion of the said two Provinces, all writs, proclamations, instruments for summoning and calling together the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, and for prorguing and dissolving the same, and all writs of summons and elections, and all writs and public instruments whatsoever relating to the said Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, or either of them, and all returns to such writs and instruments, and all journals, entries, and written or printed proceedings,

1 See No. CLIII.